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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
The essays which comprise The Federalist began ap-
pearing seriatim in The Independent Journal of New York 
October 27, 1787. Mostl of them were published in New York's 
Independent Journal and The New York Packet before they were 
issued in a collected edition. They were planned originally 
to convince voters in the special2 New York State Convention 
which was called to consider ratification of the proposed 
constitution agreed upon by the Philadelphia Convention Sep-
tember 17, 1787, that the proposed constitution should be 
ratified. It is doubtful that these essays exercised much 
influence upon the voters they were designed to persuade. 
Hamilton's debates in the New York Convention were a weighty 
influence. The influence of 'rhe Federalist would have been 
1. See Dawson, Art.(l863), xxiii, for a good account of the 
interruption of the publication of the essays serially 
in order that they might be published in book form. Es-
say Number 77 appeared April 2, 1788. After the publi-
cation of Essay Number 77 no more essays were published 
in newspapers until June. Essays 78-85 appeared serial-
ly in The Independent Journal of New York beginning on 
June 14 and ending on August 16. The first edition of 
the essays in book form was the M'Lean edition. Volume I 
was published March 22, ·1788 and Volume II was published 
May 28 of the same year. Essays 78-85, therefore, ap-
peared in the first collected edition before their 
appearance in The Independent Journal. 
2. See Article VII of the Constitution of the United States. 
2 
more largely felt in the process of ratification of the con-
stitution in New York had it not been that adoption of the 
new constitution was made certain by its ratification by ten 
statesl prior to a vote being taken in New York. 2 It was 
necessary that nine states ratify the constitution to assure 
its adoption.3 After the necessary number of states had rat-
ified the constitution to make its adoption sure the pamphlets 
which had been written for and against the constitution to 
persuade opinions were not widely read in the states where a 
vote on ratification had not yet been taken. However, Hamil-
ton in New York and Madison in Virginia made great use of 
The Federalist in their arguments in their respective State 
Conventions.4 
But the influence or lack of influence of The Federal-
ist in the New York State Convention during the summer of 
1788 is not a token either of its intrinsic value or of its 
nationwide influence. Almost simul.taneously with its publi-
cation, The Federalist was recognized5 as a work of rare 
quality on republican and federal government. In a letter 
to Madison, November 18, 1788, Jefferson pronounced The Fed-
The Constitution is reprinted in Bloom, SC, 66-76. This 
reprint is a photograph of the original. Any references 
in this study to the Constitution of the United States 
will be to this reprint. 
1. Bloom, sc, 87. Here is given the order in which the 
states ratified the constitution. 
2. Bloom, SC, 87. 
3. See Article VII of the Constitution of the United States. 
4. Adair, Art.(l944} , 235-236. 
5. Ford, Art.(l898), xxviii-xxix. 
eralist "the best commentary on the principles of govern-
ment which bas ever been written."l Bourne has said that 
it is universally regarded as the best American work in the 
field of political science. 2 These views are not uncommon. 
There is hardly a writing, if any, dealing extensively with 
our American system of government which does not have some-
thing laudatory to say about The Federalist. The Supreme · 
Court of the United States has . often3 used The Federalist 
as an authoritative interpretation of the constitution when 
matters of dispute have come before it. Nor has interest 
3 
in The Federalist been limited to the United States. It has 
been widely received abroad4 as a work of great merit in 
political science. 
One of the best estimates of The Federalist by a re-
cent American comes from the pen of Beard. Referring to The 
Federalist Beard writes: 
I first read the work more than fifty years 
ago and I have reread parts of it or all of 
it nearly every year since that original ex-
perience, finding myself astonished each time 
by the discovery of ideas and suggestions 
which I had previously overlooked or had fail-
1. ~uoted in Ford, Art.(l898), xxix. 
2. Bolirne, EHC, 113. . 1 
3. Lodge, Art.(l886), xliii. See Beloff, Art.(l948) , 
viii; xi, and references there cited. Also note Earle, 
Art.{l937), -xi. · 
4. Bourne, EHC, 159-162. Although EHC was published in 1901 
Bourne's treatment of "The Federalist Abroad" is the most · 
satisfactory one available. · since he has made this study, 
further examination of tbe influence of The Federa1ist 
outside the United States will form no part of the present 
ed to grasp in their full meaning.l 
These wards of Beard might well come from tbe pen of anyone 
who has given comparable study to The Federalist. 
4 
It is interesting, then, to observe that a book which 
did not fulfill the purpose for which it was written, and, 
indeed, was not written as a book, should become a classic 
in its field and that it should endure as a classic over a 
century and a half without receiving thorough exposition or 
critical treatment. The problem, therefore, of this disser-
tation arises obviously from these facts. 
1. The Statement of the Problem 
What is it that The Federalist says that has brought 
forth such wide acclaim? Acquaintance with the social phil-
osophy of The Federalist cannot be assumed. And in order 
clearly to present it a certain amount of exposition will be 
necessary but any exposition will be examined critically. 
The purpose of this study will be (1) to give a background, 
where possible, of some of the ideas contained in The Fed-
eralist~ and (2) to examine critically wbat is found to be 
its social philosophy. 
The Federalist may be understood to be two things: 
a broad and comprehensive discussion of the 
principles of government with reference to the 
situation of the American states and an able 
investigation. 
1. Beard, Art.{l948)1, vi-vii. 
exposition of the constitution under which the 
Unitid States have existed from 1789 to this 
day. 
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The primary interest in this study will be in the principles 
of social community found in The Federalist rather than in 
The Federalist as an interpretation or defense of tbe consti-
tution. This is not to be understood as an historical study. 
2. Text of The Federalist 
All editions of The Federalist do not contain the 
same text. Although the variations in text do not amount 
to a considerable change of meaning an explanation of a 
choice of a text is pertinent. 
The publishers of the first edit ion of The Federalist, 
J. & A. M'Lean, issued a statement January 1, 1788 announc-
ing that The Federalist would soon be published and would con-
tain corrections, additions and alterations by the author. 2 
The only noticeable change in the text of the M'Lean edition 
of The Federalist from the essays as they appeared in the news-
papers has to do with the numbering of the essays3 instead 
of the body of the text. Dawson writes of the first Volume 
or the M'Lean edition that the promised additions did not ap-
pear. The corrections and alterations were too trivial to 
1. Bassett, Art.(l921), xxxv. 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863), lvi. Dawson states that the 
"Prospectus" which he quotes was copied from the New 
York Daily Advertiser of Jan. 1, 1788. 
3. See below, 37. 
6 
receive notice.l With regard to the second Volume Dawson 
writes, "the 'additions' thereto, which had been promised 
in the Proposals, are very few in number, and possess no im-
portance whatever. n2 
Ford, on the other hand, places more emphasis on the 
changes which were made in the M'Lean edition. He states 
"there is not an essay in the collected edition of 1788" in 
which Hamil ton "did not make from ten_ to twenty verbal 
corrections. n3 And he refers to the M'Lean edition as being 
"revised by Hamilton."4 He claims that Hamilton is the author 
of Essay Number 56 on the basis that Hamilton inserted in this 
Essay in the first collected edition a paragraph "relating to 
military affairs. "5 Since Hamil ton would make no alterations 
or additions in any essay not his own, Ford assumes Hamilton 
to be the author. It is, however, difficult to reconcile the 
view that Hamilton would make no changes in any essay he did 
not know himself to have written with the view that Hamilton 
made a complete revision in the first collected edition of the 
essays as they had appeared in the newspapers. 6 
1. Dawson; Art.(l863); lvii. 4. Ford; Art.(l898), xl. 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863), lx~ 5. Ford, Art.(l898), xxxiii. 
3. Ford, Art. (1898), xxxi. 
6. In writing about the text of Tbe Federalist Ford was 
less cautious than he was in his endeavors which gain-
ed him acclaim as a reputable historian. He produces 
no evidence to support his claim that the M'Lean edition 
of The Federalist -underwent complete revision at the 
hands of Hamilton. As Dawson points out, Art.(l863), 
lvii-lx, the changes promised by the publisher were not 
made. There were only a few minor verbal corrections. 
According to Lodge, the M'Lean edit ion of The Fed-
eralist contained no "substantial textual change."1 Lodge 
also wrote that the insertion of a paragraph in to Essay 
Number 56 was made in the Hopkins edition of The Federalist 
which was :printed in 1802. 2 And it is only :probable that 
Hamilton made the insertion. Bourne observes3 in this 
7 
connection that when he wrote his article on "The Authorship 
of The Federalis t"4 he had accepted Lodge's view as correct. 
He is unconvinced that Ford makes a sure case for himself 
and even if an insertion was made into Essay Number 56 for 
the M'Lean edition of The Federalist it is by no means cer-
tain that Hamilton made the insertion without the approval 
of Madison. 
The preceding remarks give a picture of the beginning 
of the textual problems of The Federalist. The next stage of 
this development came with the pub lie a tion of the Hopkins 
The essays were written hurriedly and there w~s often 
no time for rereading. See Adair, Art.(l944) , 240-241. 
In view of the pressing circumstances under which the 
essays were written in order to meet tbe printer's dead-
line it is almost unbelievable that drastic revisions 
were unnecessary. There is no basis, however, for 
assuming that the M'Lean edition is not a reproduction 
or the original text. Since J. & A. M'Lean were pub-
lishers of The Independent Journal in New York in which 
the essays first appeared it is conceivable that on the 
basis of possessing the original manuscripts of the es-
says their edition is more original than the publication 
of the essays in newspaper form. But they are essential-
ly the same. 
1~ Lodge; Art~(l886); xlii. 
2. Lodge, ·Art.(l886), xxxviii. 
3 ~ Bourne; EHC, 154. · 
4. Bourne, Art.(l897) 1 , 443-460. 
edition in 1802. There is no dispute that changes were 
made in this edition. There is, however, unclarity as 
to who made the changes. Lodge writes: 
When the edition of 1802 ·was in ·preparation, 
Hamilton was asked to revise it, but declared, 
in the strongest terms, that the 'Federalist' 
must be printed as it was written, and he also 
insisted that full credit should be given to 
Mr. Jay and Mr. Madison in the preface for the 
excellence of their work. The edition was re-
vised, unquestionably, I think, as Mr. Dawson 
has shown, by William Coleman, the editor of 
tbe New York Evening Pos t .1 
8 
In a letter to John Hamilton, son of Alexander Hamil-
ton, Hopkins stated: 
In reply to your in~iries concerning the edition 
of the Federalist, Lsic? that I published in 1802 
(being the first octavo edition of the work), 
your father's attention was called to the subject 
through the urgent solicitude of two respectable 
professional gentlemen, both of whom have long 
since departed this life. Your father, it ap-
peared, did not regard -the work with much partial-
ity; but, nevertheless, consented to its republi-
cation on condition that it should undergo a 
careful rev~sion by one of the gentlemen above 
alluded to. . 
John Hamilton credited John Wells, "an eminent barrister 
of New York," with having made revisions and corrections 
for the Hopkins edition which also was, in his opinion, re-
vised by Hamilton.J 
1. Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxiv. 
2. Hamilton; Art.{l864); xci~xcii. 
J. Hamilton, Art.{l864), xci. John Wells edited the Will-
iams and Whiting edition of The Federalist published in 
1810. It is likely that Hamilton is confusing the Hop-
kins edition with the Williams and Whiting edition. The 
view that Hamilton's father made revisions and corrections 
Dawson adds a footnote in his treatment of tbe text 
of The Federalist which is intere sting in the present dis-
cussion. 
Hopkins, printer, said to me, 'I called upon 
Wtr. HLamilton7 for permission to reprint the 
Nos. of The Federalist. He intimated that 
they hardly deserved to be printed again; he 
said he would think of it, but that they must 
not be reproduced without his assent • ' Hop-
kins said 'I will present the proofs to you 
for correction.' Hamil ton said 'No, if re-
printed, it musf be exactly ~ they were writ-
ten • ' J • A • H • 
Dawson contends that none of the authors of The Federalist 
would have made revisions of the original text nor author-
ized others to do so, and concludes that corrections in the 
Hopkins edit ion are un trustworthy. 2 Although there is no 
9 
way of knowing, he produces good reasons for suspecting that 
Coleman edited the Hopkins edition and made the alterations.3 
It seems precarious to hold that Hamilton made revisions in 
tbe Hopkins edition. 
The 1810 edition of The Federalist by Williams and 
Whiting was in large measure a reprint of the Hopkins edition 
of 1802. There were few additional textual changes in this 
1810 edition although "the text was said to have had the 
benefit of the marginal notes mde by Hamil ton in his own 
in the -Hopkins edition is without substantial proof. 
1. Dawson, Art.(l863), lxxii. Dawson adds the following to 
the above quotation: "Memorandum in Hon. James A. Hamil-
ton's copy of the work, communicated to the Editor of 
this edition, by that gentleman, Feb. 10, 1862." 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863), lxxi. J. Dawson, Art. (1863), lxx-lxxi. 
copy."1 The new feature of this edition is the use the 
editor makes of his knowledge concerning the authorship 
of the essays. An author's name for the first time is 
10 
ascribed to each essay. This account of authorship cor-
responds with the list Hamilton deposited in Judge Benson's 
office a day or two2 before his fatal duel with Burr with 
the exception that Essay Number 54, as well as Essay Number 
64 is given to Hamilton. 
The first edition of The Federalist in which Madison 
had an editorial part was the Gideon edition which was pub-
1. Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxviii. 
2. Hamilton, Art.(l864), xcvi-xcvii, and Adair, Art.(l944) 1 , 
102, state that Hamilton visited Judge Benson's office 
two days before his duel with Burr and left his account 
of the author ship of the individual essays of The Fed-
eralist. Dawson, Art.(l863), xxvi, and Lodge, Art.(l886), 
xxiv, claim Hamilton's visit was the day before he met 
his death. Jud ge Benson was out of town when Hamil ton 
made his call to see him. After nervously walking 
around the office Hamilton stopped in front of a book-
case and took out a volume of Pliny and hid an account 
of the author ship of the individual essays of The Fed-
eralist. Upon his return to his office Benson's 
attention was called to this episode by his nephew, 
Robert Benson, who was present when Hamilton's visit 
was made. Benson made a copy of Hamilton's list and 
deposited the original in the New Y0 rk Public Library. 
Coleman examined it in the New Yorl<: Publ'ic- Library in 
1818 but sometime afterward it was purloined. For clear 
accounts of Hamilton's visit to Benson's office see 
Dawson, Art.(l863), xxvi; Lodge, Art.(l886), :xxv-xxvi; 
Hruailton, Art.(l864), xcvi-xcvii. The Benson list 
follows and may be found in the sources given immediate-
1 y above • "Nos • 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 54 , by J • Nos • 10 , 14 , 3 7 , 
to 48 inclusive, M. Nos. 18, 19, 20, M. & H. jointly. 
All the others by H." Although there has been much dis-
pute about the accuracy of Hamilton's list there has 
never been any dispute that this is an account of the 
authorship of the individual essays of The Federalist 
which he gave. 
11 
lished in 1818. The publishers made the claim1 that the es-
says written by Madison ha d been corrected by himself. It 
did have as Lod ge points out "the notes made by him on his 
own essays." 2 This edition wa s the first one in which Madi-
son's account of the authorship of the essays appeared. The 
Gideon copyright wa s purchased by Glazier & Co., Hallowell, 
Maine, and beginning with an edition in 1826 this company is-
sued a number of editions. But all these editions followed 
closely the text of the Gideon edition of 1818. 
Dawson made a thorough study of The Federalist and 
found the text of existing editions to be corrupted.) He 
chose for hir~elf the task of producing an edition which 
would agree with the original text . This edition wa s pub-
lished in 1863 by Charles Scribner. Since the publication 
of Dawson's edition others4 have seen the wisdom of follow-
ing the original text . As Lod ge so aptly ·writes, "What we 
desire noN is not Madison's arguments in the pbr ase s which 
he preferred in 1818, but in the words which he actually used 
1. Dawson, Art.(l863), lxxviii. 
2. Lodge, Art~(l886), xxix. 
3. Dawson, Art.(l863), vi. 
4. Lodge's first edition of The Federalist was published 
in 1886 and, following Dawson's edit1on, it reverted to 
the original text. SubseQuent publications of the Lodge 
edition have not varied from this procedure. The Sesqui-
centennial Edit ion of The ~-Federalis t published by the 
National Home Library Foundation follows the original 
text. The Modern Library edition is copied from the 
plates used in printing this SesQuicentennial Edition. 
There are more editions of The Federalist which follow 
in 1787 and 1788. "1 Lodge well might have added the names 
of Hamilton and Jay. 
12 
Only a text which follows that of the original essays 
is suitable for a study of the thought contained in The Fed-
eralist. It is unlikely that any of the authors of the es-
says would have writ ten The Federalist had they undertaken 
to write a book on the principles of government at a time be-
fore or after the particular time in which the essays were 
written. The Federalist was wr itten under pressing circum-
stances , and for a particular purpose. The circumstances were 
the abolishnEnt of an inadequate form of national goverilii£nt 
and the adoption of one that was adequate. And the purpose 
was to persuade voters to adopt the new constitution. This 
situat ion necessitated compromise and the best possible exer-
cise of human reason. The Federalist possesses the quality 
that it does largely because it is a crisis doc um.ent. Men 
often say the noblest things during crucial moments. The Fed-
eralist can be properly understood only as it wa s originally 
written. The text, therefore, which has been chosen for this 
study is the Sesquicentennial Edition as published by The 
Mod ern Library. 
3. Au thor ship of The Federalist 
This is a continuation of the discussion of the text 
the original text but these enumerated will indicate a 
preference for the original. 
1. Lodge, Art.(l886), xliv. 
13 
of The Ji,ederalist. But due to the considerable controversy 
which has raged over the authorship of individual essays it 
seems more satisfactory to treat the authorship separately. 
In the present discussion the aim will be not to enter the 
controversy beyond giving a reason for adopting a point of 
view. 
The essays which comprise The Federalist were first 
written under the name "Publius." That Hamilton, Madison, 
and Jay were the authors was a well guarded secret. Just 
how soon the real authorship was known no one can say. The 
authors confided to friends that they had participated joint-
ly in writing the essays. 1 It is likely that before the 
final essay had been written Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were 
known by a few close acquaintances to be the authors. Yet 
this was not generally knovm until after ratification of the 
constitution was complete. As Adair points out, 2 Madison 
was a foreigner to New Yorkers, and Jay and Hamilton were 
outsiders to the Virginians. Had it been generally known 
who the authors of The Federalist were during the time of 
ratification of the constitution it would have exerted less 
influence in the r a tifying conventions than it actually did. 
Can the- author ship of the individual essays be ac-
curately assigned to one or another of the three authors? 
1. 
2. 
Ada1r, Art.(l944) 2 , 236-238. The writer is indebted to 
Adair for directing attention to the following sources: 
Lod ge (ed.), WAH, I X, 425; Hunt (ed.), li'JJM , V, 55; Hunt 
(ed.), WJ11, V, 61~ Hunt - (ed.), WJM, V, 246. 
Adair, Art.(l944) , 236. 
14 
Which did Hamil ton write? Which did J ay write? Which did 
Madison -vvrite? 
That Jay wrote Essays Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 the 
following will indicate there is no longer any doubt. There 
wa s a question for a while with regard to whether Jay ¥ITote 
Es say Number 54 or 64. In the famous Benson list Hamilton 
credited Jay with -vvriting Number 54 and himself Number 64. 
But the discovery in Jay's possession in his own handwriting 
of the manuscript of Essay Number 64 along with the other es-
says which he wrote dispelled any doubt regarding his ident-
ity as its author. This external evidence is corroborated 
by Madison's affirmation that Jay wrote Essay Number 64. 
Hamilton's staunchest supporters did not long try to defend 
the pa rt of the Benson list which credited Jay with writing 
Essay Number 54 and Hamilton with writing Number 64. Since 
Jay wrote only Essays Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64, he is out 
of the controversy concerning authorship. 
The major part of the controversy over the authorship 
of the individual essays has been centered on Essays Numbers 
18, 19, and 20; 49-58 inclusive; and Numbers 62 and 63. Did 
Hamilton, or Madison write them? Friends of Hamilton made a 
case that Hamilton was the author, which 1,-.;as, for the most 
part, uncontested until the publication of Delaplaine's Re-
pository of the Lives and Portraits of Distinguished Ameri-
cans in 1816. In this workl extragavant claims were made 
1. Delaplaine, RLPDA, I, 69-70. 
15 
for Hamil ton with wh ich friends of Madison took issue. The 
controversy which ensued has been dealt vvi th by Lod ge, Ham-
ilton, Ford, Dawson, Bourne, and Adair.l 
Hamilton's account of the authorship of tre individ-
ual essays which comprise The Federalist is the Benson list. 
Madison's acc ount is cont a ined in the attribution of author-
ship in the Gideon edition of The Federalist. It might be 
noted that the authorship of the individual essays of The 
Federalist as given in the Gideon edition coincides exa ctly 
with the listing of au thor ship which Madison made as early 
as 18162 in the copy of The Federalist owned by Richard Rush. 
Rush wa s Attorney General from 1814 to 1817 and was a close 
friend of Madison, then president. Our present concern is 
to decide on the accuracy of the claims to authorship by Ham-
ilton and Madison of the individual essays of The Federalist 
about which there is dispute. It should be borne in mind 
tha t these essays are Numbers 18, 19, and 20; 49-58 inclusive; 
and Numbers 62 and 63. In the Benson list Hamil ton claired 
joint authorship with Madison with regard to Essays 18, 19, 
and 20. Essays 49-58 inclusive, and Essays 62 and 63 he 
c1airne d for himse1 f. Madison, on the other hand, in the Gid-
1. Lodge, Art.(1886), xxiii-x1ii; Hamilton, A~t.(l864), 
1xxxv-cxxxviii; Ford, Art.(1897), 675-68f; Dawson, 
Art.(1863), xxvi-fvi; Bourne, Art~(1897) , 44~-460; 
Adair, Art.(l944) ; 97-121; Adair, Art.(1944) , 235-264. 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863), xli. Dawson reproduces a letter 
received from Rush's son in which this information · is 
verified. 
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eon edition, claimed all these essays as his own. 
~uite aside from what should lend any credibility 
to either of these two claims is the cycle of popularity 
of Hamilton and Madison. Yet, though on the surface ir-
relevant, an adequate appraisal of the claims by Hamilton 
and Madison to authorship of individual essays of The Fed-
eralist cannot be made without some attention being given 
to their respective popularity in different periods of 
P~erican history.1 It is hard to believe that scholarship 
with regard to a literary problem, or any problem, could 
have been persuaded by historical popularity. But this was 
for a long time the case in dealing with the respective 
claims of Hamilton and Madison. 
From the time Madison made his claim to his part in 
the authorship of The Federalist in the Gideon edition of 
1818 until the Civil War his account of the authorship was 
uncontested. Many editions of The Federalist appeared be-
tween 1818 and the outbreak of the Civil War and none of 
them offered any rebuttal to Madison's account of author-
ship. During this period no mention was made of the Benson 
list and it was apparently discredited. After the Civil War 
the name of Hamil ton rose to great popularity and the Benson 
list took on a revived persuasiveness among writers and his-
torians.2 While either Hamilton or Madison was popular the 
1. This idea fs introduced to me by Adair. See Adair, 
Art.(l944 ) ' 106-112. 
2. Lcx:lge, Art.(l886}, xxiii-xlii; :Ford, Art.(l897), 
other was unpopular. 
This alternating sequence of belief and dis-
belief that marks the controversy is direct-
ly correlated with the see-saw of prestige 
between these two interpreters of the Consti-
tution, depending upon whether agrarian or 
capitalistic interesrs were politically domi-
nant in the country. 
Madison teamed with Jefferson to lead the Republicans who 
were the spokesmen for agrarian democracy. Hamilton was 
the leader of the Federalist party which represented the 
financial interests of the country. Under the leadership 
and popularity of Jefferson and Madison it became increas-
ingly difficult to assimilate the figure of Hamilton in 
the formation and operation of the new government. Hamil-
ton's 
uncompromising stand in favor of a moneyed 
aristocracy and a hierarchial [Sic? society, 
was anathema to a generation of democratic 
enthusiasts that was creating its heroes2in the image of Old Hickory and Tippecanoe. 
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De Tocqueville described the American political s.cene 
during the time of Madison's extreme popular! ty in the fol-
lowing way: 
1. 
2. 
When the democratic party got the ·upper hand, 
it took exclusive possession of the conduct of 
affairs, and from that time the laws and the 
customs of roc iety have been adapted to its 
caprices. At the present day the more affluent 
classes of society are so entirely removed from 
the direction of political affairs in the 
United States, that wealth, far from conferring 
675-682; Hamilton1 Art.{l864), lxxxv-cxxxviii. Adair, Art.{l944) 1 , 106. Adair, Art. {1944) , 107. 
a right to the exercise of power, is rather an 
obstacle than a means of obtaining it ••• They 
submit to this state of things as an irremed-
iable evil, but they are careful not to show 
that they are galled by its continuance; it is 
even not uncommon to hear them laud the de-
lights of a republican government, and the ad-
vantages of democratic institutions when they 
are in public .1 
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Madison lived until 1836. For many years he was the 
lone survivor of the Philadelphia Convention. By the end of 
his life he had assumed the character of a "holy national 
relic. n 2 He represented the classic republicanism of the 
birth of the nation. In a letter to Edward Everett in Oc-
tober, 1830, Madison had to deny that he had written the 
greater part of The Federalist. "You have erred in stating 
that I wrote the greatest parts of the Federalist LSic7. A 
greater number of the papers were written by Col. Hamilton, 
as will be seen by ••• Gideon. "J In the face of such popular 
approval of Madison, no one ventured to question Madison's 
account of the authorship of The Federalist and grant approval 
to the Benson list. 
The attitude of reverence for Madison ended with the 
Civil War. After the war the following was the case. 
The United States had a new pattern of economic 
life an9. a new political party with a novel 
scheme of historical values. .Almost at once 
publicists and historians began the develop-
ment of a new cult of the Constitution which 
necessitated a reinterpretation and deflation 
1. De Tocqueville, DIA, 175. 
2. Adair, Art.{l944)1, 108. 
3. Rives { ed. ) , LOV'tM:, IV, 116. 
of Madison's contribution to the writing and 
ratification of that document.l 
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:Even before the Civil War was over, Hamil ton's son made the 
claim2 that his father was author of the disputed essays of 
The Federalist. John Hamilton's admiration for his father 
and his careless handling of evidence militated against his 
arguments in behalf of his father. And, too, his edition of 
The Federalist, published in 1864, did not allow enough time 
for the popularity of Madison to be eclipsed by that of his 
father. 
But by 1886 the time was ripe for a new prophet of 
the Benson list to emerge, and this prophet emerged in the 
person of Lodge. Lodge's case for Hamilton met with approval 
far out of proportion to its merit. It was uncontested un-
til tb:l appearance of Bourne's article3 in the American His-
torical Review in 1897 on "The Authorship of The Federalist." 
As Adair points out concerning Lodge's discussion4 of the 
authorship of The Federalist: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
:Examined by scholarly standards, or indeed by 
the light of common sense, he is found guilty 
of self-contradiction, distortion of his data, 
and sins of documentary omission, all of which 
further illustrate the curious way in which 
even a scholar's integrity may be swept into 
strong currents of popular sentiment. Only 
the burgeoning strength of tbe pro-Hamilton 
intellectual current can explain why the weak-
ness of Lodge's case for the New Yorker was 
Adair, P~t.(l944) 1 109. 
Hamilton, Art.(l86t), lxxxv-cxxxviii. 
Bourne, Art.(l897) , 443-460. 
Lodge, Art.(l886), xxiii-xlii. 
not at once detected.l 
When Lodge's edit ion of The Federalist was republished in 
1902 he ignored completely the findings of Bourne and al-
lowed his introductory essay in which he discussed the 
authorship of The Federalist to be reprinted as it was 
written in 1886. 
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Lodge presented three reasons for leaning toward 
Hamilton in the controversy concerning the disputed author-
ship of The Federalist. First2 he thought that Madison 
should have disagreed with the Benson list when it appeared. 
Failure of Madison to do this cast doubt, in the opinion of 
Lodge, on Madison's counter-claims made at a later time. 
But use was not made of the Benson list until the publica-
tion of the Williams and Whiting edition of The Federalist 
in 1810. At this time Madison was president and deeply in-
volved in politics. It would have been politically unwise 
for -him to take is sue with the deceased Hamilton at this 
time. Had Madison entered this controversy during his ten-
ure of office as president, his action would have been ex-
ploited for partisan purposes. 
There is not the slightest bit of evidence to indi-
cate that either Hamilton or Madison cared to get involved 
in a dispute over the authorship of individual essays of The 
Federalist. In explaining to Hamilton's son in 1847 the cir-
1. Adair, Art.(l944) 1 , 112. 
2. Lodge, Art.(l866), xxx-xxxiii. 
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cumstances surrounding the publication of the Hopkins edi-
tion of The Federalist, Hopkins stated that he had adver-
tised that "the name of the writer should be prefixed to each 
number; but this, as I was told, met with your father's de-
cided disapprobation."1 Lodge ignores this fact completely. 
With regard to the notes he kept on the secret debates of the 
Philadelphia Convention Madison wrote: 
Posthumous publication as to others as well 
as myself may be most delicate, and most 
useful also •••• As no personal or party views 
can then be imputed, they will be ~ead with 
less of personal or party feeling. 
The conditions concerning the notes which Madison kept of the 
Philadelphia Convention which made anonymity preferable were 
comparable to those concerning The Federalist. 
It was roughly fifteen years after it was learned who 
the authors of The Federalist were before the Benson list was 
produced. And then five years more passed before use was made 
of it in the Williams and Whiting edition of The Federalist. 
No one can say how many times both Hamilton and Madison were 
asked by their respective followers to indicate which of the 
essays they had written. Neither can it be accurately stated 
how many times they gave their claims in secrecy to friends. 
There was no public knowledge as to which of the essays had 
been written by Hamilton and which by Madison until the contro-
versy was precipitated by the appearance of the Be-nson list. 
1. Hamilton, Art.(l864), xcii. 
2. Rives (ed.), LO~f.M , III, 549· 
The truth of the matter is that both Hamilton and Madison 
regretted being identified with certain of the essays. 
Hamilton, for example, stated: 
It may safely be received as an axiom in our 
political system, that the State governments 
will, in all possible contingencies, afford 
complete security against invasions of the pub-
lic liberty by the national authority.! 
In another instance Hamilton wrote the following. 
Independent of parties in the national legis-
lature itself, as often as the period of discus-
sion arrived, the State legislatures, who will 
always be not only vigilant but suspicious and 
jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens 
against encroachments from the federal govern-
ment, will constantly have their attention awake 
to the conduct of the national rulers, and will 
be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, 
to sound the alBrm to the people, and not only 
to be the VOICE, ~ut, if necessary, the ARM of 
their discontent. 
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This view was against Hamilton's position in this matter in 
his entire public record. It can only be understood here as 
a special plea for a constitution yet unratified and not as 
a commentary on an established constitution. Adair directs 
our attention to the fact that, 
When the legislature of Virginia in 1790 re-
monstrated against the assumption of State 
debts, Hamilton wrote to Chief Justice Jay: 
'This is the first symptom of a spirit which 
1. FED(28), 174. All quotations from The Federalist will 
be indicated in footnotes with the form here used. The 
number within parentheses is the number of the essay 
from which the quotation is made. Unless otherwise 
noted the page number is the page on which the quo-
tation can be located in The Modern Library edition 
of The Federalist. · 
2. FED(26), 163-164. 
must eit~r be killed or will kill the Consti-
tution.' 
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So Hamilton had good reason to tell Hopkins in 1802 that he 
wanted no names of authors prefixed to the individual es-
says of The Federalist. 
Hamilton was aware that Madison was in the same po-
sition as was he. Madison had ·written in his explanation of 
the "necessary and proper clause:" 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or 
in reason, than that wherever the end is required, 
the means are authorized; wherever a general power 
to do a thing is given, every parti~ular power 
necessary for doing it is included. 
When Hamil ton Ill3.de use of this argument in the creation of 
the National Bank, "and then used the bank both to break 
down the separation of powers between Congress and the Execu-
tive, and to weaken the division of authority between the 
states and the national government, n3 Madison wished that he 
bad omitted writing his explanation of the "necessary and 
proper clause. n4 Madison developed a s trio t cons true ti on 
theory of the constitution as an argument against his "axiom," 
but when Marshall used this "axiom" in Mc'Culloch vs. Mary-
l and to shatter Madison's strict construction theory, Madi-
son was further embarrassed.5 With the foregoing said it is 
possible to understand why Madison did not care to enter the 
1. Adair, Art.(l944) 1 , lOln. 
2. FED(44), 294. 
3. Adair, Art.(l944) 1 , 101. 
4• Rives (ed.), LOvVM , III, 143• 
5. Rives (ed.), LOWI\1 , III, 143. 
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controversy over the authorship of The Federalist. Especial-
lywas this true during his tenure of office as pr esident. 
Lodge did not consider these facts . He simply ~ccused Madi-
son of serious errorl in not taking issue with the Benson 
list imm.edia tely upon its appearance and reasoned that Madi-
son 's counter-claims made at a later time were thereby weak-
ene d. 
As his second point against Madison's account of the 
authorship of The Federalist, Lodge accused lv1adison of making 
an appeal to internal evidence2 and concluded this would not 
have been done by a man who had anything other than memory to 
rely upon. He citesJ as his source of information a letter 
which Madison wrote to J. K. Paulding in April, 18Jl. It is 
strange that Lodge could draw the conclusion he did from read-
ing this letter. Madison stated that his account of author-
ship as given to Gideon "if erroneous, could not be ascribed 
to a lapse of memory." If there were errors, they were due to 
a "lack of veracity." The claims he made for himself, he said, 
were "communicated by me at an early date to a particula r 
friend, and finally to Mr. Gideon."4 Lodge ignored this in-
formation. 
In reply to a letter from Walsh in 1819 Madison as-
serted: 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4· 
Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxi. 
Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxi-xxxii. 
Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxi. 
Rives (ed.), LOWM, IV, 176. 
I take the liberty of remarking, independent 
of any internal evidence that may be discern-
ible, the inaccuracy of Mr. Hamilton's memory ••• 
If I have any interest in proving the falli-
bility of Mr. Hamilton's memory, it is not that 
the authorship is of itself a point deserving 
the solicitude of either of the parties; but 
because I had, at the request of a confidential 
friend or two, communicated a list of the num-
bers in that publication, with the names of 
the writers annexed, at a time and under the 
circumstances depriving me of a plea for so 
great a mi~take in a slip of the memory or 
attention. 
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Lodge did not consider this information in stating his con-
tention that Madison's account of the authorship of the es-
says was produced from memory. 
In making his third point against Madison, Lodge ad-
mitted2 that Hamilton's account was also from memory. He 
then proceeded to show that Hamilton's memory was superior 
to Madison•s.3 In order to do this Lodge merely disquali-
fied everything as relevant except the Benson list.4 Two 
anonymous accounts of the authorship of the individual es-
says ~peared in 1817 in reply to Delaplaine and were signed 
by "Corrector. u5 The information given in these accounts 
purported to have come from Madison. Since they contained 
slight variations, Lodge used them to demonstrate that the 
Madison lists contained more errors than the Benson list and 
concluded that by a mathematical examination Hamilton's mem-
1. Rives (ed.), LOWM, III, 126. 
2. Lodge, Art.{l886), xxxii. 
3. Lodge, Art.(l886), xxix-xxxiii. 
4. Lodge, Art.(l886) xxx. 
5. Dawson, Art.(l863~, xxx-xxxiii. 
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ory was proven superior to Madison's. Lodge did not place 
importance in the facts that Madison carefully went through 
Rush's copy of The Federalist and marked the initials of the 
author to each essay; that Madison publicly affirmed the 
accuracy of the Gideon account; and that the Rush and Gideon 
accounts of the authorship are identical. Bourne and Adair 
refute1 Lodge's mathematical argument by showing that he ig-
nores relevant facts and descends to a curious ~evel of 
scholarship. One can only say that Lodge's acceptance of 
the popularity of Hamilton in the 1880's coupled with his 
admiration for Hamilton exceeded his regard for facts in his 
discussion of the authorship of The Federalist. 
Dawson, in 1863, gave a brilliant reproduction of the 
claims and counter-claims of Hamilton and Madison and the 
friends of these two. 2 His was a thorough analysis of the 
literature which had been written on this subject. But Daw-
son did not take sides. He assembled what were apparently 
all available facts and left it to the reader of his work to 
decide for himself the truth of the dispute. Yet it is dif-
ficult to understand how Dawson's work could be read and the 
material which he produces ignored. Lodge did just this.3 
Almost accidentally in 1897 Bourne entered the contro-
versy over the disputed authorship of The Federalist. There 
is no available information to indicate that Bourne was 
1. Bourne, Art.(l897) 1 , 444-446; Adair, Art.(l944) 1 , 114-116. 
2. Dawson, Art.{l863), ix-lxxxviii. 
3. Lodge, Art.(l886), xxiii-xlii. 
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ever interested in this controversy before his preparation 
of a paper in 1896 on "The Use of H~story Made by the Fram-
ers of the Constitution" to be read before a m3eting of the 
American Historical Association. 1 Bourne examined2 Madison's 
research memorandum entitled, "Notes of Ancient and Modern 
Confederacies," and discovered that Essays Numbers 18, 19, 
and 20 were Madison's reae.arch in literary form. Madison 
cla irne d these Essays as his own in Rush's copy of The Fed-
eralist. But Lodge stated3 that Madison had held in the 
Gideon edition that they were joint products of Madison and 
Hamilton. Madison made no such claim as Lodge contends. 
Madison claimed himself as author in the Gideon account and 
added the following note to Essay Number 18 in the Gideon 
edition. 
The subject of this and the following Numbers 
happened to be taken up by both Mr. H/8milton7 
and Mr. Mffidison7. What had been prepared by 
Mr. H~amilton7; who had entered more briefly in-
to the subject, was left to Mr. Mffidison7, on 
its appearing that the latter was engaged upon 
it, with larger materials, and with a view to a 
more precise delineation, and from the pen ot 
the latter the several papers went to press. 
The interest Bourne developed in writing his paper on 
"The Use of History Made by the Framers of the Constitution" 
led him to write in 1897 his classic article on "The Author-
ship of the Federalist."5 Bourne discussed further in the 
1. Bourne; Art.(l896}, 223-228. 
2. Bourne, Art.(l896), 226. 
3. Lodge, Art.(l886}, xxx. 
4. FED(l8), 94. Gide£n edition. 
5. Bourne, Art.(l897} , 443-460. 
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latter article Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20.1 He found 
what will become clear to anyone who reads these Essays and 
then reads Madison's research memorandum, 2 that there is 
very little Hamilton material, if any, in Essays Numbers 18, 
19, and 20. Bourne asserts with reference to Essay Number 
20: 
Fully nine-tenths of it is drawn from Madison's 
own abstract of Sir William Temple's Observations 
upon the United Provinces and of Felice's Code 
de 1 'Human it e. This can be verified by any one 
in a few minutes by comparing No. jO with pp.302-
309 of Madison's Writings, Vol. 1. 
With Essays Numbers 18 and 19 the case is similar a1-
though, as Bourne points out, they were not drawn from as few 
sources as Number 20.4 
After a .... comparison of these numbers with Madi-
son's 'Notes on Confederacies' no editor can 
have any excuse for assigning these numbers to 
'Hamilton and Madison,' as has been uniformly 
done by Hamiltonian editors since 1810. It · 
should at least read, 'Madison and Hamilton,' 
although there seems to be no good reason why 
the exact and truthful course of the Gideon 5 editions should not be followed in the future. 
Bourne's discovery with regard to Essays Numbers 18, 
19, and 20 encouraged him to a consideration of the remain-
der of the disputed Essays: Numbers 49-58 inclusive, and · 
Numbers 62 and 63. What Bourne does is to select passages 
from these Essays and then to indicate in parallel columns 
1. Bourne, Art•(l897) 1 , 444-445. 
2. Rives (ed.), LOlNM ,1I, 293-315. 3. Bourne , Art. ( 1897) 1 ; 445. 4. Bourne, Art.(l897) 1 ; 445. 5. Bourne, Art.(l897) , 445. 
similar reasoning from writings of Madison before The Fed-
eralist was written.1 He concludes on the basis of this 
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comparison that Madison's account of the authorship of The 
Federalist as published by Gideon is accurate.2 This study 
of Bourne has never been refuted, and it seems to me that 
his findings are unanswerable. 
To date the only attempted answer to Bourne was made 
by Ford in 1897.3 This reply by Ford was made within three 
months after the appearance of Bourne's article. Ford's 
conclusion was that the Benson list gave the most accurate 
version of the authorship_of The F~deralist. To reach this 
opinion he appealed to some of Lod ge's untenable arguments.4 
He discounted the internal evidence unearthed by Bourne by 
st a ting5 that men in the same age would naturally have sim-
il ar ideas and what Hamilton and Madison thought was irrel-
evant as a clue to authorship. The pe ak of Ford's argument 
can be seen in the f ol lowing remark on internal evidence. 
Professor Bourne, by pa r allel columns, cites 
extracts to prove that Madison wrote the 
d i spu ted number. But would i t no t be as 
good ev idence if he quoted the paraphrasing 
of Niontesquieu in The Federalist to prove 6 that ' Publius' wrote the Espr1t des Lois? 
Bourne replied? immediate~y to Ford's article and 
a ccur ately called attention to the fact tha t i n ternal evi -
1. Bourne, Art.(l897)i, 448-460. 
2 . Bourn e, Art.(l897) , 459-460. 
J. Ford, Art.(l897), 675-682 . 
4 . Ford, Art.(l897), 676- 679. 
5. Ford, Art.(l897), 675-
676. 
6 . Ford, Art.(l897), ~76. 
7. Bourne, Art.(l897) , 
682-687. 
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dence "may be applied in a rash or an ignorant fashion, but 
it must be met point by point. nl Ford did not meet any of 
Bourne's findings. Evidently Ford still was unconvinced after 
Bourne's reply, for in 1898 he reproduced his article as part 
of his "Introduc tion" 2 to the edition of The Federalist which 
he edited. 
The controversy over the disputed authorship of The 
Federalist was not entered into again until the publication 
of Adair's two articles on this subject in 1944.3 In the 
meantime various editions of The Federalist appeared which 
ascribed joint authorship to all of the disputed essays. 
There has been no reason for assigning joint authorship to 
the disputed essays other than a refusal to produce reasons 
for taking sides. The Heritage Press of New York published 
an edition of The Federalist in 1945 in which the oorrect 
attribution of authorship was given. 
Adair enters more thoroughly in to the controversy than 
any of his predecessors. His treatment of the subject is 
careful and scholarly. Similar to Bourne's, Adair's study 
is unbiased and unswayed by either the popularity of Hamil-
ton or Madison. Of Bourne' s account of tbe au thor ·ship Adair 
writes: 
An examination of Bourne's monograph shows that 
he did not exaggerate when he claimed that a 
substantial portion of the disputed essays ac-
1. Bourne, Art.(l897) 2 , 683. 
2. Ford, Art.(l898) xxix-xxxix. 
3. Adair, Art.(l944)1 , 97-121; Adair, Art.{1944) 2 , 235-264. 
tually duplicated Madison's pre-convention 
writing. If Bourne had carefUlly checked the 
Debates in the Convention he could have dis-
covered even more confirmatory material.l 
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Adair presents much of this additional and confirma-
tory material. 2 Like Bourne he indicates how it coincides 
with the content of the disputed essays. He further shows 
that none of the essays could have been written jointly in 
view of the fact that time was so pressing that the indi-
vidual authors seldom had time to re-read what they had 
written.3 Neither could Hamilton nor Madison have written 
the amount that they did if it had not been for the fact 
tba t they were able to dr·aw upon what they had !written be-
fore their undertaking to write The Federalist.4 Adair 
makes use5 of the pre-Federalist writings of Hamilton and 
Madison to present his case. 
Another point Adair makes which seems to be a highly 
important bit of external evidence is Madison's stay in New 
York through February of 1897. This was the time when the 
disputed Essays Numbers 49-58 inclusive, and Numbers 62 and 
63 were being written and published. The election of dele-
gates to the ratifying convention in Virginia was scheduled 
for early March, and Madison's friends6 feared that a speedy 
return home was necessary to assure his election. Neverthe-
1. Adair, Art. (1944)~, ll?n. 
2. Adair, Art.(l944)2; 235-264. 
3. Adair, Art.(l944) 2 , 240-241. 4· Adair; Art • ( 19 44) 2 ' 240-262. 
5. Adair; Art. ( 1944) 2; 240-262. 
6. Adair, Art. ( 1944) , 252. 
less Madison stayed in New York. Madison's friend William 
Moore wrote: 
You know the disadvantage of being absent at 
elections ••• I must therefore entreat and con-
jure you---nay command you if it were in my 
power---to be here in February, or the first 
of March next. Pray don't disappoint the wish-
es of your friends, and many others, who are 
wavering on the Constitution, and anxiously 
awaiting for an explanation from you.l 
Madison remained in New York until March 4 and ar-
rived home just one day prior to the election in Virginia. 
Fortunately, he was elected to the ratifying convention. 
But as Adair points out: 
If one accepts the hypothesis that Madison 
stopped writing as 'Publius' after No. 48, 
which was published February 1, there is no 
explanation of his risky policy of staying 
in New York until March 4. For it was a risk 
to allow himself only one day to spare be-
fore the election. It should be remembered 
that a 300 mile winter trip in 18th century 
America was an enterprise fraught ~ith the 
possibility of delaying accidents. 
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Adair is convinced "that James Madison undoubtedly wrote 
every number he claimed in the Gideon list,"3 and that Lodge 
and Ford in their undertaking to establish Hamilton as the 
author of the disputed essays, 
1. 
2. 
3~ 
4. 
passionately proceeded to build their elabo-
rate structure of specious scholarship as a 
monument to a man who did not in the least 
care to be remembered as 'Publius.'4 
Quoted in Adair, Art.(l944) 2 , 252-253. 
LO~ , · II, 549. 2 · Ada1r, Art.(l944) 1 ; 253. Adair; Art.(l944) 2 ; 122~ Adair, Art.(l944) , 264. 
See Rives (ed.), 
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It seems to me unnecessary to ignore the dispute over 
the authorship of The Federalist by assigning joint author-
ship to the disputed essays. There appears to me to be ample 
evidence to enable one to conclude that Madison wrote the dis-
puted essays. And it would be unfair to Madison in the face 
of the evidence not to assign him the authorship. In this 
study, then, it will be held that Madison wrote Essays Num-
bers 18, 19, and 20; 49-58 inclusive; and 62 and 63. 
As a reflection on the foregoing discussion of the 
authorship of The Federalist it will be well to consider 
further two pointed questions. Which of the two, Hamilton 
or Madison, had the superior memory? And, was there collab-
oration among the authors in writing The Federalist? 
The answer to the question of the reliability of the 
memory of Hamilton and Madison with regard to the authorship 
of The Federalist seems clear. Hamilton made no claims for 
the accuracy of the Benson list. He produced it in a dis-
turbed state of mind. 1 He, no doubt, thought it was accurate. 
It contained one glaring error in attributing Essay Number 
54 to Jay instead of Number 64. 2 This mistake on the part 
of Hamilton has led others who did not agree with the Benson 
list to make the following conjecture: 
He might also have made another mistake, and 
since he allotted 37 to 48 to Madison, who 
claimed 37 to 58, they urge that in his agi-
1. Dawson, Art.(l863), xxvi. 
2. See above, 14. 
tatfon he may well have written 48 instead of 
58. 
It appears, however, to be unnecessary to guess as 
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to the accuracy of the different accounts of the authorship 
of The Federalist. 2 Adair is so convinced by available evi-
dence that Madison's account is correct that he writes: 
Fortunately it is not necessary to depend on 
any list in distributing the majority of The 
Federalist essays among the three authors:--
Even if Hamilton, Madison, and Jay had never 
given a written or spoken hint as to which 
numbers each had written, there would still 
be enough evidence available to make it possi-
ble to assign most of the eighty-five numbers 
of 'Publius' to the different individuals who 
wrote them. And when Hamilton's and Madison's 
several statements of authorship are used in 
conjunction with this evidence, strangely ig-
nored for three quarters of a century, it be-
comes entirely unnecessary to mark the wTiter 
of a single number as uncertain.j 
Vfuile this statement by Adair may seem too strong the 
evidence is on his side. If establishing the authorship of 
The Federalist were a question o~ memory between Hamilton 
and Madison one would have to conclude that Madison's memory 
had supporting facts whereas Hamilton's did not. Although 
it cannot be proved, one can easily surmise that Madison 
possessed some written notations dealing with the author-
ship of The Federalist.4 It is unlikely that a person's 
memory after a lapse of years is reliable enough to deter-
1. Bassett, Art.(l921), xxxvii. 
2. See above, 14-32. 
3. Adair, Art.(l944) 2 , 238. 
4. See above, 24-25. Madison may have been intimating that 
he had kept a record of the authorship of The Federalist, 
mine the authorship of a collected edition of essays. 
To what extent was there collaboration among the 
authors of The Federalist in the writing of the essays? 
There has been, as we have seen, 1 considerable controversy 
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over whethe r Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20 were the joint 
product of Hamilton and Madis on or the work of Madison alone. 
No one has found any evidence to indicate that Hamilton 
participated in writing them. Madison's note to Essay Num-
ber 18, 2 in the Gideon edition, is our most reliable source 
of information. This note together with the fact that much 
of the material in these particular Essays can be found in 
some of Madison 's previous writings3 leads to the conclusion 
that Madison wrote them. It appears that such a small amount 
of collaboration existed between Madison and Hamilton that 
neither of them knew the other had begun this series of Es-
says. Upon making the discovery that each of them was work-
ing on the same Essays, Hamilton gave to Madison a small amount 
of material and allowed him to continue the .. work. 
This circumstance with regard to Essays Number 18, 19, 
and 20 answers in part the question of collaboration so far 
as Hamilton and Madison are concerned. It is tbe closest they 
ever came to any collaboration. There is no dispute about 
this by anyone. Madison wrote to Jefferson, August 10, 1788: 
but this possibility is only a guess. 
1. See above; 27-31. 
2. See above, 27. 2 J. Adair, Art.(l944} , 249-250. See above, 28-29. 
Though carried on in concert, the writers 
are not mutually answerable for all the ideas 
of each other, there being seldom time for · 
even a perusal of the pieces by any but tbe 
writer before they were wanted at the press
1 and sometimes hardly by the writer himself. 
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Adair calls attention to an apology by Hamilton for the way 
in which The Federalist was written. 
The particular circumstances under which these 
papers have been written, have rendered it im-
practicable to avoid violations of method and 
repetitions of ideas which cannot but displease 
a critical reader.~ 
Hamilton and Madison wrote independently and alone3 
while writing The Federalist. There was no time for collab-
oration.4 They both bad other duties. Madison was one of 
the representatives from Virginia i~ the Continental Congress, 
while Hamilton had an extensive law practice. They had a 
large political correspondence5 to which it was necessary to 
give attention. The Federalist was written in spare time and 
it was possible for it to be written only because Madison and 
Hamilton had in their possession notes which had been pre-
viously gathered.6 Hamilton and Madison were familiar with 
the work of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the Con-
stitution they were undertaking to get ratified. Although 
they did not agree in their political thinking? the Constitution 
1. 
2. 
). 
4· 5. 
6. 
?. 
Hunt (ed.), WJM, V, 246~ 
Adair, Art.(l944)2, 241. This quotation is from Hamilton's 
"Preface" to the ~irst collected edition of Tbe Federalist. 
Adair, Art.(l944) , 240. 
Hamilton, Art.(l8~4), lxxxvi. 
Adair, Art.(l944) , 239. 
Hamilton, Art.(l864), lxxxvi. 
See above, 17-23. 
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was the best they could get from the Convention and if they 
expressed some ideas which were similar in defense of it, it 
was no mere coincidence. 
4. The Numbering of the Essays 
'rhe standard numbering of the essays which constitute 
The Federalist is the numbering adopted by the editor of ~he 
M'Lean edition of 1788. An adequate account of the changes in 
tbe numbering of the essays made in the f irst collected 
edition of The Federalist is given by Dawson. 
In this new edition, the editor divided the 
origina l Number XX1~I. LSic7 into t wo distinct 
parts, (XXXII. and :x:xxiii-:-,) and the greater 
part of the original Number XXXV. he trans-
ferred, and with it formed a new Number XXIX. 
Of course the original Numbers XXIX. and XXX. 
became~ Numbers XXX. and XXXI.; the original 
Numbers XXXI. to XXXIV., inclusive, became new 
Numbers XXXII. to XXXVI., inclusive; and th_e __ 
original Numbers XXXVI. to LXXVI. became new 
Numbers X:XXVII • to LXXVII. From the same ---c8us e 
when the Numbers LXXVII. to LXXXV. of this 
edition, in_which, as has been stated, they 
originally appeared, were reproduced in The 
Independent Journal; or, The General Adver-
tiser, they were designated, in continuation 
of the series which had been commenced in that 
paper, Numbers LXXVII. to LXXXIV., inclusive; 
and there was no Number LXXXV. whatever in the 
latter. 
Since the numbering adopted in the M'Lean edition of 
The Federalist has been followed by other editions, it would 
lead to chaos not to follow this accepted method. The contro-
versy over the authorship of individual essays follows this 
1. Dawson, Art.(l863}, lx-lxi. 
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standard numbering. So this numbering adopted by the col-
lected editions of The Federalist will be followed in this 
study. 
5. Treatment of the Subject 
Unfortunately no systematic and thorough study of ~ 
Federalist has ever been printed. Even brief treatments of 
the subject in related studies are almost non-existent. 
This is amazing in view of the fact that The Federalist has 
been so often referred to. There is no clear explanation 
for this lack of treatment. 
The preceding discussion of the text and authorship 
of The Federalist1 constitutes, in large measure, a survey 
of the literature which deals with it. And this literature, 
as has been seen, deals with the textual problem. 
Of the many editions of The Federalist, a number of 
them have contained able introductions. Listed chronolog-
2 ically, they are as follows: Dawson, 1863; Hamilton, 
1864;3 Lodge, 1886;4 Scott, 1894; 5 Ford, 1896; 6 Bourne, 
1901;7 Smith, 1901; 8 Ashley, 1911; 9 Bassett, 1921; 10 Pierson, 
1. See above, 5-37. 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863), v-lxxxix. 
3. Hamilton, Art.(l864), lxxxv-cxxxviii. 
4. Lodge, Art.(l886), xxxiii-xlv. 
5. Scott, Art. (1894), 5-6. 
6. Ford, Art.(l896), vii-xli. 
7. Bourne, Art.(l901), vii-xii. 
B. Smith, Art.(l901) iii-ix. 
9. Ashley, Art.(l9ll), vii-xiv. 
10. Bassett, Art.(l921), xxv-xlii. 
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1923;1 Earle, 1937; 2 Van Doren, 1945;3 Beard, 1948;4 Beloff, 
1948; 5 and Commager, 1949. 6 
Several of these articles deal extensively with the 
literary problem, which has already been dealt with.? These 
include the articles by Dawson, Hamilton, Lodge, and Ford. 
The article by Bourne mentioned here is briefer than his 
articles which appeared in the American Historical Review,B 
and adds nothing noteworthy. Van Doren,9 Bassett,lO and 
Beardll give brief statements of this literary problem and 
adopt the point of view taken in this study.l2 Scott does 
not enter this controversy but cannot help assigning Essay 
Number 54 to Hamilton, and Number 64 to Jay. 13 He gives no 
reason for assigning Number 54 to Hamilton instead of to 
Madison. Smith takes the position, without giving any ground 
for it, that Hamilton wrote the disputed Essays. 14 Ashley,l5 
Earle,l6 and Beloffl7 do not treat this subject of authorship 
but assign joint authorship where there is a case of doubt. 
1. Pierson, Art.(l923), xlvii-lix. 
2. Earle, Art.(l937), v-xxv. 
3. Van Doren, Art.(l~45), v-xii. 
4. Beard, Art.(l948) 1-30. 
5. Beloff, Art.(l948) 1 , vii-lxviii. 
6. Commager, Art.(l949), vii-xiii. 
7. See above, 5-37. 
8. See above; 19; 27-30. 
9. Van Doren, Art.(l945), v-Vlll. 
10. Bassett, Art.(l92±), xxxvii-xxxviii. 
11. Beard, Art.(l948) , vii. 
12. See above, 37. 
13. Scott, ft~t.(l894), 6. 
14. Smith, Art.(l90l) , -iii. 
15. Ashley, Art.(l9ll), ix. 
16. Earle, Ar t.(l937), 1xxii. 17. Beloff, Art.(l948) , lxviii. 
Pierson does not give consideration to the question of au-
thorship. His article, however, ~pears in a reprint of 
Lodge's edition of The Federalist. Commager does not dis-
cuss this problem but hold·s a view similar to the one held 
in this study.l 
Not much can be said about these introductions to 
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various editions of The Federalist as treatments of the so-
cial philosophy of The Federalist. There is considerable 
variance in length of discussion but on the whole they in-
clude matter of fact statements ab.out events leading up to 
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, as well as matter of 
fact statements about The Federalist. The nearest approach 
to a consideration of the subject of this study is the ar-
ticle by Beloff.2 His article, however, s~ffers from too 
strong reliance on secondary sources3 and too few specific 
references to The Federalist. 
Commager makes the observation that The Federalist is 
more than an authoritative commentary on the Constitution. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
It is a great and · profound treatise on polit-
ical science. If, by some unimaginable turn 
of history, the United States Constitution 
should disappear, or the United States abandon 
it and adopt a new one, the Federalist would 
/ not lose its significance. It would reiiBin 
one of the great documents of history; great 
in its method, its style, its substance, and 
its philosophy.4 
Commager, Art.(l941}, xiii. 
Beloff, Art.(l948} , vii-lxviii. 
See bel on, 46. · 
Commager, Art.(l949), x. See above, 4-5. 
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This is a commendable statement, and a failure to realize its 
truth may account for the lack of treatment of the content of 
The Federalist. It may be, in other words, that The Federal-
ist has too often been solely associated with the American 
Constitution and practically identical with it. This would 
lead to the view that the Constitution and The Federalist do 
not need separate treatment. 
The Encyclopedia Americana contains a brief historical 
statement about The Federalistl the author of which is not 
given. It errs in holding that Madison's contribution to The 
Federalist is valuable as an exposition of the American Con-
stitution. Madison discussed the House of Representatives in 
Essays 52-58 but the remainder of the exposition of the Con-
stitution was done by Hamilton. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Chamber's Encyclopaedia, and Collier's Encyclopedia do not 
treat The Federalist at all. 
In his famous and influential book, An Economic In-
terpretation of The Constitution of the United States, Beard 
makes frequent references to The Federalist. By means of 
this book Beard established the view that the forces which 
shaped the Constitution were economic forces. Although this 
view has been widely held, it is subject to criticism. 2 
Beard's significant question in his "Introduction" to 
The Enduring Federalist, "Why Study The Federalist Now?," 
seems to lean upon something more ideological than mere eco-
1. Enc. Aller., 11, 85. 2. See below, 113-118. 
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nomic considerations.l 
Dawson promised2 a critical edition of The Federalist 
which would be published as Volume II of the edition which 
he edited in 1863. This promised edition was never publish-
ed. Adair promised3 in 1944 a "critical annotated edition 
of The Federalist" but to date it has not been printed. 
Adair's competence in this field causes us to look enthusi-
astically toward the publication of his edition of The Fed-
eralist. 
6. Plan of the Study 
The purpose has been in this introductory chapter to 
present the problem of this study and to deal in addition 
with the literary problem concerning the authorship of the 
individual essays of The Federalist. The literary problem 
concerning the authorship of The .. Federalist is a "well-
established historical controversy"4 which has received 
little careful treatment. It has been deemed necessary to 
ascertain by whom each of the essays was written in order 
to determine the thought of each of the contributors. The 
sources of the social philosophy of The Federalist cannot be 
established unless the authors of the individual essays be 
1. Beard, ·Art.(l948) 2 ; 1-25. 
2. Dawson, Art.(l863l; v-vi. 
3. Adair; Art~(l944) ; 97. 
4. Adair, Art. ( 1944) 1 , 97. This phrase is quoted from 
Lodge by Adair without any reference being given. 
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known. An examination of the sources of The Federalist in 
the ensuing chapter will also throw additional light on the 
question of authorship. 
The second chapter will deal with the sources of The 
Federalist. An effort will be made to ascertain the in-
fluence which helped form the social philosophy of Hamilton 
and Madison. 
The purpose of chapter three will be to discover what 
reasons the writers of The Federalist gave for favoring union 
as against disunion. It will be an attempt to answer the 
question, "Why union?" 
The aim of chapter four will be to discover what kind 
of union the writers of The Federalist were in favor of. 
What did they understand to be the true principles of repub-
licanism? Throughout this study it will be the aim to estab-
lish connections with sources of ideas. 
A final chapter will constitute a summary of this 
study and a listing of the conclusions reached. 
CHAPTER II 
SOME SOURCES OF THE FEDERALIST 
1. Some General Remarks 
A chapter on "Some Sources of The Federalist'' is 
undertaken with a great deal of uneasiness. Although a 
large number of historical analogies are drawn in The Fed-
eralist between the proposed constitution and other gov-
ernments, not a great number of direct references are made 
to social philosophies. As Beloff adequately attests: 
The fact that the Federalist was primarily a 
contribution to an actual political contro-
versy •••• makes more than usually hazardous the 
search for the philosophical and literary 
sources of its authors' inspiration. Even 
where specific au thor s are referred to in the 
text, the borrowings are made to give addi-
tional authority to the Federalist's pre-
scriptions on particular po~nts. Such ref-
erences cannot in themselves be taken as evi-
dence1 of the main intellectual influences at 
work. 
Where a writer fails to admit sources which influenc-
ed him, they are difficult to establish. It is possible for 
different individuals to arrive at similar conclusions inde-
pendently of each other. Neither does it mean that because 
a person owns a large library he has read all of the books 
which he ovms. But in the case of The Federalist there are 
some clues as to sources. It will be the purpose of this 
cha.pt er to reveal these clues. 
1. Beloff, Art.(l948) 1 , lvii. 
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The plan is to deal with the sources of Madison; then 
Hamil ton; and then to present a comparison of the social 
philosophies of Plato's Republic, and Locke's Essay Concern-
ing The True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government 
with the social philosophy of The Federalist. Jay was an 
experienced diplomat and a good choice to write essays ar-
guing the need of a stronger union to combat foreign in-
fluence and danger. Since his contribution to The Federalist 
was limited to five essays which draw on no new sources, he 
will not be given separate treatment. 
Why discuss Plato and Locke? The Federalist leans 
heavily on Greek history to show the defects and merits of 
different types of government. Is there not also ground for 
believing that the writers of The Federalist were familiar 
with Greek political thought and possibly influenced by it? 
In a supposedly definitivel work on Madison's philosophy, 
Burns contends that "Madison mentioned Aristotle only one e, 
and Plato, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Rousseau not at all."2 
Burns makes the following statement with regard to the ref-
erence by Madison to Aristotle: 
In a hal~-~inished essay on The Influence of 
Domestic Slavery on Government, he referred 
to Aristotle's doctrine that the citizen should 
1. Beloff, Art•(l94B)l, lvii. 
2. Burns, JMPC, 186. This book deals with Madison's phil-
osophy as a whole. It is of little value so far as the 
social philosophy of The Federalist is concerned. No 
book has been written w1th any one of the three authors 
of The Federalist as subject which can be considered a 
treatment of their thought as expressed in The Federalist. 
be free from private cares so as to derote 
himself exclusively to public service. 
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Although he doesn't say where, Bourne rightly states, 
"Madison, like several of his contemporaries, had studied 
Aristotle's Politics."2 Evidently Bourne was referring to 
Madison's research on the senates of Sparta, of Carthage, and 
of Rome. And had Burns consulted this research3 he would 
have discovered that Madison made use of both Aristotle and 
Cicero. Again, Burns is wrong in his position that Madison 
does not mention Plato. Madison writes in Essay Number 49, 
"A nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the 
philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. n4 Maybe 
Burns was of the opinion that Madison did not write Essay 
Number 49. To be clear on the authorship of The Federalist 
is extremely important. Others have the same point of view 
as Burns in denying that the authors of The Federalist were 
familiar with Greek social thought. Beloff, for example, 
contends that Madison never mentioned Plato or Cicero, and 
Aristotle only once.5 No doubt he was paraphrasing Burns. 
Becker writes with regard to Locke that "Most Americans 
had absorbed Locke's works as a kind of political gospel."6 
This was especially true with reference to Locke's second 
treatise on government. No one disputes this fact. The dif-
1. Burns, JMPC, 186. 
2. Bourne, EHC, 167. 
3. Rives (ed.), LOWM , 394-398. 
4. FED(49), 329. 
5. Beloff, Art.(l948) 1 , lviii; see Freeman, HFG, 249. 
6. Becker, DOI, 27; see Maciver, Art.(l938), 51-61. 
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ficul ty in establishing Locke as a source lies in the fact 
that Locke was so widely read that he was seldom quoted. 
Writers1 were so familiar with Locke that they reproduced 
his ideas without being always aware of it. Consider the 
Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was forced to deny 
that he copied it from Locke. 2 Locke is not quoted in The 
Federalist; neither do any of the authors of The Federalist 
discuss Locke's thought anywhere with direct reference. 
Yet, not to discuss Locke's Essay Concerning Civil Govern-
ment as a possbile source in the present context would be to 
adopt the position that some of the most astute social phil-
osophers of the day were unfamiliar with the book which was 
the "political gospel" of the day. 
Madison received his college training at the College 
of New Jersey (now Princeton). He was a student at the time 
Witherspoon was president of the College of New Jersey and 
enjoyed studying with Witherspoon to such an extent that he 
remained a year after graduation for additional study. He 
has been referred to as America's first graduate student.3 
Witherspoon was one of the most important early popularizers 
of the Scottish common sense philosophy in the United States.4 
In addition Witherspoon's lectures contained discussions of 
Htune, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Hobbes, Harrington, and works dealing with the history of 
1. Becker; DOI, 24-28. 
2. Becker, DOI, 25. 
3. Smith, JMB, 9. 
4· Riley, AP, 18. 
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politics.1 
Ashbel Green, who was a professor at the College of 
New Jersey part of the time Witherspoon was president, and 
who was himself later president, wrote a brief history of 
that institution in which he listed the curriculum. This 
book was published in 1822. Courses for the freshman class 
were Aritlllmtic, Geography, English Grammar, Latin Grammar, 
Ovid, Virgil, Xenophon, and Composition. Courses for the 
sophomore class were Arithmetic, Geography, English Grammar, 
History, Horace, Collectanea Graeca Majora, Homer's Iliad, 
Composition, Algebra, and Roman Antiquities. Courses for 
the junior class were Geometry, Trigonometry, Surveying, 
Greek and Latin Classics, Composition, History, Mechanics, 
Astronomy, Navigation, Conic Sections and Curve Lines, Nat-
ural Theology, and Locke on Human Understanding. Courses 
for the senior class were Rhetoric, Composition, Moral Phil-
osophy, Logic, Metaphysics, Political Economy, Philosophy 
of Mind, Mechanics, Chemistry, Natural History, Experimental 
Philosophy, Greek and Latin Classics, Astronomy, and 
Evidence of the Christian Religion. 2 It is obvious from 
this outline of courses that the classics constituted a 
large part of the college curriculum. Holst directs atten-
tion to the fact that the Greeks and Romans were not driven 
from the colleges of America until state systems of educa-
tion were substituted for the traditional classical discip-
1. Witherspoon, WJW, VII, 152. 2. Green, DIS, 403-404. 
line. 1 
Madison was either directly or indirectly familiar 
with Plato. 2 Jefferson read some of Plato's writings and 
was very critical of them.3 Jonathan Edwards, a president 
of the College of New Jersey, studied Greek Philosophy at 
Yale. Townsend says of Edwards: 
All in all, the student of Edwards who knows 
the writings of the Cambridge Platonists can 
hardly avoid the conclusion that he was more 
directly indebted to them than4to any other source of philosophy whatever. 
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It does not seem possible to state conclusively that 
Plato and Locke had a direct influence on the writers of 
The Federalist. It is entirely possible that they did. But 
without sufficient proof the best one can do is to compare 
their writings without placing any claim of direct influence. 
In a brilliant treatment of The Intellectual Origins 
of Jeffersonian Democracy Adair defends the point of view that 
these "intellectual origins" are traceable to the Fourth 
Century B. c.5 His study is convincing. Yet, the influence 
may be from secondary sources. Convenient places to discover 
some of the sources of the thought of Madison and Hamilton are 
tbe ir writings. It is good to turn to them now. 
2. Some Sources of Madison's Contribution 
The claim is made for Madison that "No man in all the 
1. Holst, CPH, I, 31. 3. Muelder and Sears, DAP, 66-81. 
2. See above, 46. 4. Townsend, PI, 44. 
5. Adair, IOJD, ii. This is an unpublished dissertation and 
is deposited in the Yale University Library. 
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world had studied so thoroughly the general problems of fed-
eralism. "l Whether this statement is true or not, one can 
be sure that Madison made an extensive study of federal gov-
ernment. 
By 1784, when tbe Confederation was already 
showing its inadequacies, he had commenced 
building up a library on the subject that be-
came the most comprehensive private collection 
on the topic in 18th century America, if not 
in tbe world. 2 
This echoes the point of view taken by Bourne in the 
paper he read before the American Historical Association in 
New York in 1896.3 Bourne's paper was, it seems, the first 
clear and precise account of Madison's scholarship. The 
popularity of Hamilton forbade an objective study of Madison 
for the next several decades. Bourne states: 
It is a fact of no little interest t~at · Madison, 
whose ideas pervaded the 'Virginia Plan,' who 
shaped the growth of the Constitution in the Fed-
eral Convention, who was its indefatigable 
champion in the Virginia convention, and who, 
in The Federalist, was the ingenious and sym-
pathetlc advocate of its fitness for American 
conditions, was our first thorough and systematic 
stuient of the history of federal government ••• 
We may feel sure that Madison, in 1787, had 
more thoroughly studied and knew more of the 
history of federal government than any other 
American or Englishman .4 
These are excellent comments as secondary sources, but 
where does the information come from? In a letter to Jef-
ferson in March, 1784, Madison mentions his search for books. 
1. 
2. 
2 Adair; Art.(l944) 2 , 248. Adair, Art.(l944) , 248n. 
J. Bourne, EHC, 165-169. 
4. Bourne, EHC, 165-166. 
I must leave to your discretion the occasional 
purchase of rare books, disregarding the risk 
of duplicates. You know tolerably well the ob-
jects of my curiosity. I will only particular-
ize my wish of whatever may t hrow light on the 
general constitution and droit public of the 
several confederacies which have existed. I 
observe in Boinaud's catalogue several pieces 
on the Dutch, the German, and the Helvetic. 
The operations of our own must render all such 
lights of consequence. Books on the Law of 
N. & N. fall within a similar remark. The 
tracts of Bynkershoek, which you mention I 
must trouble you t£ get for me ••• Is not Wolfius 
also worth having? 
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Madison writes Jefferson in this same letter that he recent-
ly got home the trunk which contained his Buffon; that he 
would like a copy of Hawkin's abridgement of "Co: Litt.n 
LSic7; and that he wanted a copy of Deane's letters. 
In a letter to Randolph, March 10, 1784, Madison says: 
On my arrival here early in Dec. I entered 
as soon as the necessary attentions to my 
friends admitted on the course of reading 
which I have long meditated. Co: Litt: in 
consequence and a few others from the same 
shelf h~ve been my chief society during the 
winter. 
Both Beloff and Burns assert3 that Madison drew copi-
ously from Vattel, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek, for his views 
on international relations. Madison wrote a long letter to 
Jefferson on January 9, 1785 in keeping with a promise that 
he would inform Jefferson of the proceedings of the Virginia 
Assembly. Madison mentions,4 in this letter, consulting 
1. Hunt . (ed.), WJM, II, 42-46. 
2. Hunt (ed.), WJ1vi , If, 30. 
3. Beloff, Art.(l948) , lviii; Burns, JMPC, 187. 
4. Hunt (ed.), WJ1VI , II, 110-111. See also Hunt (ed.), WJ11/I. , 
VII, 204-375. 
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Vattel, Grotius, and Pufendorf in connection with an act au-
thorizing the surrender of a citizen to a foreign sovereign 
within whose jurisdiction the citizen should commit a crime. 
Burns thinks "it is quite possible that their emphasis upon 
a higher law of justice and right reason may have affected"l 
Madison's thinking. 
Jefferson, evidently, was a good errand runner for 
Madison, for Madison thanks him in a letter dated April 27, 
1785 for his "attention to my literary wants."2 Additional 
requests were made by Madison in this same letter. He asked 
for "the Dictionary in 13 vol. by F~lice and others, also 
de Thou in French. n3 Madison also wanted "the utility of 
Moreri"4 if it was not superseded by some better work. He 
reiterated his desire for any treatises on 
the ancient or modern foederal republics--on 
the law of nations--and the history natural and 
political of the New World; to which I will add 
such of the Greek and Roman authors ••• as are 
worth having and are not on the common lists 
of school classics.' 
Further, Madison expressed a desire far books on the Roman 
empire during its decline. 
Pascal's Provincial letters--Don Ulloa in the 
original--Linnaeus best edition Ordinances Ma-
rines--Collection of Tracts in french on the 
Oeconomics of different nations, I forget the 
full title. It is much rgferred to by Smith 
on the Wealth of Nations. 
1. Burns, JMPC, 187. 
2. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 133. 
3. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 133. 
4. Hunt (ed.), W~, II, 133. 
5. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 134. 
6. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 134. 
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Madison confessed in this letter that he had 57 volumes by 
Buffon: "His original work of 31 vol. 10 vol. of Supplemt, 
and 16 vol. on birds. nl 
Two trunk loads of books were received by Madison 
from Jefferson in January, 1786. In a letter of March 3, 
1786, Madison thanks Jefferson for this cargo and asks that 
two mistakes be rectified. 2 The first mistake was the omis-
sion of a pert of "the Encyclopedia." The second mistake was 
the omission "of the 4th vol. of D'Albon sur l'interet de 
plusieurs nations, &c." 
ing: 
Madison writes to Jefferson on August 12, 1786, stat-
The Catalogues sent by Mr. Skipwith I do not 
expect to receive till I get back to Virga. 
If you meet with 'Graecorum Respublicae ab 
Ubbone Emmio descriptae,• 3sugd. Batavorum, 1632, pray get it for me. 
Now what have these references to books to do with the 
sources of The Federalist? Madison used his learning gained 
from his busy research in the history of federal government 
to promote the cause of federal government throughout his po-
litical career. The research memorandum he compiled on an-
cient and modern confederacies4 he used in the Philadelphia 
Convention and in writing The Federalist. 5 Madison made an 
1. Hunt (ed.), W~~' II, 134. 
2. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 225-226. 
3. Hunt (ed.), WJM, II, 265. 
4. Rives (ed.), LOWM, I, 293-315. 
5. See Bourne, EHG, 165-169. It is necessary only to look 
at Essays Numbers 18, 19 and 20 and see where Madison put 
into literary form much of this research. The exact ref-
erences are given in his research memorandum. A reading 
of Madison's speeches in Farrand, RFC, will reveal how 
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appeal in Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20 to the history of the 
ft~phictyonic Council, the Achaean League, the Holy Roman Em-
pire, the S\dss Confederation, and the United Netherlands. 
Madison in writing these Essays merely had to turn to his re-
search. 
Under the topic, Notesl of Ancient and Modern Confed-
eracies, Preparatory to the Federal Convention of 1787, 
Madison prepared notes2 on the Lycian Confederacy, the Amphic-
tyonic Confederacy, the Achaean Confederacy, the Helvetic Con-
federacy, and the Belgic Confederacy. Unfortunately, Madison 
usually referred to a source by using only a writer's name. 
He seldom mentioned a specific book. In his notes on the 
Lycian Confederacy Madison refers to Montesquieu's L'Esprit 
des L.ois, F~lice' s Le Code de 1 'Hum.anit e"; and to Ubbo Emmius' 
Graecorum Respublicae Descriptae. Felice edited an encyclo-
pedia of comparative politics in 1788 which Madison constant-
ly cites under its secondary title, Le Code de l'Hum.anit~. 
Madison's sources for his discussion of the Amphic-
tyonic Confederacy are the following: F~lice's Le Code de 
l'Humanit~; Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopedia; Diction-
naire de T.revieux; Plutarch's Gimon; Potter's Archeologia 
Graeca; Plutarch's Themistocles; Rawleigh's History of the 
World; Gillie's History of Greece; and an Encyclopedia of 
Madison used these sources there. 
1. In the body of this study this topic will be hereafter 
referred to as Notes. 
2. Rives (ed.), LOWM, I, 293-315. 
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Political Economy. 
For his information concerning the Achaean Confed-
eracy Madison consulted the General History by Polybius; 
Felice's Le Code de l'Humanit~; an Encyclopedia of Political 
Economy; Comte d'Albon's discourses on the history and gov-
ernment of Europe; and Ubbo Emmius' Graecorum Respublicae 
Descriptae. 
Madison's Notes on the Helvetia Confederacy contain 
references to the following sources: Felice's Le Code de 
l'Humanite; Stanyan's Switzerland; and a Dictionnaire de 
Suisse edited by Tscharner. 
For his data concerning the Belgic Confederacy Madi-
son drew from Felice's Le Code de l'Humanite; Temple's Ob-
servations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands; 
Mably's Historical Studies; and Comte d'Albon's discourses 
on the history and government of Europe. 
Madison in his Notes on the Germanic Confederacy re-
fers to F~3'iice' s Le Code de 1 'Humanit e'; Savage's History of 
Germany; and Mably's Historical Studies. 
Reference has been made above to the fact that Madison 
used this material in writing Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20. 
This is true enough, but it would be misleading to leave the 
impression that Madison used this material only in these Es-
says. In varying degrees Madison relied on this material in 
all of the essays he wrote; in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention; and in the Philadelphia Convention. 1 
1. See Bourne, EHC, 165-169. 
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Madison, in April, 1787, wrote Notes on the Confed-
eracy which he subtitled Vices of the Political System of 
the United States.1 Essay Number 10 can be traced from its 
appearance as a part2 of Notes on the Confederacy, to Madi-
son's convention speech of June 6, 1787,3 to a letter to 
Jefferson on October 24, 1787, 4 and finally to its literary 
form in The Federalist. Madison's only other contribution 
to The Federalist prior to Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20 was 
Essay Number 14, which is a continuation of Essay Number 10. 
But Essays Number 10 and 14 or, better still, Madison's 
Notes on the Confederacy, could not have been written with-
out the background of his Notes on ancient and modern con-
federations. Madison was able through his study of the 
history of federal government to analyze existing evils and 
confidently assert that "permanent peace, pro:sperity, and 
development could not be obtained under any type of confed-
eracy known to history. n5 He was de.eply concerned over the 
dissensions to which confederacies had fallen prey, and was 
aware that nsomething new must be devised in the form of a 
federal constitution."6 So Madison felt there were no real 
precedents to follow if an adequate federal government were 
to be established. The value of his research was in a sense 
negative. 
1. Rives (ed.), LOWM, I, 320-328. 
is printed here. 
Rives (ed.), LOWM, I, 325-328. 
Farrand, RFC, I, 134-136. 
Rives (ed.), LOVY.M, I, 350-353. 
Notes on the Confederacy 
5. Bourne, EHC, 169. 
6. Bourne, EHC, 169. 
Madison drew copiously from his research in federal 
government in writing Essays Numbers 37-58 inclusive, and 
62 and 63. 
In this division of the work so peculiarly 
suited to his talents he had occasion not 
only to develop the federal principles of the 
Constitution, but also to discuss in his own 
characteristic vein the various questions 
which lie at1 the foundation of free govern-
ment itself. 
He began this group of Essays by explaining how the Con-
vention had combined "energy in government, with the in-
violable attention due to liberty and to the republican 
form." 2 Essays Numbers 36 and 37 were given to a discus-
sion of the problems faced by the Convention in guarantee-
ing both the security of the few and the liberty of the 
many. Madison in Essay Number 39 indicated how the gov-
ernment rests with the people, and then followed with a 
brilliant analysis, in Essay Number 40, of the "compound 
aspects of the proposed system with its mixed national and 
federal features. n3 
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Then in a section of six Essays, Numbers 41-46, Mad-
ison showed how the relationships between the states and the 
national government would be established under the proposed 
federal structure. He was cautious to make clear that the 
states would not be reduced to nothingness by national en-
croa chme n ts. 
1. Adair, Art.(l944} 2 , 251. 
2. FED(37}, 227. 
3. Adair, Art.(l944} 2 , 251. 
58 
Madison sought to analyze in Essays Numbers 47-51 
"the particular structure of this government, and the dis-
tribution of this mass of power among its constituent 
parts."1 Although, as commonly held, Montesquieu's The 
Spirit of the Laws was familiar to Madison,2 it should not 
be maintained that Madison merely duplicated Montesquieu. 
Madison had a specific constitution to explain, and may not 
have been solely indebted to Montesquieu for the doctrine of 
checks and balances in government. He says: 
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on 
this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If 
he be not the author of this invaluable precept 
in the science of politics, he has the merit at 
least of displaying and recommending it most 
effectually to the attention of mankind • ..:s 
Essays Numbers 47-51 are a carefully wrought unit. 
They culminate in Essay Number 51 where Madison explains how 
in "the compound republic of America" the power surrendered 
by the people is first divided between the states and the 
nation, and then the portion allotted to the latter is "sub-
divided among distinct and separate departments." 
In the compound republic of America, the power 
surrendered by the people is first divided be-
tween two distinct governments, and then the 
portion allotted to each subdivided among dis-
tinct and separate departments. Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people. 
The different governments will control each 
other, at the same
4
time that each will be con-
trolled by itself. 
1. FED(47), 312. 
2. Bourne, EHC, 167. FED(47), 313. 
3. FED(47), 313. 
4. FED(51), 339. 
In Essay Number 10 Madison had held that a functional bal-
59 
ance of many conflicting economic and social interests would 
favor liberty in a large republic; in Essay Number 46 he had 
shown how the mixture of powers vested in the states and 
nation would work to the same end; and now in Essay Number 
51 Madison character is tic ally applied his theory of balance 
to the inter-departmental organization of the new state.l 
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In Essay Number 10 Madison had held that a functional bal-
ance of many conflicting economic and social interests would 
favor liberty in a large republic; in Essay Number 46 he had 
shown how the mixture of powers vested in the states and 
nation would work to the same end; and now in Essay Number 
51 Madison character is tic ally applied his theory of balance 
to the inter-departmental organization of the new state.l 
Hamilton was mainly interested in the executive and 
the judicial branches of the government, whereas Madison al-
so had a deep interest in the legislative.2 Madison knew 
that he would soon have to depart for home to take part in 
the Virginia elections, so in the next seven Essays, Numbers 
52-58, Madison discussed the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment. These Essays would not necessarily draw on addition-
al source material. However, in Essay Number 56 Burgh's Po-
litical Disquisitions is mentioned. It is known that Madison 
was reading Burgh's Political Disquisitions at this time.3 
Madison quotes from this work in his Additional Memorandum for 
the Convention of Virginia in 1788.4 
It is not irrelevant to add here as an addendum to the 
literary problem discussed in Chapter I that Hamilton and his 
supporters had claimed Essay NQ~ber 56. Political Disquisi-
tions, as Adair points out, 
1. 
2. 
4. 
/ 
was the most famous contemporary expose of the 
'corruption' of the British Parliament--that 
See Adair, Art.(l~44) 2 , 252 for a good summary. 
Adair, Art.(l944) , 253. 3. Bourne, EHC, 133-135. 
Rives (ed.), LOWM, I, 392. 
same corruption which Hamilton had praised 
as a pr ime virtue of the Engli sh system. It 
is si gnificant too that the passage in Num-
ber 56 which cites Burgh speaks of the 'mon-
itory lessons' LBourne showed that 'monitory•l 
was a favorite word of Madison's? to be learn-
ed from British history. The author who 
wrote this essay, and who speaks of 'the 
vicious ingredients in the parliamentary con-
stitution' of Great Britain in Number 52 could 
hardly be called an a2dent admirer of the 
British Constitution. 
To complete his part in writing The Federalis t and 
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to finish his m1al ysis of Congress, Madison wrote Essays 
Numbers 62 and 63 . These two Essays were much better writ-
ten than Madison's analysis of the House of Representatives 
g iven in Essays Numbers 52-58. The r eason is that Madison, 
in writing Essays Numbers 62 and 63, ha d the aid of a long 
research memorandum he had compiled. on the senates of Sparta, 
of Carthage, and of Rome.3 Madison draws his material in 
this mem orandum from fl~istotle, Cicero, Polybius, Middleton's 
Life of Cicero, Gibbon's Decline and Fall, and Felice's Le 
Code de 1 'Hwnanite. 
Was Madison influenced by Harrington's Commonwealth 
of Oceana? Harrington combined a republican philosophy with 
an autocratic re spect f or l anded pr operty, and, as Maciver 
says, "ranks next to Locke among the English writers who had 
vogue in America."4 Harrington set forth an economic basis 
of politics5 which foreshadowed much of Essay Number 10. He 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Bourne, EHC, 133. ~. 
Adair, Art.(l944) 2 , 261. 5. 
Rives ( ed. ) , LOWM , I, 394-398. 
Maciver, Art.(1938), 54. 
Harrington, COO, 18. 
maintained that factions and parties in a state arise from 
the uneven distribution of wealthl which sets classes in 
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conflict. His solution to the disease of faction, however, 
. was not the sane as Madison's although both men did believe 
that a "design of govern.m9nt to prevent any interest or 
combination of interests from becoming too powerful should 
be the chief reliance. n 2 But Madison worked out a practical 
scheme. Madison nowhere says that he owes anything to 
Harrington and it is with great caution that anyone has 
sought to establish any direct influence.) 
). Some Sources of Hamilton's Contribution 
As students of Hamilton. rightly attest, 4 Hamilton 
was an omnivorous reader. 
1. 
2. 
). 
That Hamilton did not permit even the advent 
of war to interfere with his studies is evi-
denced by his pay book while in command of a 
company of artillery. Side by side with nota-
tions of the sums paid out to members of his 
company are comments and excerpts of books 
read in the interim of drills and war's alarums. 
Among others he read Cicero, Demosthenes, Plu-
tarch, Bacon's Essays, Rousseau's Emile, 
Hobbes' Dialogues, Robinson's Charles V, 
Millot's History of France, .Smith's Histor~ 
of New York, and Raft's Dictionary of T.rad 
and Commerce.~ . 
Harrington, COO, 18. 
Burns, JMPC, 174• 
Burns, JMPC, 175. 1see Maciver, Art.(l938), 59-60. Beloff, Art.(l948) , lviii. 
Beloff, Art.(l948), lvii. Schachner, AH, 33; 145. 
Hamilton, ILAH, 74-75. 
Schachner, AH, 33. 
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Even before Hamilton decided on law as a profession he had 
grounded himself in "Blackstone and the treatises of Grotius 
and Pufendor f. nl 
Allen McLane Hamilton records2 a list of books found 
in the library left by Hamilton many of which are relevant 
to this study and some actually quoted in The Federalist. It 
will be worthwhile to reproduce this list here. 
Hume 's "Essays," [Sic? "~h~ Letters of Pliny," 
"Oeuvres Pos thume s de Frederic, Roi de Prusse," 
"Trai te Gene rale du Commerce," "Oeuvres de 
Molie're " "Histoire de Turenne " "Gil Blas " 
' ,; J J 
"De la Felicite Publique," Diderot and D'Alem-
bert' s [Sic? "Encyclopedia Methodique," La 
Rochefoucauld-Liancourt's "Travels," Journal 
des Etats Generaux, Plutarch's "Lives," Hamp-
ton's "Polybius," Lord Chesterfield's "Let-
ters," Voltaire, Winn's "History of America," 
Cicero's "Morals," Bacon's ''Essays," Halt's 
"Die tionary of Trade and Commerce," Montaigne' s 
"Essays," Cudworth's "Intellectual . System," 
"The Orations of Demosthenes," Hobbes's "Dia-
logues," Robertson's "Charles V," and Enti cle' s 
"History of the Late War," "The Works of 
Laurence Sterne ,-!• "The Works of Edward Gibbon," 
"The Connoisseur," Walpole's "Anecdotes," 
"Works of Sir Thomas Browne," Goldsmith's 
"Essays," "Hudibras," "The Works of St. Ans-
elmo," "The Letters Qf _Socrates," and Ruther-
furd Is "Ins ti tu tes. nJ 
One notable absentee from this list is of course Mon-
tesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws. Hamilton drew heavily 
upon Montesquieu's views in Essay Number 9 to argue that 
a republican government was suitable for a large territory. 
The opponents of the plan proposed have, with 
great assiduity, cited and circulated the ob-
1. Schachner, AH, 145. 
2. Hamilton, ILAH, 74-75. 
3. Hamilton, ILAH, 74-75. 
servations of Montesquieu on the necessity 
of a contracted territory for a republican 
government. But they seem not to have been 
apprised of the sentiments of that great man 
expressed in another part of his work, nor 
to have adverted to the consequences of the 
principle to which they subscribe with such 
ready acquiescence.l 
Hamilton points out that "when Montesquieu recommends a 
small extent for republics, the standards he had in view 
were of dimensions"2 much smaller than the individual 
states. Hamilton adds that if this point be taken as a 
criterion of truth, the only alternative is either to 
form a monarchy or to split the nation into a number of 
little clashing commonwealths. 
But Hamilton did not think this to be a true inter-
pretation of Montesquieu and remarks: 
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu 
from standing in opposition to a general 
Union of the States, that he explicitly 
treats of a Confederate Republic as the 
expedient for extending the ~here of pop-
ular government, and reconciling the ad-
vantages Qf monarchy with those of repub-
licanism.) 
Hamilton then quotes Montesquieu's The Spirit of The Laws 
at great length to prove his poi~t.4 
With a further indication of an amazing versatility 
in his reading, Hamilton quotes from Recherches philoso-
phigues sur les Americains in Essay Number 11.5 Hamilton 
3 • FED ( 9 ) , 50 • 
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1. 
2. 
5. 
FED( 9), 49. 
FED( 9), 49 • 
FED(ll), 69. 
fails to name 
See 
the 
4. ~D(9), 50-53· 
Beloff, Art.(l948) , 478. Hamilton 
author of this work. Beloff supplies 
here makes a plea that Americans not be so stupid as to yield 
themselves to European domination. Europe, he maintains, has 
long held a superiority which has enabled her "to plume her-
self as the Mistress of the world, and to consider the rest 
of mankind as created for her benefit·. ttl It is at this point 
that Hamilton paraphrases Raynal. 
Men admired as profound philosophers have, in 
direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a 
physical superiority and have gravely asserted 
that all animals, and with them the human spa-
cies, degenerate in America--that even dogs 
cease to bark a~ter having breathed awhile in 
our atmosphere. 
Hamilton, in quite a different context from the above, 
while arguing for the unity of the executive in Essay Number 
70, refers to Delolme and Junius.J 
The idea of a council to the Executive, which 
has so generally obtained in the State con-
stitutions, has been derived from that maxim 
of republican jealousy which considers power 
as safer in the hands of a number of men than 
of a single man. If the maxim should be ad-
mitted to be applicable to the case, I should 
contend that the advantage on that side would 
not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages 
on the opposite side. But I do not think the 
the following information. "Recherches Philosophiques 
sur les mricains. The Abbe Guillaume Thomas Francois 
Raynal (1713-96) published this celebrated work at Am-
sterdam in 1770 under the title of L'Historie Philosoph-
ique et Politique des Establissenents et du CoillllBrce des 
Europ?ens dans le s deux Irides. It went through many 
editions in French and other languages. In 1781 he pub-
lished, at Dublin, his Revolution de l'Amerique. The 
original theory of 'the tendency of nature tO belittle 
her productions on this side the Atlantic' as Jefferson 
styled it, was ascribed by him to the naturalist, the 
Comte de Buffon (1707-88)." 
1. FED(ll), -.69. 2. FED(11), :.69. 3. FED(70), , _ 462~ . 
rule at all applicable to the executive power. 
I clearly concur in opinion, in this particu-
lar, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius 
pronounces to be 'deep, solid, and ingenious,• 
that 'the executive power is more easily con-
fined when it is one ~ ; that it · is far more 
safe there should be a single object for the 
jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, 
in a ward, that all multiplication of the Exec-
utive is1rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. 
And Hamilton adds that "the Decemvirs of Roim n 2 were more 
to be dreaded than any one of them would have been. 
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There was such agitation3 during the process of rat-
ification of the Constitution that it contained no bill of 
rights. Hamilton undertook to show in the first part of 
Essay Number 84 that the proposed constitution contained 
all that could be desirable in a bill of rights. As great 
bulwarks to liberty and republicanism Hamilton mentions 
"the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex-pos t-:-facto 
laws, and Titles of Nobility.n4 He contems that punishment 
for crine s which when they were done were not against the 
law, and "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments"5 
1. FED( 70), 461-462. "The reference to Delolme is from 
Junius' preface to the collected edition of the Letters 
of Junius (1772). For the dispute as to the authorShip 
of' this work see e.g. Sir Charles Grant Robertson, Eng-
land under the Hanoverians, lOth ed. App. VI •••• Jean 
Louis Delolme (1740-1806), a native of Geneva, spent a 
protracted exile in England which ended in 1775. His 
Constitution de l'APgleterre appeared at Amsterdam in 
1771 and an enlarged edition in English in 1772. The 
work was several times reprinted and was a major source 
of information for foreign students of Englis~ consti-
tutionalism." Q,uoted from Beloff, Art.(l948) , 482. 
2. FED(70), 462. 4. FED(84), 557. 
3 • FED ( 84 ) , 5 55 • 5 • FED ( 84 ) , 55 7 • 
are the strongest devices of tyranny. And to add au-
thority to his words Hamilton quotes from the "judicious 
Blackstone." 
To bereave a man, or by violence to confiscate · 
his estate, without accusation or trial, would 
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, 
as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny 
throughout the whole nation; but confinement of 
the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, 
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, 
is a less public, a less striking and therefore 
a morr dangerous engine of arbitrary govern-
ment. · 
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Hamilton's suggestion of a remedy enables him to quote Black-
stone again. "He L8lackstone7 is everywhere peculiarly em-
pbatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which he 
calls 'the BULWARK of the British Constitution. 1 " 2 
Hamilton tried in the two last Essays, Numbers 84 and 
85 of The Federalist, to touch upon some subjects which bad 
not been previously dealt with. There was much popular dis-
cussion3 as to what would be the status of the debts owed the 
United States by the individual states. Hamilton's answer to 
those who objected that the proposed constitution did not 
deal with this issue specifically was a quotation from Ruth-
error d's Ins ti tu tes. 
1. 
2. 
In addition to the remarks I have made upon 
the subject in another place, I shall only 
observe that as it is a plain dictate of common-
sense, so it is also an established doctrine 
FED(84), 557. This quotation by Hamilton is from Black-
stone's Commentaries , I, 136. Hamilton gives this in-
formation in a footnote to FED(84), 557. 
FED(84), 557. This quotation from Blackstone is from 
Commentaries, IV, 438. 3. FED(84), 563. 
of political law, that 'states neither lose 
any of their rights, nor are discharged 
from any of their oblifations, by a cha~e 
in the form of their c vil government.' 
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Hamilton's final argument in Essay Number 85 of~ 
Federalist was to show tba t "it will be far more easy to ob-
tain subsequent than previous amendments to the Consti-
tution."2 He was exactly right in affirming that 
the moment an alteration is made in the present 
plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a 
new one, and must undergo a new decision of each 
state. To its complete establishment throughout 
the Union, it will therefore require the con-
currence of thirteen States. If, on the con-
trary, the Constitution proposed should once be 
ratified by all the States as it stands, alter-
ations in it may at any time be effected by nine 
States.3 
Hamilton was well aware of the dangers of resubmitting the 
proposed constitution to the various conventions and he 
clinches his argument with an appeal to Hume. 
1. 
2. 
J. 
The zeal for at tempts to amend , prior to the 
establishment of the Constitution, must abate 
in every man who is ready to accede to the 
truth of the following observations of a writer 
equally solid and ingenious: 'To balance a 
large .state or society, whether monarchical 
or republican, on general laws, is a work of 
great difficulty, that no human genius, however 
FED(84), 563. At the bottom of this page Hamilton adds 
this note: "Vide Rutherford's 'Institutes' /Sic?, vol. 
II, book II, chapter X, sect. xiv and xv. -Vide also 
Grotius, book II, chap. IX, sects. vii.L and""Tx':"" Beloff 
gives a clear explanation of this source. He states, 
"Tbe reference is to The Institutes of Natural Law, by 
T. Rutherforth LSic7, 2 vols,, Cambridge, 1754-6; 2nd 
ed. 1779. The work consisted of lectures on Grotius. 
It was one of the ~orks in the library left by Hamilton." 
Beloff~ Art.(l948) , 484. 
FED(85J, 571. 
FED(85}, 571. 
comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of 
reason and reflection, to effect it. The 
judgments of many must unite in the work; 
experience must guide their labor; time must 
bring it to perfection, and the feeling of 
inconveniences must correct the mistakes 
which they inevitably fall int~ in their 
first trials and experiments.• 
The prospectus 2 which Hamilton outlined in Essay 
Number 1 was an extremely ambitious one. 
I propose, in a series of papers to discuss 
the following interesting particulars:--The 
utility of the UNION to your political pros-
perity--The insufficiency of the present 
Confederation to preserve that Union--The 
necessity of a government at least equally 
energetic with the one proposed, to the at-
tainment of this object--The conformity of 
the proposed Cons ti tut ion to the true prin-
ciples of Republican government--Its analogy 
to your own State Constitution--and lastly, 
The additional security which its adoption 
will afford to the preservation of that spe-
cies ~f government, to liberty and to prop-
erty. 
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Hamilton's promise could not have been fulfilled had be not 
had material in reserve to rely upon. In addition to this 
he secured assistance and it has been shown above4 how Mad-
i son drew upon previously prepared material. 
What bad Hamilton prepared upon which he could rely? 
According to the prospectus given in Essay Number 1 the first 
two topics to be discussed were "The utility of Union" and 
"The insufficiency of the present Confederation" to preserve 
1. FED(B5), 574. Hamilton inserts the follcming footnote: 
"Hume 1 s 'Essays,' vol. i., Page 128: 'The Rise of Arts 
and Sciences ~ '" 
2 • FED ( 1 ) , 6 • 
3 • FED ( 1 ) , 6 • 
4. See above, 50. 
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it. Hamilton's Convention syllabusl shows that he had cov-
ered these subjects in his famous speech of June 18, 1787. 
The main thrust of the argument in both the syllabus and The 
Federalist is toward the dangers of disunion. 
The first series of essays which Hamilton wrote were 
Essays 6-9. He discus sed "the dangers ••• which will in all 
probability flow from dissensions between the states them-
selves and from domestic factions and convulsions,"2 for, as 
he explained, if the states remained joined in mere "partial" 
confederacies they might be thrown into "frequent and violent 
contests with each other."3 To write Essays Numbers 6-9 Ham-
ilton could rely on his Convention syllabus. The section from 
which this group of Essays were taken reads as follows: 
League Offensive & Defensive &c.--particular 
Govs. might exert themselves &c.--But liable 
to usual Vicissi LSic7--Internal Peace affect-
ed--Proximity of Situation--natural enemies--
Partial confederacies from unequal extent--
Power inspires ambition--Weakness begets jeal-
ousy--Western Territory--Obj: Genius of re-
publics pacific--Answer--jealousy of commerce 
as well as jealousy of power begets war--
Sparta Athens Thebes Rome Carthage Venice 
Hanseatic League England as many Popular as 
Royal Wars--Lewis the 14th Austria Bourbon 
William & Anne--wars depend on trifling circum-
stances everywhere--Dutchess of Marlboroughs 
Glove--Foreign Conquest--Dismemberment --Pol-
and-~Foreign Influence--Distractions set afloat 
Vicious humour--Standing armies by dissensions--
Domestic Factions--Montesquieu--4 
Essays Numbers 6-9 are written from this syllabus 
with this division: Essay Number 6 carries through "Dutchess 
1. Farrand, RFC, I, 304-308. 
2. FED ( 6) , 27. 
3 • FED ( 6 ) , 27 • 
4. Farrand, RFC, I, 307-308. 
of Marlborough's Glove"; Essay Number 7 carries through 
"Vicious humours"; Essay Number 8 discusses the rise of 
"standing armies"; and Essay Number 9 discusses "Factions" 
ending with a long quotation from Montesquieu. 
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As Hamilton had outlined in Essay Number 11 the sec-
om major division of discussion in the papers would be "The 
insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that 
Union." Discussion of this topic begins with Essay Number 
15. In Essays 15, 16, and 17 Hamilton developed the idea that 
no national government could endure unless it had jurisdic-
tion over the individuals in states rather than over the 
states in their corporate capacities. To do this Hamil ton 
could rely again upon his Convention syllabus.2 The subject 
of "The insufficiency of the present Confederation" is dealt 
with through Essay Number 22. Madison wrote Essays Numbers 
18, 19, and 20. An examination of Hamilton's syllabus under 
''Objections to the Present Confederation"3 ~ill shaN that it 
is paralleled to a notable degree by Essays Numbers 15, 16, 
17, and 21, and 22. 
Next came a discussion of "The necessity of a govern-
ment at least equally energetic with the one proposed." At 
this stage Madison and Hamil ton entered in to a division of 
labor. Hamilton would write all of the essays on "The ne-
cessity of a government equally energetic with the one pro-
posed," and Madison would write all of the essays dealing 
1. FED(l), 6. 2. Farrand, RFC, I, 304. 3. Farrand, RFC, 
I, 304. 
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with "The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the 
true principles of republican government." This division 
was a natural and logical one since Hamilton was keenly in-
terested in a vigorous government whereas Madison was in-
terested in the principles of federal government. Hamilton, 
in writing this section, used much of tbe material of the 
Convention syllabus.1 
He could not use all of the material of his speech to 
the Philadelphia Convention for he had made a plea for a gov-
ernment modelled after tbe British monarchy2; for a govern-
ment which could be maintained independent of the people's 
will3; for electing senators for life4; for a "strong soul-
ed" goverrun.ent.5 Adair appropriately suggests that "Hamil-
ton's remedy for this class war was the Hobbesian expedient 
of setting up a leviathan state to impose order upon the 
American people from above."6 When Hamilton learned that he 
could not secure the kind of government he had recommended 
to tbe Convention he departed and returned only for the 
closing session. So Hamilton was present at the Convention 
for the opening and closing sessions. He introduced a plan 
which was unacceptable to the Convention and left; he return-
ed and accepted a plan he did not want. And in behalf of his 
country he labored heroically to get ratified a Constitution 
that was better than he realized. Aside from the quality of 
1. Farrand, RFC, I, 308-309. 4. Farrand, RFC, I, 309. 
2. Farrand, RFC, I, 288. 
3. Farrand, RFC, I, 308. 
5. Farrand, RFC, I, ~08. 
6. Adair, Art.(l944) , 255. 
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The Federalist the mere fact that Hamilton would engage in 
such a compromise with himself is a monument to his great-
ness. His willingness to accept compromise as a basis for 
moving forward is as much of a lesson for us as any contri-
bution he made to social philosophy through his writings. 
4. Some Similarities between the Republic and 
The Federalist 
A. Distrust of Democracy. No attempt will be .n:a.de 
to establish a definition of democracy by vihich the views of 
Pl a to and the ~Titers of The Federalist may be criticized. 
Both Harold Laski and James Bryce attest the conclusion that 
an adequate definition cannot be given.1 "There are govern-
ment s which are 'on the line,' too popular to be called oli-
garchies, and scarcely enough to be called democracies."2 
Also, ":B'ree Government cannot but be, and has in reality al-
ways been, an Oligarchy within a Democracy."3 Here, the in-
terpretation of democracy presented by the Republic and The 
Federalist will be compared on the basis of their own content. 
Let us begin with Plato. His briefest description of 
democracy is tbat it results "when the poor win."4 Wbat en-
sues under this label? People lead mosaic lives, and no re-
strictions govern them. "They are free. Liberty and fre e 
speech are rife everywhere; anyone is allowed to do what he 
likes. n5 There is "plenty of variety and an equality of a 
l. 
2. 
3. 
5. 
Laski, 
Bryce, 
Bryce, 
Plato, 
Art.(l930), 76; Bryce, MD, I, 22. 
wiD, I, 22. 4. Plato, Rep., 557. Unless other-
niD , II, 550. wise noted, all references to Rep 
Rep., 557. will be to Cornford, RP. The 
Greek paging is used. 
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peculiar kind for equals and unequals alike."1 One's life 
is "subject to no order or restraint, and he has no wish to 
change an existence which he calls pleasant, free, and hap-
py."2 This is a description of the way those people live 
nwhose motto is liberty and equality. n 2 
Plato does not seem to have reached this appraisal of 
democracy through means of deductions from premises relevant 
to what a popular government could be thought to be like, 
but records a description of the people's governments of small 
city-states with which he was familiar.) Commitments as to 
what actually occurs in the civic life of a democracy sub-
, 
stantiate this opinion. "You are not obliged to be in au-
thority, however competent you may be, or to submit to au-
thority, if you do not like it; you need not fight when your 
fellow citizens are at war. n4 
Such a democracy engenders intolerance of all toler-
anc e. "A magnificent indifference" is exercised in regard 
"to the sort of life a mn has led before he enters poli-
tics."5 Men sit on juries and hold public office who have 
no legal right to do so.6 And Socrates tells Adeimantus: 
In a democracy you must have seen how men con-
demned to death or exile stay on and go about 
in public, and no one takes any more notice7than he would of a spirit that walked invisible. 
This picture of popular rule struck hard at the struc-
1. Plato, Rep., 558. 
2. Plato , Rep. , 561. 
3. Cornford, RP, 273. 
4· Plato, Rep., 557. 
5. Plato, Rep., 558. 
6. Plato, Rep., 557. 
7. Plato, Rep. , 5 58. 
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ture of Plato's view of the just state which could only be 
brought about by the rule of "genuine philosophers" who de-
spise "all existing honours as ·mean and v-orthless, caring 
only for the right and the honours to be gained from that."1 
The even order of a just society made up of tradesmen, aux-
iliaries and guardians doing their own work2 is disrupted by 
opposing factions which strive to banish each other.3 
A similar criticism of a completely popular govern-
ment is offered by the writers of The Federalist. There, 
Madison defines "a pure democracy" as "a society consisting 
of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer 
the government in person" and who "can admit of no cure for 
the mischiefs of faction."4 Both Plato and the writers of 
The Federalist are directly concerned with factions as a so-
cial malady. 
Hamilton echoes Plato's description of the way those 
people live "whose motto is iiberty and equalityu5 when he 
states: 
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of 
those republics the advocates of despotism have 
drawn arguments, not only against the forms of 
republican government, bgt against the very prin-
ciples of civil liberty. . 
The democratic city-state of ancient Greece which ran counter 
to Plato's concept of good government is, too, an object of 
criticism for Tfie Federalist. 
1. Plato, Rep., 540. 
2. Plato, Rep., 434. 
J. Plato, Rep., 557. 
4. FED(lO), 58. 
5 • Plato , Rep • , 
561. 
6 • FED ( 9 ) , 48 • 
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B. Attack on Factions. Distrust of democracy re-
ceived its expression in the Republic and The Federalist as 
a consequence of intolerance of the results of factions, the 
cause of which, said Madison, are "sown in the nature of 
man."1 They are brought about "into different degrees of 
activity, according to the different circumstances of civil 
society." 2 Factors which have driven mankind into parties 
have been religion, government, attachment to leaders, prop-
erty · "and many other points, as well of speculation as of 
practice,") Popular governments have failed to reconcile 
factional differences for the good of the community,4 the 
regulation of which "forms the principal task of modern 
legislation. n5 
Plato's chief purpose in the Republic was to determine 
whether or not it pays to b·e a just individual. His work can 
best be described as a psychological analysis of man's soul 
with analogies drawn from the state. It is necessary to sur-
vey this analysis briefly in order to decipher Plato's com-
plete mistrust of factions. Funda.Imntal to what he has to 
say in this connection is to bear in mind the assertion "that 
more things will be produced and the work be more easily and 
better done, when every man is set free from all other occu-
pations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he 
is naturally fit ted. ,,6 
1. FED(lO), 55. 
2. FED( 10) , 55. 
j. FED(lO), 55-56. 
4. FED(lO), 5S. 
5. FED(lO), 56. 
6. Plato, Rep., 369~370. 
Virtues to be found in an ideal state are wisdom, 
which is that peculiar form of knowledge 
possessed by some among the citizens of our 
new-founded commonwealth, which will enable 
it to take thought, not for some particular 
interest, but for the best possible conduct 
of the state as a w~ole - in its internal and 
external relations; 
courage, which is that quality possessed by those in the 
state who take tbe field and fight in its defense~; and 
temperance, which is that virtue brought about when self-
mastery exists and "the better part rules the worse. n.3 
Justice, or the fourth virtue, is expressed in "the ob-
servance by everyone, child or woman, slave or freeman or 
artisan, ruler or ruled, of this principle that each one 
should do his own proper work without interfering with 
others."4 Now what has this to do with factions? 
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Intemperance means that the different parts of the 
state are in disharmony among themselves and there is no 
protection of the _rights of the minority.5 Factions result 
when violations are made of the "universal principle" former-
ly laid do.vn6 ''that everyone ought to perform the one func-
tion in the coim!luni ty for which his nature best suited him. n7 
Likewise, the soul of men has three distinct parts, 
tbe rational,8 irrational appetite,9 and spirited.10 These 
1. Plato, Rep., 427-428. 6. Plato, Rep., .369-370. 
2. Plato, Rep., 428. 7. Plato, Rep., 432. 
3. Plato, Rep., 431. 8. Plato, Rep., 439. 
4. Plato, Rep., 433. 9. Plato, Rep., 439. 
5. Plato, Rep., 431. 10. Plato, Rep., 440. 
' 
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parts are analogous to the state which has "three orders to 
hold it together, traders, Auxiliaries, and Counsellors. ~,l 
The corresponding virtues of these parts of the soul 
are bravery, which characterizes the spirited part of one's 
nature2 ; wisdom, which is expressed by the part that rules 
and issues injunctions3; and temperance, which occurs "by 
reason of the unanimity and concord of all three. n4 
Factions result vmen there is internal conflict be-
tween tbe se parts of the soul just as when disharmony exists 
in a state. Plato could well assent to Madison's definition 
of a faction as a 
number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are 
united and ·actuated by some common impulse 
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the 
rights of other citizens, or to the perma~ent 
and aggregate interests of the community. · 
Hamilton states that if no more perfect models of 
government than that found in the petty republics of Greece 
and Italy can be devised, then "the enlightened friends to 
liberty" must abandon "the cause of that species of govem-
:rre nt as indefensible. "6 But in affirming that improve.rren ts 
have been made, Hamilton submits as evidence measures which 
were designed to eliminate factions.? 
C. Popular Governments Lead to Anarchy. Democracy, 
according .to Plato, tramples under foot "all those fine prin-
1. Plato ; Re;Q. , 440 ~ 
2. Plato , Rep. ; 441 • 
3. Plato , Rep. , 441 • 
4~ Plato, Rep., 441. 
5. FED(lO), 54· 
6. FED ( 9) , 48. 
?. FED(78), 508; 
( 49) J 328; 
(51) ' 341. 
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ciples we laid down in founding our commonwealth. "1 Waste 
is laid to the program of studies set forth to determine what 
an individual has ability to do. 2 Disharmony is promoted 
through intemperance, for temperance 
is not like courage and wisdom, which make 
the state wise and brave by residing each in 
one particular part ••.• it extends throughout 
tbe whole gamut of the state, p~oducing a 
consonance of all its elerren ts.; 
This intemperance is brought to pass by free men who 
enjoy "liberty and free speech" and are allowed to do with 
them what they like.4 As a result justice is banished, which 
is that quality 
which makes it possible for the three we have 
already considered, wisdom, courage, and temper-
ance, to take their place in the commonwealth, 
and so long ~s it remains present secures their 
continuance.' 
Justice, however, cannot reign unless temperance, or the 
"unanimity or harmonious agreement between the naturally su-
perior and inferior elements on the question which of the two 
should govern, ,,6 exists. 
Liberty, free speech, lack of restraints and contempt 
for "fine · principles"7 are features of a democracy. Plato 
correctly called this "an agreeable :form o:r anarchy. n8 When 
self-control, "dishonoured and insulted as the weakness of 
an unmanly :fool,'' is placed in exile, there remains only "to 
1. Plato, Rep., 558. 
2. Plato, Rep., 535-541. 
3. Plato, Rep., 431. 
4. Plato, Rep., 557. 
5. Plato , Rep. , 432. 
6. Plato, Rep., 431. 
7. Pla to , Rep. , 5 58. 
8. Plato, ReE., 558. 
marshal the great procession bringing home Insolence, An-
archy, Waste and impudence, those resplendent divinities 
crowned with garlands."1 
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Hamilton voiced an opinion somewhat similar to Plato's 
view of a society in discord when he said: 
I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a 
different and, perhaps, still more alarming 
kind--those which will in all probability flow 
from dissensions between the States thernsel~es, 
and from domestic factions and convulsions. -
These words were set together to convince o~ponents of the 
new constitution that it should be adopte.d, but Hamilton was 
fully aware of the anarchic leanings of popular governments. 
He asserts that ancient popular rules "were kept in a state 
of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and 
anarchy.") 
Madison refers to the "turbulent democracies of an-
cient Greece" which fell fatally wounded because they had no 
"proper antidote for the diseases of faction. n4 The removal 
of restraints from those who discount Plato's concept of sym-
metrical living clears the way for anarchy. 
D. Emphasis on Ability. Writing of the efficiency 
o~ a well-planned national government, Jay contends that the 
"best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but 
also will generally be appointed to manage it. n5 Local and 
state governments may allow some incompetent individuals to 
hold office , but even if they are elected to the na ti onal 1 eg-
1. Plato, Rep., 560. 
4. FED(l4), 79-80. 
2. FED( 6) , 27. 
5 • FED ( J ) , 14. J • FED ( 9 ) , 4 7 • 
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islative body, competent men will receive appointments to 
offices under tbe national government rather than they, since 
in the national legislative there will always be an abundance 
of talent.1 
Return of elected individuals to the people after term-
ination of a certain period of time 2 for reapproval or rejec-
tion by the people offers a check to incompetence in office. 
The higher an office is in the national government, the more 
advanced are qualifications for holding it. For example, 
"the qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished 
from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age 
and a longer period of citizenship.") 
Election of the Executive ought to be done "by men 
most capable of anal yzing the qualities adapted to the station, 
and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation. n4 
And the Executive should be one who is able ttto dare to act 
his own opinion with vigor and decision."5 
Plato bases his plan for an ideal state on the view 
that an individual can do one job best, 6 and he outlines a 
program of training? to determine whether individuals will 
best be suited f'or artisans, warriors or rulers. Individuals 
capable of most advanced study and understanding make up the 
ruling class, "who lift up the eye of the soul to gaze on 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
FED( 3) ~ 14-15. 
FED(52J, 343• 
FED(62), 400. 
FED ( 68) , 441. 
5. FED(71), 465. 
6. Plato, Rep., 370. 
7. Plato, Rep., 535-541. 
that which sheds light on all things, and when they .have 
seen the Good itself, take it as a pattern for the right 
ordering of the state."l 
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Philosopher rulers are men who "despise all existing 
honours as mean and worthless, caring only for the right and 
the honours to be gained from that, and above all for jus-
tice."2 Somewhat comparable to them are the members of the 
judicial review, who "are to hold their offices during good 
behavior".3 and who "guard the Constitution and the rights 
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors ••• of de-
signing men."4 Yet this is a slightly strained similarity, 
so attention will now be directed to some differences. 
5. Some Differences between the Republic and 
The Federalist 
A. Instead of Democracy. Plato's solution to the 
miscarriages of the rampant freedom found in popular gov-
ernments is not a remedy within the limits of democracy. 
He presents an ideal picture of a state based on a division 
of labor. It is made up of "traders, Auxiliaries, and Coun-
sellors"5 who, when the state is just, work in harmony with 
one another. Assignment is made to one of these orders of 
the state on the basis of "the mixture of metals in the souls 
of children."6 
1. Plato, Rep., 540. 
2. Plato, Rep., 540. 
.3. FED(78), 50.3. 
4. FED(78), 508. 
5. Plato, Rep., 440. 
6. Plato, Rep., 414 • 
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A child with an alloy of brass or iron must be sta-
tioned among "the craftsmen or the farmers," whereas one 
"with gold or silver in his composition will be promoted, 
"according to his value, to be a Guardian or an Auxiliary.nl 
Excellence is achieved in the affairs of public life when 
farmers, Auxiliaries and Guardians "perform the one function 
in the community" which their respective natures best suit.2 
No admission is made in the Republic of the impossi-
bility of Plato's plan of government being realized. He 
states that such a realization, "though hard, is not impossi-
ble.") Whatever one may say of it, however, the contention 
could hardly be supported that it has any leanings toward 
being a representative government. Elsewhere Plato does ao~ 
knowledge the Laws as "second best."4 The Platonic phil-
osopher state is not a republic. It is designed to alleviate 
the condition of factions by means of a categorizing of tal-
ents. A rational, harmonious, justice will be brought about 
when reason takes "the many-headed beast" under its care to 
"tame its wildness, like the gardener who trains his cherish-
ed plants while he checks the growth of weeds."5 
1. 
4· 
In answer to this Madison cries out: 
It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen 
will be able to adjust these clashing in-
terests, and render them all subservient 
to the public gpod. Enlighteneg statesmen 
will not always be at the helm. 
Plato, Rep., 414. 2. Plato, Rep., 432. J. Plato, Rep., 
Plato, Laws, V, 739ff. This reference to 502. 
Plato's Laws is to The Dialogues of Plato, translated by 
Jowett. --5. Plato, Rep., 589. 6. FED(lO), 57. 
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Madison states in another connection that in a "nation of 
philosophers" much of the present legislation would be use-
less, since men would be obedient to laws because of an "en-
lightened reason," but it is added, "A nation of philosophers 
is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of 
Kings wished for by Plato. ul What, then, doe_s The Federalist 
present as a solution to the maladjustments of a completely 
popular rule? 
It presents a republican form of government2 offering 
a republican remedy far the diseases most incident to it.J 
Much as the writers of The Federalist distrusted rule by a 
majority of the people in a given civil life, they argued 
tba t the evils ensuing could best be remedied through an amel-
ioration of popular govermnent by means of what Hamilton 
called great improvements in the science of politics.4 
Under the influence of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws 
these improvements include: 
The regular distribution of power into distinct 
department s; the introduction of legislative 
balances and checks; the institution of courts 
composed of judges holding their offices dur-
ing gpod behavior; the representation of the 
people in the 51egi sla ture by deputies of their ONn election. . 
Then, there is the difficulty of the aiJBnding process,6 
which was held to be another factor which prevented selfish 
interests from ameliorating representative government. Aneth-
l. FED(49), 329. 
2. FED(39), 243. 
3. FED(lO), 62. 
4. FED( 9), 48. 
5 • FED ( 9 ) , 48 • 
6. FED(49 and 50), 327-
335. See particular-
ly 328. 
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er important factor in this regard is "the qualified negative 
of the president upon the acts or resolutions of the two 
houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of 
returning all bills with objections."! 
Other arguments which the writers of The Federalist 
felt to be safeguards to the disruption of republican gov-
ernment were "the appointment of senators by the State legis-
latures"2 for long terms, "the equality of representation in 
the Senate".3 by the different states, the election of the 
president by "men chosen by the people for the special pur-
pose"4 and a judicial review of executive and legislative 
acts.5 
Hamilton was extremely vigorous in his attack on those 
who argued that "the paver of construing the laws according 
to the spirit of the Constitution, will enable that court to 
mould them into whatever shape it may think proper"6 and saw 
in the judicial review the most powerful stronghold against 
the errors of the democratic Greek city-state. That is to 
say, in the case of Hamilton, against the innovation of popu-
lar government. In answer to the above quotation against the 
pONer of' judicial review he stated tba t "there is not a syl-
lable in the plan under consideration which directly empowers 
the national courts to construe the laws according to the 
spirit of the Constitution."? 
1. FED(73), 476. 
2. FED(62), 401. 
4. FED(68), 441. 
5. FED(78), 504. 6. FED(81), 523. 7. FED(81), 524. 
3. FED(62), 401. 
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This correction of the errors of popular government 
enumerated above makes The Federalist dissimilar to the Re-
public. Though similar to the Republic in its "distrust of 
democracy," in its recognition of the inability of popular 
rules to treat of factions and in its realization of the an-
archie nature of ancient city-states, The Federalist, never-
theless, sought solutions of all these difficulties within 
the confines of representative government. As a result the 
Constitution which it expounded has proven adaptable, through 
the amending process, to democratic ways of life. 
Madison rightly contended that a reconciliation of 
conflicting economic interests could best be effected by a 
republican government based on the representative principle. 
Public views, h'El held, would be refined and enlarged by 
passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best dis-
cern the true interest of their country, and 
whose patriotism and love of justice will be 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations. Under such a regu-
lation, it may well happen that the public 
voice, pronounced by the representatives of 
the people, will be more consonant to the pub-
lic good thin if pronounced by the people 
themselves. 
This ret'ining process ot' the views ot' the people is well 
adapted, in the case of The Federalist, to favoring the best 
policies for a state as a whole. The larger the society the 
more capable it is of self-government 2 and the less of "town-
Ire eting" democracy, such as Plato disliked. 
1. FED(lO), 59. 2. FED(51), 341. 
86 
But, in the case of the Republic, philosopher-rulers 
are selected on the basis of achievement while undergoing a 
period or periods of study •1 They may all come from one 
section, since territorial and population interests are not 
factors in determining rulers in Plato's .ideal state. If 
they are rational and just, an understanding of the problems 
confronting a society can be had by all rulers. Here, it 
seems that The Federalist presents the best system and the 
one most likely to succeed due to its variegated representa-
tion. 
B. Result of Different Solutions. Important to con-
sider in a comparison of the Republic with The Federalist is 
the status of the individual. We have seen that in Plato's 
Republic the state has three orders to hold it together. This 
state is made up of "traders, Auxiliaries, and Counsellors."2 
That group of people vno produce goods are members of tb9 
artisan class. The Auxiliaries attend to the defense and 
protection of the others. Counsellors .. care for the "best 
possible conduct of the state as a whole in its internal and 
external relations. n3 Justice is brought about in the state 
when everyone performs "the one function in the community for 
which his nature best"4 . suits him. 
It is deducible from this summary that individuals are 
assigned their lot in the state on the basis of what they can 
do best. If a person is a better carpenter than a warrior or 
1. Plato, Rep., 535-541. 3. Plato; Rep., 428. 
2. Plato, Rep., 440. 4. Plato, Rep., 432. 
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anything else, he spends his life as a carpenter. One be-
comes a soldier by manifesting the qualities which character-
ize a good soldier. Rulers are chosen from among that group 
who manifest superb understanding and intellectual excellence. 
There is no place in such a society for politics, for 
politics would create discord, and the result vrould be in-
justice. Any type of republican go.v.ernment would creat loop-
holes through which individuals might advance to positions 
in the state for which they were not best fitted. Hence, 
election of individuals to office could not be tolerated in 
Plato's ideal civil society. 
The writers of The Federalist were pessimistic as to 
the possibility of Plato's ideal being realized, 1 and they 
argued that through a process of balancing a faction against 
a faction, if need be inefficient officials would not be al-
lowed to corrupt the government •2 The counterpart of Plato's 
concept of the just state in The Federalist is discovered in 
the view 
that as all these exterior :provisions are found 
to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, 
by so contriving the interior structure of the 
government as that its several · constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the me~s of 
keeping each other in their proper places. 
It may be asked regarding the status of the individual 
in the social philosophy of The Federalist, who are to be rep-
resentatives of the people? Answer to this question brings to 
1~ FED(49), 329; (10), 57. 
2. FED(49), 327; (9), 48; (62), 401. 3. FED(51}, 336. 
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view a complete break with Plato's view of the ideal state. 
Instead of a state constructed on a division of labor, one 
finds a republican government founded on the representative 
principle. And the electors of federal representatives are 
the people. 
Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learn-
ed, more than the ignorant; not the haughty 
heirs of distinguisood na1ms, more than the 
humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious for-
tune. The electors are to be the gleat body 
of the people of the United States. 
These federal representatives can be any of the citi-
zens who meet specified requiren:ents2 and who are duly 
elected or appointed. 
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? 
Every citizen whose merit may recommend him 
to tbe esteem and confidence of his country. 
No qualification of wealth, of birth, of re-
ligious faith, or of civil profession is per-
mitted to fetter the judgment jr disappoint 
the inclination of the people • 
This lack of qualification for public office due to 
"wealth, birth, religious faith, or civil profession" means 
that a federal official may be a rich man, poor man, doctor, 
lawyer, or philosopher (not Indian chief). Gumrdians in the 
Republic must have property limitations4 and serve "without 
getting a mercenary's pay. n5 There is nothing in The Feder-
alist analogous to this. 6 
1. FED(57); 371. 
2~ FED( 52); 341-342; (62}, 400. 
3. ~~D(57), 371. 
4. Plato , Re:p ~ , 416. 
5. Plato, Rep., 419. 
6. See below, 111-113. 
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War is waged in Plato's ideal state by the Auxilia-
ries, "who will enforce the decisions of the RUlers. n1 The 
Auxiliaries are n:embers of a society who best manifest 
courage or the spirited element of the soul. In The Feder-
alist regulation of tbe militia is assigned "to the direc-
tion of the national authority, " 2 and there is no particular 
class of individuals who alone can be I!2mbers of it. 
Plato is as much interested in the Republic in deter-
mining what a just individual is like as he is in construct-
ing a concept of a just state. This work is as much a psy-
chological treatise as it is a book on social philosophy. 
The Federalist, on the other hand, is a vigorous plea for the 
adoption of a Constitution based on the repUblican principle 
of government and framed to work. 
In spite of their distrust of democracy as they de-
fined democracy, both Plato and the writers of The Federalist 
sought to avoid tyranny. Plato's wise individual ruled his 
own spirit, and Plato's ideal society was put together with 
symmetry. There was no place for tyranny. Through a system 
of checks and balances and a republican form of government 
based on the representative principle the writers of The Fed-
eralist sought to avoid either anarchy or tyranny. It was 
unnecessary for them to assume that a republican form of gov-
ernll2nt is not democratic. 
1. Plato, Rep., 414. 
2. FED(29), 176. 
6. Some Compa risons of Locke's Essay Concerning 
the True Ori ginal, Extent and End 
of Civil Government with The Federalist 
A. A Government of the People. Both Locke's Es-
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1 §.£Z and The Federalist contain the view that civil society 
rests on the c ons ent of the governed . Locke's views in 
this regard are most l y theoretical deductions from a view 
that man is a rational being ·when he adheres t o a "law of 
2 
n a ture," whereas the authors of The Federalist assumed 
the tas k of arguing in behalf of a proposed constitution 
which was to become a great living and growing reality. 
This difference does not a lter acceptance by Locke and the 
writer s of The Federalis t tha t g overnments are best based on 
the consent of t he governed. 
Men are in civil society for Locke when they are "unit-
ed into one body, and have a common established law and j udi-
cative to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies 
between them and plmis h offenders ."3 But thi s statement alone 
is not a clear example of how men enter into a social contract. 
We are b orn into a stat e of f reedom4 wher e ana rchy 
would ex is t if we did not give up this freedom to a central -
1. Locke's Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and 
End of Civil Government wi ll be ref erred to in the body 
of t h is s tudy e s Essay . It is the second division of 
Locke 's ~vo Treat ises on Government and is f requently 
referred to as the Second Treatise on Government. 
2 . Locke, ECCG, ch. ii, sec. 6. All references to ECCG 
are to Burtt {ed.), EPBM. 
3 . Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 87 . 
4 . Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 87; ch. viii, sec. 95; 
ch. viii, sec. 104. 
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ized social agency. Absolute monarchy is discounted by 
Locke as being any form of civil government at all. It is 
inconsistent with civil society.1 This is true because 
civil society is 
to avoid and remedy those inconveniences of 
the state of nature which necessarily follow 
from every man's being judge in his own case, 
by setting up a known authori ty to which 
everyone of that society may· appeal upon 
an injury received or controversy that may 
arise, a~d which everyone of the society ought 
to obey. 
The argument, however, that one does not enjoy civil 
society when under a monarch is itself inconsistent with 
the view that wherever any number of men unite into one so-
ciety, "as to acquit everyone his executive power of the law 
of nature, and to resign it to the public, there, and there 
only, is a political, or civil society.n3 Locke speaks at 
times as though releasing "uncontrolled enjoyment of all the 
rights and privileges of the law of na ture"4 to a govern-
mental authority is equivalent to, in fact is, civil society. 
When he tells us that civil society does not exist under an 
absolute monarchy we are led to wonder just where such a so-
cie ty does begin. 
Often statements are made to the effect that civil 
society exists when agreement is made to enter into a social 
compact between the persons concerned. l!,or example, 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 90. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 90. 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 89. 
4. Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 87. 
this is done by barely agreeing to unite into 
one political society, which is all the com-
pact that is, or needs be, between the indi-
viduals1that enter into or make up a common-
wealth. 
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Even Locke admits that if we go far enough into the past 
"tonards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally 
find them under the government of one man. n 2 This type of 
commonwealth had its counterpart in the patriarchal families, 
and the reference to such a society as a commonwealth indi-
cates that it might be conceived as a civil society. 
Yet this position is discounted by Locke when he says 
moving back into history and finding original commonwealths 
under one man 
destroys not that which I affirm, viz.: that 
the beginning of politic. society depends up-
on the consent of the individuals to join in-
to, and make one society; who when they are 
thus incorporated, might set3up what form of government they thought fi t. 
Men originally placed their confidence in and submitted to 
the rule of a monarch .by common consent for expedient reasons. 4 
This leader was the director of battles,5 and no one "dreamt 
of monarchy being jure divino. "6 
Locke, too, was not unmindful of a society in which 
the officials were elected representatives who form3d laws 
to which the people gave adherence. It would be unfair to 
leave him in the above light. In fact, he even states once 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 99 . 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 105. 
J. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 106. 
4. Locke, ECGG, ch. viii, sec. 112. 
5. Locke, ECCG, 
ch. viii, sec. 109. 
6. Locke, ECCG, 
ch. viii, sec. 112. 
of monarchies: 
that the reason that continued the for.m of 
government in a single person was not any 
regard or respect to paternal authority, since 
all petty monarchies, that is, almost all 
monarchies, near their original, have been 
commonly--at least upon occasion--elective.1 
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Men, also, can change governments if they so desire. Alle-
giance to a compact does not bind one's posterity. "What-
ever engage~n ts or promises anyone made for himself, he is 
under the obligation of them, but cannot by any compact 
whatsoever bind his children or posterity."2 
The principle, then, to which Locke gives emphasis 
is that no matter what form of government3 to which one 
gives approval, it is done by one's own consent. The trans-
ition in Locke's argument is from conformity to a law of 
nature to obedience to civil law. 
In what way does the political philosophy that social 
compacts should rest on the consent of those who are govern-
ed find expression in The Federalist? It is inherent to the 
nature of The Federalist in that it is a series of essays de-
signed to persuade a people that they should give their ap-
proval to a proposed constitution. 
This is nowhere more clearly expressed than by Hamil ton 
when he states: 
After an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency 
of the subsisting federal government, you are 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 106. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 116. 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. x, sec. 132. 
called upon to deliberate on a new consti-
tution f'or the United States of America.I 
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He goes so far as to remind his readers tba t it msy be left 
to those giving their consent to the constitution being pre-
sented for their approval to determine 
whether societies of men are really capable 
or not of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice, or whether they are 
forever destined to depend for their politi-
cal constitutions on accident and force.2 
Madison, in admitting that no claims for flawlessness are 
made for the proposed constitution, calls attention to the 
fact: 
It is not a little remarkable that in every 
case reported by ancient history, in which 
government has been established with delibe-
ration and consent, the task of framing it 
has not been committed to an assembly of men.3 
Again, in his candid survey of the plan of government report-
ed by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, Madison reminds 
us that none but a republican form of government "would be 
reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with 
the fundamental principles of the Revolution or with that 
honorable determination which animates every votary of free-
dom,"4 which .is belief in man's capacity for self-government. 
The writers of The Federalist never sought to argue 
that the new government should be taken completely out of the 
hands of the people once it was established by their consent. 
1 • FED ( 1 ) , 3 • 
2 • FED ( 1 } , 3 • 
3. FED(38), 233. 
4• FED(39), 243. 
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There was quite an argument among critics of the pro-
posed constitution and among the designers of it as well as 
to when the people should be appealed to for tbe ir consent 
in regard to new legislation. In answering an argument as 
to when there should be an appeal to the people , Madison 
states: 
There is certainly great force in this 
reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove 
that a constitutional road to the decision 
of the people ought to be marked out -ani 
kept open, for cert~in great and extra-
ordinary occasions. 
These citations will suffice to show that both Locke 
and the writers of The Federalist were of the opinion that 
civil society functions most properly when it rests on the 
consent of the governed. Closely related to this principle 
of political philosophy is the view that representatives of 
the people who make up a given society may be elected by the 
people of that society. 
B. Elected Representatives. Attention was called2 
to Locke's statement that even monarchies near their begin-
ning have commonly been elective. That Locke believed in 
the election of the legislative branch of government by the 
people composing a particular civil society is defensible 
from the development of his thought in his Essay. The legis-
lative division of a social compact has as its task the pres-
ervation of a particular society and 
1. FED(49), 328. 2. See above, 93. 
is not only the supreme power of the common-
wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the 
bands where the community have once placed 
it; nor can any edict of anybody else, in 
what form soever conceived, or by what power 
soever backed, have the force and obligation 
of a law, which has not its sane tion from 
that legislatiye which the public has chosen 
and appointed. 
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The phrase "which the public has chosen" does not in-
dicate any distinct kind of elective system, but it does 
present us with the idea tba t some scheme . whereby the voice 
of the people is crystallized in the selection of an official 
or officials is meant. That idea is fundamental to Locke's 
political philosophy, and no constitution is a valid one 
which is not formed by representatives chosen for that pur-
pose by the people who are to be bound by it. A consti-
tution must be 
made by persons authorized thereunto by the 
consent and · appointment of the people, with-
out which no one man or number of men amongst 
them can have authority of na~ing laws · that 
shall be binding to the rest. 
It was also clearly understood by Locke that indi-
vidua 1 s elected by the people to be their representatives 
held an official capacity only d w-ing . the 1 ength of tii~E for 
which they were chosen. At the termination of a period of 
ti:roo for which one had been elected, the people had. the 
power of expressing themselves again for a choice.3 
1. Locke; ECCG, ch. xi, sec. 134. · 
2. Locke; ECCG; ch. xix, · sec. 212. · 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. xiii, sec. 154; ch. xix, sec. 243. 
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This power of the people to elect some of their rep-
resen ta ti ve s is expressed by Madison when he states, "If the 
plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from 
the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as 
no longer defensible."1 
Yet to understand Tbe Federalist adequately, recog-
nition must be given to a manifest distrust of complete de-
mocracy among its writers. What they favored was a type of 
repr esen tati ve governrnen t which tended to dilute p_opular gov-
ernment. It may be that in their arguments for a remedy of 
a completely popular government they gave expression to a 
more perfect democracy. 
After a discussion of the miscarriages of ancient re-
pub lie an governrr.ents, Hamilton states: 
The science of politics, however, like most 
other sciences, has received great improve-
n:ent •••• The regular distribution of power 
into distinct departments; the introduction 
of legislative balances and checks; the in-
stitution of courts composed of judges hold-
ing their offices during good behavior; the 
representation of the people in the legis 2 lature by deputies of their ovm election, 
are modern improvements. In Essay Number 35 Hamilton remarks 
that "the idea of an actual representation of all classes of 
the people, by persons of each class, is altogether vision-
ary. "3 
Madison was of the opinion: 
1~ FED(39), 243. 
2. FED( 9), 48 • 
3. FED(35), 213. 
The instability, injustice, and confusion in-
troduced into the public councils, have, in 
truth, been the mortal diseases under which 
popular governments have everywhere perished.l 
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But he was aware that great improvements bad been rmde in re-
moving certain ills from popular government and calls our 
attention to the fact that "our most considerate and virtuous 
citizens" were aware of the necessity that some obvious de-
fects be remedied. Madison contended that the enlightened 
citizenry were familiar with the abuse of the public good in 
the interest of rival parties and that me a sur es were often 
decided, "not according to the rules of justice and the rights 
of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interest-
ed and overbearing rmjori ty. 112 
The difficulty of the amending process3 was another 
factor which prevented representative government from being 
weakened by selfish interests. Another important factor in 
this regard is "the qualified negative of the President upon 
tbe acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature; 
or , in otbe r words, his power of returning all bills with ob-
jections. "4 
Other arguments which the writers of The Federalist 
felt to be safeguards to the disruption of republican govern-
ment were "the appointment of senators by the State legis-
la tures"5 for long terms, "the equality of representation in 
in tbe senate"6 by the different states, the election of the 
1. 
4. 
FED ( 10 ) ~ 53 • 2 ~ 
FED(73), 476. 5. 
FED ( 10) ; 54. . 3 • 
FED(62), 401. 6. 
FED{49-50), 327-335. 
FED(62), 401. 
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president by "men chosen by the people for the special pur-
pose"1 and a judicial review of executive and legislative 
acts. 2 
Hamilton was extremely vigorous in his attack on those 
who argued that "the power of construing the laws according 
to the spirit of the Constitution, will enable that court to 
mould them into whatever shape it may think proper"3 and saw 
in the judicial review the most powerful stronghold against 
democratic innovation. That is to say, in the case of Hamil-
ton, against the innovation of popular government. In answer 
to the above quotation against tbe power of judicial review, 
he stated: 
In the first place, there is not a syllable 
in the plan under consideration which direct-
b[ empowers the national courts to construe 
the laws a~cording to the spirit of the Con-
stitution. 
Locke's view of a "perfect democracy" and the defi-
nition presented by The Federalist of a "pure democracy" are 
similar. Locke states: 
The Majority having, as has been shown, upon 
men's uniting into society, tbe whole power of 
the community, naturally in them, may employ 
all that pONer in making laws for the communi-
ty from time to time, and executing those laws 
by officers of their own appointing: and then 
the form of the government is a perfedt democ-
racy.' 
1. FED(68); 441~ 
2. FED(78), 504. 
3. FED(81), 523. 
4. FED(81), 524. 
5. Locke, EGGG, ch. x, sec. 132. 
100 
Madison means by a ttpure democracy,n "a society consisting of 
a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
government in person."1 
Both Locke and the writers of The Federalist were 
cognizant of the difficulties involved where a majority of 
the people ruled or where factions worked for their own 
interest rather than the public good. Locke stated in regard 
to the legislative: 
They are to govern by promulgated established 
laws, not to be varied in particular cases, 
but to have one rule for rich and poor , for 
the fav~rite at court and the countryman at 
plough. 
Madison presents a clear argument in the following citation 
of how the writers of The Federalist meant to reconcile con-
flicting economic interests in a republican government found-
ed upon the representative principle. The public views would 
be refined and enlarged 
by passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may 
best discern the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love of 
justice will be least likely to sacri~ice 
it to temporary or partial considerations. 
Under such a regula,tion,. it may well happen 
that the public voice, .pronounced by the 
representatives of the people, will be more 
consonant to the public good than3if pro-nounced by the people themselves. 
But the constitution which The Federalist recommended 
has grown more democratic thr-ough the means of the amending 
1. FED(lO), 58• See above, 72•74. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. xi, sec. 142. 
3. FED( 10) , 59. 
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process. For example, the direct election of senators, the 
enfranchisement of Negroes, and nation-wide woman suffrage 
required constitutional amendments. This, however, enhances 
the genius of The Federalist in its promotion of the amend-
ing process1 as well as discounting some of the arguments 
made in favor of the remedies of popular government.2 
Locke is very clear in his presentation of the idea 
that governments must at times revert to the people. "When 
it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew 
into wba t hands they please, and so consti tut.e a new form of 
government. ,3 Yet Locke failed to clarify any means by which 
the people might alter their government except at the termi-
nation . of a period of time for which a representativ~ or rep-
resentatives had been elected. 
The power of judicial review4 advocated by The Feder-
alist is ·a marked advance over Locke's political philosophy. 
Locke states that "whatsoever shall be done manifestly for 
the good of the people, and the establishing the government 
upon its true foundations is, and always will be, just pre-
raga ti ve. "5 He further adds that 
1. 
2. 
3. 
the executar of the laws, having the power 
in his hands, has by the common law of nature 
a right to make use of it for the good of 
society, in many cases wherg the municipal 
law has given no direction. 
FED(49), 328. 4. 
FED(62), 401. 
ECCG, ch. x, sec. 132. 5. 
6. 
FED(81), 524. See Essays Num-
bers 78-79 in their entirety. 
Locke, ECCG, ch. xiii, sec. 158. 
Locke, ECCG, ch. xiv, sec. 159. 
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The executive may "act according to discretion for the public 
good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even 
against it."1 This is at wide variance with Hamilton's plea 
that "there is not a syllable in the plan under considera-
tion which directly empowers the national courts to construe 
the laws according to the spirit of the Cons ti tu tion. u 2 
Also, a bit of vagueness or inconsistency is noticed 
in the development of Locke's thought in regard to the legis-
lative and executive branches of government when compared to 
his view of prerogative. He states that 
the legislative, or supreme authority, cannot 
assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary 
arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense 
justice, and decide the rights of the subject 
by promulgated standing laws, and known au-
thorized judges.J 
And the executive power is only to "see to the execution of 
the laws that are made and remain in force. n4 
There is much that is similar between the general 
framework of a kind of government discussed in Locke's Essay 
and that advocated by the writers of The Federalist. Locke 
recognizes a legislature5 based on an equal representation of 
the people6 and chosen by the people for a certain period of 
time? to make laws. The legislative branch of government is 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. xiv, sec. 160; see also ch. xiv, sec. 164. 
2. FED(81), 524. 
3. Locke, ECCG, . ch. xi, sec. 136. 
4. Locke, ECCG, ch. xii, sec. 144. 
5. Locke, ECCG, ch. xii, sec. 143. 
6. Locke, ECCG, ch. xiii, sec. 158. 
7. Locke, ECCG, ch. xiii, sec. 154; ch. xii1, sec. 157. 
10.3 
inconstantly in session1 and during their absence from as-
sembly the executive administers the laws2 and may even call 
an extra session of the legislative assembly • .3 
The following counterpart of this Lockian general 
framework of government is found in The Federalist. The 
legislature is that branch of governm-ent which has "an im-
mediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the 
people. n4 Apportionment of representatives to the several 
states is recommended to be made on the same basis "with 
tba t of direct taxes." But, 
It is not contended that the number of people 
in each State ought not to be the standard 
for regulating the proportion of those who 5 are to represent the people of each state. 
Members of the House of Representatives are chosen 
for a certain period of time, at the termination of which 
they must re-submit themselves to the people for approval 
if they desire re-election. "Biennial elections will be as 
useful to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that 
they will be safe to the liberty of the people ."6 This 
House is inconstantly in session and is adjourned by the 
Executive when they cannot agree among themselves upon a 
time of· -adjournment. 7 
In the absence of chosen representatives, a good ex-
ecutive insists on a "steady administration of the laws."8 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. xii, sec. 143. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. xii, sec. 144. 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. xiii, sec. 154. 
4. FED(52), 343. 
5. FED(54), 353. 
6. FED(53), .35.3. 
7. FED( 77), 501. 
8. FED(70), 454. 
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And if extraordinary occasions warrant such action, he may 
convene one or both houses of the legislature.1 
Any republican form of government raises the diffi-
cult problem of the rule of the majority versus the rights 
of the ·minority. Much of the preceding discussion can be 
directed to a discussion of this difficulty. The Federalist 
itself is as much a document designed to remedy this problem 
as to remedy any other. Both Locke and the writers of The 
Federalist realized how in a "pure democracy" the majority 
insisted on the accomplishment of their interests at the ex-
pense of the minority. 2 But as we shall see, Locke offered 
no solution comparable to tha~ of The Federalist. 
Most of Locke's discussion. of majority rule is con-
earned with an explanation of how an original social compact 
is brought about. There the voice of a majority in the 
forming of a government includes all of those within its 
area of influence who have consented to form a civil soci-
ety. 
When any number of men have so consented to 
make one community or government, they are 
thereby presently incorporated, and make one 
body politic, wherein the majority have a 
right to act and conclude the rest.3 
At the very time anyone consents to membership in a 
civil society he submits himself "to the determination of 
the majority" and is "to be concluded by it. n4 This con-
1. FED(69}, 447. 4. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 97. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. x, sec. 132; FED(lO), 58. 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 95. 
elusion of Locke is essentially sound as a general state-
ment in regard to the beginning of a civil community. 
For if the consent of the majority shall not 
in reason be received as the act of the whole 
and conclude every individual, nothing but 
the consent of every individual ern make any-
thing to. be the act of the whole. 
This would result in so many imperfections that the re-
sult would be anarchy. 
1~ 
The difficult problem which this position regarding 
the rule of the majority at the beginning of a society raises 
is to what extent the interests of the minority are going to 
be protected and respected once a government is formed. It 
is in the treatment of this problem that The Federalist sur-
passes Locke's Essay in an excellence of analysis and solu-
tion. But it would be incorrect to say that Locke did not 
recognize that the rights of the minority should be cared for. 
In a discussion of legislative power, Locke even 
strikes at the center ~f the problem of factions with which 
tbe writers of The Federalist excelled in their treatment. 
There is no need that the legislative should 
be always in being, not having always business 
to do; and because it may be too great a tempt-
ation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power 
~or the same persons ••• both in its making and 
execution to their own private advantage, and 
thereby come to have a distinct interest from 
the rest of the community, 2contrary to the end of society and government. 
He also states that laws are "not to be varied in particular 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 98. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. xii, sec. 143. 
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cases" and that there is to be "one rule for rich and poor, 
for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough. nl 
These, however, are general statements which verge on the 
nature of being platitudes. The only effort at solution of 
the problem of the majority wersus the minority given by 
Locke is that of the inconstancy in session of the legis-
lative along with the republican nature of government. 
Madison, too, believed that. __ a reconciliation of con-
flicting economic interests could be effected through a re-
publican government based on the representative principle. 
He held that. the public views should be passed through a cho-
sen body of citizens 
whose wisdom may best discern the true interest 
of their country, and whose patriotism and love 
of justice will be least likely to sacr~fice it 
to temporary or partial considerations. 
But The Federalist goes much farther than this in the analy-
sis of factions. 
The Federalist defines a faction as a 
number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole , who are 
united and actuated by some common impulse 
or passion, or of interest, adverse to the 
rights of other citizens, or to the perm~ent 
and aggregate inter.ests of the community.) 
This is a proper putting of the : problem, since it is no less 
bad for a majority to control a minority than for a minority 
to control a majority. The enlightened public was familiar 
with this difficulty and complained 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. xi, sec. 142. 
2. FED{lO), 59. 3. FED{lO), 54. 
that the public good is disregarded in the 
conflicts of rival parties, and that measures 
are too often decided, not according to the 
rules of justice and the rights of the minor 
party, but by the superior forci of an inter-
ested and overbearing majority. 
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As a remedy to the problem of factions, Hamilton calls our 
attention to 
the regular distribution of pc:m-er in to dis-
tinct departrr£nts; the introduction of legis-
lative balances and checks; the institution 
of courts composed of judges · ~olding their 
offices during good behavior. 
And of the judicial review he states that it is requisite to 
guard the minor party from serious oppressions.) 
These remarks are in a large measure a reproduction 
of too argument for those measures which diluted popular gov-
ernrnent. This means, then, that in a repub lie an form of 
government popular government may not only be ameliorated 
but that all internal factions can best be corrected. 
C. A Law of Reason. To find a counterpart of Locke's 
view of a law of reason in The Federalist may, in a s.en se, be 
a forced argument. If the notable absentees (Tom Paine, 
Thomas Jefferson and Samuel Adams) from the Philadelphia Con-
vention of 1787 had been present, the adopted constitution 
would probably ba.ve given a clearer and more emphatic ex-
pression to belief in man's rational self-determination. 
Locke gave assent to belief in a law of nature "which 
obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all 
1. FED(lO), 54. 2. lt~D( 9) , 48. 3. FED(78), 508. 
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mankind who will but cons._ult it. ul Each man in a state of 
nature is judge in his own case of that which affects him 
through his appeal to this law of reason2 and may rightly 
punish those who disobey this law in relation to him. Be-
cause men have evil passions, it becomes necessary or ex-
pedient to form a social compact3 to which the members of 
a civil society can appeal for pr~tection against violators 
of individual rights. 
It would be a mistake to interpret Locke as meaning 
tbat a social compact is a substitute for the law of reason. 
Municipal laws are right only in so far as they are based 
on this law of reason, and by entering into a civil society 
for a kind of community protection mankind does not escape 
them.4 In a civil society, if the laws are good ones, man 
is still governed by laws of nature but has written them in-
to a civil code and given a community assent to them, where-
by they become binding to all members and effective against 
all trespassers, even in the case of war. It is, then, on 
the basis of a concept of reason that Locke justifies slav-
ery,5 war,6 and the right to property.? This does not mean 
that war and slavery are rational, but that they may be en-
tered into on rational grounds. 
1. Locke; ECCG; ch. ii, sec. 6~ 
2. Locke; ECCG, ch~ ii; sec. 7 • . 
3. Locke, ECCG; ch. ii; sec~ 13. 
4- Locke, ECCG; ch. xi, sec~ 135. 
5. Locke; ECCG, ch. 1 v, · sec. 24. 
6. Locke, ECCG, ch. iii, sees. 17-18; ch. xvi, sec. 181. 
7. Locke, ECCG, ch. v, sec. 30. 
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Becker tells us that in the eighteenth century, nMost 
Americans had absorbed Locke's works."1 In fact, French 
political writers were little read in America before the 
forming of the United States Constitution, and Becker doubts 
if even Jefferson ever read Rousseau's Social Contract.2 
It seems safe to assume that the writers of The Federalist 
were familiar with Locke, particularly Madison. Much of the 
language of The Federalist might almost be quotations from 
Locke's Essay. Such phrases as the follCMTing recur often in 
both writings: "gocxl of society"; "life, liberty, prop-
erty"; and npreservation of property." 
The writers of The Federalist, however, gave no ex-
plio it analysis of the concept of man as rational. Yet the 
concept of mari as a rational being capable of self-government 
is a proposition on which the arguments of The Federalist 
are based. Hamilton states in the first Essay that it seems 
to have been reserved to the people of this country "to de-
cide tbe important question, whether societies of men are 
really capable or not of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice. n3 
In another connection we find Madison stating, "It is 
the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and 
regulate the government."4 After discussing at length the 
powers of the Executive, Hamilton asks, ''What more could be 
3 • FED ( 1 ) , 3 • 
4. FED(49), JJl. 1. Becker; DOI; 27~ 2. Becker, DOI, 28. 
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desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?"l Again, 
Madison asks of an argument directed against the House of 
Representatives, "Is it supported by reason?"2 The phrase 
"capacity for self-governraent"3 occurs several times in The 
Federalist. There are, however, frequent references to the 
fallibility of man's reason, 4 which Locke could not counte-
nance. 
D. The Protection of Property as an End of Govern-
men t. Transition from the former topic to the present one 
involves a striking paradox in the development of political 
philosophy. One faces on one hand, in the two works being 
discussed, expressions of man's capacity for rational self-
determination, and on the other the clearest statements of 
the economic basis of politics and of tbe economic interpret-
ation of political history. 
"Political power," states Locke, "I take to be a 
right of making laws vrlth penalties of death, and consequent-
ly all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of 
property. n5 He mentions no other chief end of civil socie-
ty, for this end is the "preservation of property. u6 The 
powers o~ making war and peace operate for the aim of pro-
tecting property. 
1. FED(77); 502. 2. FED(57), 374. 
3 • FED ( 51 ) , 3 41 • 4. FED ( 10) , 55 • 
5. Locke; ECCG; ch. i, sec. 3. 
6. Locke, ECCG~ ch. ix, sec. 124; ch. ·vii, sec. 85; ch. vii, 
sec. 87; ch. vii, sec. 88; ch. vii, - sec. 94; ch. viii, 
sec. 120; ch. ix, sec. 127; ch. xix, sec. 239. 
And thus the commonwealth comes by a power 
to set down what punishment shall belong to 
the several transgressions which they think 
worthy of it committed amongst the members 
of tha t society, which is the power of mak-
ing laws, as well as it has the power to 
punish any injury done unto any of its members 
by anyone that is not of it, which is the 
power of war and peace; and all this for the 
preservation of the Pfoperty of all the mem-
bers of that society. 
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All powers are defined by Locke in terms of property. 
Paternal power is only where minority makes 
the child incapable to manage his property; 
political where men have property in their 
own disposal; and d2spot ical over such as have 
no property at all. 
And the legislative is forbade not to trample on the people 
by "invading their property." 3 It should be stated in 
fairness to Locke that he often speaks of "the preservation 
of life, liberty and estate, u4 but his emphasis is on prop-
erty interpreted in terms of estate. There is in his po-
litical philosophy a notable lack of expression of regard 
for the human freedoms other than the right to have an es-
tate. 
According to The Federalist what is the basis of all 
government? In Essay Number 10 Madison claims that "those 
who hold and those who are without property have ever formed 
distinct interests in society."5 And he insist-s that "the 
diversity in tbe faculties of men, from which the rights of 
1. Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 88. 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. xv, sec. 174. 
3. Locke, ECCG, ch. xix, sec. 226. 
4. -Locke, ECCG, ch. vii, sec. 87. 
5 • FED ( 10 ) , 56 • 
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property originate'' must be protected as "the first object 
of government. "l Varied property interests form ''the prin-
cipal task of mod ern legislation. " 2 Madison's famous Essay 
Number 10 is really a classic statermnt of the economic in-
terpretation of political history. The interests men hold 
and the parties to which they attach themselves are mostly 
emotional reactions to their property interests.3 
The critical danger which ensues from these interests 
is that some will fuse together into a majority, which Mad-
ison prophesied would be the landless proletariat.4 The fear 
that this majority would protect its interests at the ex-
pense of the minority was an urgent concern of the writers 
of The Federalist and created a difficulty toward which they 
directed many of their arguments. 
One may ask, "Why, if the protection of property 
rights lay at the foundation of the new system of govern-
ment, are there no property qualifications for voters and 
representatives?" The answer is that it is only a case of 
where an event might have taken place but did not. There 
were no strong arguments against a property qualification 
for voters and representatives. The chief concern was how 
the qualification was to be arranged. · The reasons then, 
strange as it may seem, why there were no economic qualifi-
cations for voters and representatives were economic ones.5 
1. FED(lO), 55. 2. FED(lO), 56. 3. FED(lO}, 55. 
4. Farrand, RFC, II, 20 3. 5. Be.ard, EIC, 165. 
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Madison stated these economic reasons in a debate over land-
ed qualifications.1 Farrand also shows that most of the 
states provided for property qualifications for voters any-
way, and radical democratic changes did not seem close at 
hand •2 
The authors of The Federalist assumed the army and 
navy to be safeguards to economic interests. They regarded 
trade and commerce to be the chief causes of wars between 
nations, and class conflicts due to economic interests the 
chief cause of internal disruptions.3 Jay states that, 
"Nations in general will make war whenever they have a pros-
pect of getting anything out of it. n4 And in Essay Number 
11 Hamilton points out the advantage of the new constitution 
to interstate traffic and commerce. Madison argued that re-
form was wanting "which will banish speculations on public 
measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give 
a regular course to the business of society."5 
The foregoing analysis of The Federalist as a treat-
ise on economic determinism is submitted for the purpose of 
indicating a similarity to Locke's Essay, and for the pur-
pose of being fair to Beard and his sohoo1. 6 The truth is 
that a purely economic interpretation of The Federalist can 
1. Farrand, RFC, II, 123-124. 
2. Farrand, RFC, II, 123-124. 
3. FED(21), 126-127. 
4. FED(4) , 18. 
5. FED(440, 291. 
6. Beard in EIC presented an economic interpretation of the 
Constitution which has been widely influential. 
See above, 41-42. 
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be widely misleading. Selections can be chosen from The 
Federalist which will indicate the exact opposite of eco-
nomic determinism. Hamilton in Essay Number 15 stated that, 
"We must extend the authority of the Union to the persons 
of the citizens, ... --the only proper objects of government. nl 
Here it is "persons" and not property which is the chief ob-
ject of goverrunent. 
It is possible to give The Federalist, or any other 
work, different meanings by taking particular passages out 
of their context. Essay Number 10, written by Madison, is 
the portion of The Federalist most frequently referred to 
when The Federalist is appealed to as a classic expression 
of the doctrine of economic determinism. Madison was perfect-
ly right in holding that those who have and do not have 
property form dis tine t interests in society. But Madison 
also had in mind things other than property. 
A zeal for different opinions concerning re-
ligion, concerning government, and many other 
points, as well of speculation as of prac-
tice; an attachment to different leaders am-
bitiously contending for pre-eminence and 
pavver; or to persons of other descriptions 
whose fortunes ba ve been interesting to the 
human passion~, have, in turn divided mankind 
into parties. 
In disregard of Madison's influence from the time The 
Federalist was written to the Civil War, and the popularity 
of the democratic elements of the Constitution, it is held 
1. FED(l5), 91. 
2. FED(lO), 55-56. 
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by some 1 that Madison's social philosophy was a philosophy 
of conservatism which received its best expression in the 
"reactionary movement that developed in the 1780's against 
the radicalism of the Revolutionary Period. n2 
By an interesting contrast, Daniel DeLeon· viewed 
Madison's discussion upon class conflict as a basic force 
underlying all political action to constitute a forerunner 
of Marx's Communist Manifesto.3 
Neither of the two latter views is correct. Madison 
was somewhere in between the extremes of radicalism and re-
action. Much as he believed in economic determinism in the 
sphere of politics, Madison was no "John the Baptist to Karl 
Marx. For the Father of the American Constitution was al-
most everything that Marx was not."4 Madison was an indi-
vidualist who believed in the rights of private property and 
free enterprise. It would be as easy to argue that Madison's 
views were best expressed in the reaction of the 1780's as 
it would be to make him a Marxist. Madison Imrely tried to 
understand class war and factions. Rather than being an ad-
vocate of class war, he saw it as destructive of society. 
He believed that a principal object of govern1mn t was to de-
vise means of preventing one group from dominating another. 
The very Nwnber of The Federalist to which appeal is made to 
make Madison an agitator of class struggle is the Nwnber in 
1. Merriam, APT, 101-122. 
2. Burns, JMPC, 190. 
4. Burns, JMPC, 190. 
Farrington, MCAT, I, 280-288. 
3. DeLeon, MAM, 1-12. 
which he recommended means of preventing it.l 
In the extent and proper structure of the 
Union, therefore, we behold a republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to 
republican government. And according to the 
degree of pleasure and pride we feel in 
being republicans, ought to be our zeal in 
cherishing the spirit and2supporting the character of Federalists. 
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It is not easy to give a thorough explanation of 
human happenings. History, no doubt, escapes complete analy-
sis and understanding. Human life cannot be interpreted by 
means of formulas. Too much is unaccountable and unpredict-
able. The many factors which enter into the molding of 
human events make it impossible fully to comprehend them 
all. Any interpretation of history is partial and incomplete. 
The view that history is economically determined is inadequate 
as a clarification of historical movements. To be sure, a 
person may hold such a view. Although Madison saw clearly 
the role of economics in man's social community it is the 
view of this study that he did not view history as economic-
ally determined. 
Madison's view that a man can have "property in his 
opinions"J must not be overlooked. There is an economic fac-
tor in man's political life as well as in most phases of his 
life. It is wise to recognize this factor_. But it seems 
unwise to recognize it as the necessarily determining factor. 
1. FED(lO), 53~62. 
2. FED{10), 62. 
J. Hunt (ed.), WJ.M, IV, 101. 
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Just as it may be argued that Madison believed in an eco-
nomic basis for politics---which he did---it may be argued 
that he believed in an ideological basis for politics---
which he did. Ideas and opinions can own men. They may 
not bring about any great social movement by themselves but 
they can be dynamic factors in history. 
Strange as it may seem the person most often associated 
with an economic interpretation of the development of polit-
ical theory in the United States has given us the most force-
ful rejection of all determinism in history. In his presiden-
tial address to the American Historical Association in 1933 
Beard viewed "Written History as an Act of Faith."1 He out-
lawed any determinism or formula as an adequate interpreta-
tion of history. This does not mean that Beard no longer saw 
the part played by economics in man's political life. He 
did reject it a.s_ a formula for interpretation and understand-
ing. Commager writes of Beard: "If he did not, like Henry 
Adams, repudiate his own handiwork, he did repudiate its con-
trolling formula and, indeed, the propriety of all formulas. n 2 
With specific reference to Ranke and his followers who 
emphasized the scientific method as the indispensable tool of 
written history, Beard writes the following: 
Slowly it dawned upon them that the human 
mind and the method employed were not com-
1. Beard, Art.(l934), 219-229. This is a reprint in the 
American Historical Review of Beard's presidential 
address. 2. Commager, AM, 308. 
petent to the appointed task, that omni-
science was not vouchsafed to mortals. 
Moreover it was finally realized that if 
all human affairs were reduced to law, 
to a kind of terrestrial mechanics, a 
chief end of the quest, that is, human 
control over human occurrences and ac-
tions, would itself become meaningless. 
Should mankind discover the law of its 
total historical unfolding , then it would 
be i mprisoned in its own fate, and power-
less to cbange; the past, present, and 
future would be revealed as fixed beyond 
the reach of human choice and will. Men 
and women would be chained to their des-
tiny as the stars and tides are to their 
routine. The difference between human 
beings and purely physical objects would 
lie in their poignant knowledge of their 
doom and £f their helplessness in its 
presence. 
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This quotation is given because no one could give a 
better argument against a purely economic interpretation of 
history, and because it s ays something with which it seems 
Madison would have agreed. Al though the exact point of con-
t act between Madison and political philosophers who preced-
ed him cannot always be located, it does seem clear that his 
thinking was marked and as sis ted by many who went before. 
As Plato and Aristotle, by whom Madison may have been in-
fluenced, and a s many others have done, he sought to de-
lineate man as a political being. If this rr.I.Elant seeing eco-
nomic forces at work in the formation of human opinions it 
did not mean seeing only economic farces at work. Madison's 
research in the history of federal government was not for 
naught. He wrestled with ideas. 
1. Beard, ODH, 13-14. 
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7. Summary 
Hamilton drew upon his wide reading, being primarily 
influenced by the British Constitution, to reach the con-
clusion that a strong centralized government was necessary. 
Madison drew upon his research in the history of federal 
goveril.Illents to arrive at the conclusion that a republican 
form of government which controls factions by means of di-
visions of poNer was the most satisfactory one. It is not 
possible to trace direct influence to specific individuals 
as having been greatly influential in the social thought of 
either Hamilton or Madison. Yet, it is at least reasonable 
to assume that their familiarity with political philosophy 
did bear weight on their thinking. 
Both Hamilton and Madison desired a fabric that was 
new. They argued for tre same one in The Federalist, but they 
wanted different ones. Hamilton went to the Philadelphia 
Convention to try and get a government with an overpowering 
will. He favored life tenure in office for the president and 
the senate. He could not get this. Madison went to the 
Philadelphia Convention with the Virginia Plan in mind. This 
plan would have made the federal gowernment stronger at the 
expense of the state governments. Both Madison and Hamilton 
wanted a strong central government with weakened state govern-
ments. But in the genius of cooperation they builded better 
than either knew or wished. 
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Did they owe much to particular men or to precedents? 
Maciver presents an interesting answer to this question. 
The bal anced state which Madison did so much 
to construct and Hamilton so much to defend 
had a character entirely different from that 
of the exemplars ·and models to which they 
pointed. The functional divi sion of powers 
does not imply the constituent division of 
sovereignty itself. The latter had no real 
precedents. It flouted an agelong tradition. 
It owed nothing to Locke or Harring ton or 
even Montesquieu. Greatly influenced by 
European political philosophies as were the 
builders of the Republic, the f abric they 
constructed was in essentials, almost with~ 
out their knowing it, profoundly new. That 
part of the ancient tradition of government 
that might have stood in the way they re-
jected almost without discussion. One of 
the ablest of the representatives at the Fed-
eral Convention, Rufus King of Massachusetts, 
expressed on one occasion his ama zement that 
me n were ready to sacrifice their substantial 
good to the 'phantom of sovereignty.' But it 
was only a phantom, vanishing before the face 
of necessity. They did not reason with it, 
they merely i gnored it. Therefore the polit-
ical philosophy of the Constitution is a dif-
ferent thing from the political philosophies 
that moved its creators. In this respect 
they builded better than they knlw' indeed 
better than the world yet knows. 
These claims ma de by Maciver are extravagant but are 
not without soill3 grain of truth. Certainly The Federalist 
was not a model of any precedent. But it is a strong state-
oont which says that Hamilton and Madison owed nothing "to 
Locke or Harrington or even Montesquieu." Merely to read 
them and disagree with them is, perhaps, to owe something to 
them. If Maciver means that Hamil ton and Madison did not 
1. Maciver, Art.(l938), 60-61. 
duplicate Locke or Harrington or Montesquieu in their 
thinking, then he is right. It is regrettable that Mac-
Iver fails to make clear specifically what he means when 
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he asserts that "the builders of the Repub lie" were "great-
ly influenced by European political philosophies.'t 
Although Madison analyzed the economic basis of man's 
political life, his construction of the principles of repub-
licanism cannot be wholly understood in economic terms. 
In the ensuing chapter consideration will be given to 
a basic idea of The Federalist. It is the idea of "union." 
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CHAPTER III 
UNION 
The most far-reaching contribution to social philos-
ophy made by the writers of The Federalist is found in the 
arguments they present in support of a union of states and 
against a dissolution of the same. The social philosophy of 
The Federalist is a philosophy of union. Reasoning to the 
effect that union is better than disunion was necessitated 
due to the very nature of the social compact about to be 
entered into. But the proposed constitution received the 
form that it did because some of its framers believed in the 
kind of union it would make possible. This was especially 
true of Madison, who more than anyone else shaped the form 
of the constitution. Madison was the only one of the writers 
of The Federalist who had a part in the construction of the 
constitution. Jay was not a member of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. Hamilton was a member but attended only the open-
ing and closing meetings. Madison was in constant attendance 
and made repeated use of his kn~1ledge of the history and 
nature of' f'ederal governments to point out errors which had 
caused the decay of other systems of federal government. If 
in this chapter it is possible accurately to present the 
philosophy of union contained in The Federalist, the purpose 
in writing it will have been achieved. 
There is no indication that the writers of The Feder-
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alist had the remotest idea that they were writing for man-
kind; that they were painting an ideal toward which all men 
ought to look. Although they did just this, they were 
thinking in terms of the immediate present. They were 
thinking specifi cally of the American situation, of the 
plight of the American government, and the need of a better 
form of government. So this cha]l>t er will be begun with a 
brief account of the conditions which led to a desire for 
a m~e perfect government. Then it will be the aim to an-
oNer the question, why union? 
1. Apology for Articles of Confederation 
Among the divergent opinions held by political think-
ers in the United States in 1787 concerning the existing 
consti tution, there seemed to be one point of extensive agree-
ment, namely, that a change was necessary. 1 Major differ-
ences of opinion were occasioned by the problem of what amend-
ments to add to, or what kind of substitute to adopt in place 
of, the Articles of Confederation. Before producing a list 
of the insufficiencies of the "subsisting federal government, n2 
Hamilton v~ites: 
It may perhaps be asked what need there is of 
reason~ng or proof to illustrate a position 
which is not either controverted or doubted, 
to which the understandings and feelings of 
all classes of men assent, and which in sub-
stance is admitted by the opponents as well 
as by the friends of the new Constitution. 
1 • FED ( 15 ) , 89 • 2 • FED ( 1 ) , 3 • 
It must in truth be acknowledged that, how-
ever these may differ in other respects, 
they in general appear to ha r monize in this 
sentiment, at least, that there are material 
imperfections in our national system, and 
that something is necessary to be1 done to secure us from imp ending anarchy. 
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It should be noted, however, that the point of view adopted 
in The Federalist which attributed so many national ailments 
to the existing government was not uncontested. 2 Even Madi-
son was willing to grant "that some of the distresses under 
which we labor have been erroneously charged on the opera-
tions of our governments." 3 
Although there were causes contributing to the chaos 
current in 1787 other than the form of the federal govern-
ment, the writers of The Federalist concentrated on severe 
1. FED(l5), 86-87. 
2. See Lee, Art.(l787), 275-325. Lee was one of the fare-
most opponents of the proposed plan of government of the 
Philadelphia Convention in 1787 and may be considered 
representative of its critics. For the views of other 
leading critics, see: Mason, Art.(l787), 329-332; Gerry, 
Art.(l788), 3-23; Cato (pseudonym of George Clinton), 
Art.{l787-1788), 241-278. These men could not deny the 
internal as well as the external plight of the nation, 
but they would not go so far as the writers of The Fed-
eralist and say an overthrow was needed in the structure 
of government (see FED(37}, 226). The critics of the 
proposed constitution wan ted any change in the national 
system of government to perpetuate non-interference with 
the states. Although they could agree on no plan of re-
vision, theywere largely agreed that any revision should 
take place within the framework of the Articles of Con-
federation. The causes of the existing chaos they at-
tributed as much to post-war conditions, which would 
soon subside, and to the maladministration of the state 
governments, as to the national government. As eminent 
an historian as Ford adopted this point of view. See 
Ford, .Art. (1898), xi. 
3. FED{lO), 54· 
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criticism of the existing national system. Hamilton goes so 
far as to characterize the total framework of the national 
government as an "imbecility. n1 Since some of the framers 
of the Articles of Confederation were also members of the 
Philadelphia Convention, 2 it would have been unwise that too 
adverse reflection be cast on those men; neither would it 
have been wise to indicate .. a pessimistic .point of view with 
regard to the possibility of establishing a popular form of 
government which would work. It must be remembered that the 
Articles of Confederation were adopted as a popular form of 
government to establish "perpetual union n3 among the then ex-
isting states. 
In order that harsh criticism might be directed to-
ward the Articles of Confederation without offe_nding the men 
who took part in their framing, or without dimming the faith 
in the possible erection of a popular governnent "adequate 
to the exigencies of government,"4 Jay offered the following 
apology for the Articles of Confederation. 
A strong sense of the value and blessings of 
union induced the people, at a very early 
period, to institute a federal government 
to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed 
it almost · as soon as they had a political 
existence; nay, at a time when their ba bi-
tations were in flames; when many of their 
citizens were bleeding, and when ·the progress 
of hostility and desolation left little room 
for those calm and mature inquiries and re-
1. FED(l5), 88. 
2. Bloom, SC, 163. - FED{2), 11-12. 
J. FED, Appendix 1, 577. - {The -Modern Library edition). 
4. State Department (ed.), DHC, IV, 78. Farrand, RFC, III, 13. 
flections which must ever precede the forma-
tion of a wise and well-balanced government 
for a free people. It is not to be wonder-
ed at, that a government instituted in times 
so inauspicious, should on experiment be 
found greatly deficient and inadequate1to the purpos e it was intended to answer. 
2. Factors Conducive to a Change of Government 
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A. An "Unequivocal Experience of the Inefficiency of 
the Subsisting Federal Government. "2 Hamil ton clearly stated 
in Essay Number 15 that, 
The evils we experience do not proceed from 
minute or partial imperfections, but from 
fundamental errors in the structure of the 
building, which cannot be amended otherwise 
than by an alteration in the fi~st principles 
and main pillars of the fabric. 
Since the Articles of Confederation were adopted to guarantee 
"perpetual union," on what grounds was the proposed constitu-
tion constructed at the Philadelphia Convention to be justi-
fied? Two arguments to justify the adoption of a new consti-
tution were presented by the writers of The Federalist. The 
first one was that the existing government had never been 
ratified by the people. 4 The second argUilfl nt was an appeal 
to the law of nature. 
This latter argument to justify the adopt ion of a new 
constitution as a relief from an "unequivocal experience of 
the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government" di; 
serves solll3 attention. A good place to begin is with the Dec-
1~ FED(2); 9-10. 
2 • FED ( 1 ) , 1 • 
3 • FED ( 15 ) ; 89 • 
4. FED( 22}, 140-141. 
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laration of Independence. In it Jefferson had written what 
the writers of The Federalist were eager to affirm. 
When in the course of human events, it be-
comes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them 
with another; and to assume among the powers 
of the earth, the separate and equal station 
to which the -Laws of Nature and Nature's God 
entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions 
of mankind requires that they should declare 
the causes which impel them to the separa-
tion.--We hold these truths to -be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Lib-
erty and the pur suit of Happiness. --That to 
secure these. rights, Governments are ins t i-
tuted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governad,--That wh:ln-
ever any Form of Government becomes destruct-
ive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
people to alter or to abolish it, and to in-
stitute new government, laying its foundation 
on such principles and organizing its powers 
in such for m as to them shall seem most like-
ly to effect their safety and happiness. 
Here Jefferson had proclaimed the right to abandon a form of 
government when it became destructive of certain ends. This 
is · just the situation which was faced with regard to the Art-
icles of Confederation. Wba t did Hamilton and Madison say 
about the right to form a new government? 
Hamilton in Essay Number 78 wrote that he hoped that 
the friends of the proposed constitution would never agree 
with its enemies, 
in questioning that fund amental principle of 
republican government, which admits the right 
of the people to alter or abolish the estab-
lished Constitution, whenever they find it 
1 • Bloom, SC , 1.3 2. 
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inconsistent with their happiness.! 
Madison raised the following question in Essay Number 
43. "On what principle the Confederation, which stands in 
the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be super-
seded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?"2 
His answer is as follows: 
By recurring to the absolute necessity of the 
case; to the great principle of self-preserva-
tion; to the transcendent law of nature and 
of nature's God, which declares that the safe-
ty and happiness of society are the objects at 
which all political institutions aim, and to 
which all such institutions must be sacrificed.) 
Madison in Essay Number 37 says that tbe principles 
on which the Artic~_s of Confederation are based are falla-
cious, and that this has been shown by comparing them with 
other confederacies.4 This comparison, he adds, has reveal-
ed the errors on which they were all based, but it has not 
revealed the path to be pursued. The most tbat the Phila-
delphia Convention could do, he then says, was to try and 
avoid past errors and "provide a convenient mode" of recti-
fying them. 5 In endeavoring to do this he felt that the 
Convention was justified. 
Instead of going back to Aristotle, or the Stoics, or 
Aquinas, it seems that the writers of The Federalist were 
more directly related to the natural law theorists after the 
middle ages. Beloff is apparently right when he states: 
1. FED(78); 508~ 
4. FED(37), 226. 
2. FED(43); 287. 
5. FED(37), 226. J. FED(43), 287. 
The most powerful intellectual support for 
the natural rights ar guments of the politi-
cians came from the school of natural law 
which played so important a part in Eur o-
pe an intellectual development from the six-
teenth to the eighteenth centuries. 
Chief Justice Marshall stated in Ogden vs. Saunders: 
When we advert to the course of r eading gen-
erally pur sued by American s tate.smen in 
early life, we must suppose tbat the framers 
of our Constitution were intima tely acquaint-
ed with the writings of those wise and learn-
ed men, whose treatises on tbe laws of nature 
and nations have g uided public opinion o~ 
the subjects o f obliga tion ard contract. 
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As ha s been shovm,3 Madison, and probably Hamilton as well, 
read Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, Locke and Hobbes. 
Hobbes had written in the Leviathan: 
Reason suggesteth convenient' articles of 
peace, upon which men may be drawn to 
agreement. These articles are they whica 
otherwise are called the Laws of Nature. 
The rig ht of Nature, · which writers common-
ly call jus naturale, is the liberty each 
man ha th to use his own power, a s he will 
himself, for the preservation of his own 
na tur e; that is to s ay, of his own life ••• 
A law of nature, lex ·natur alis, is a pre-
cept or general rule, found out by reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do that 
which is destructive of his life, or tak- 5 e th away the means of pre serving the same • 
Wha tever may be their differences, Locke is no less emphatic 
1. Beloff, Art.(l948) 1 , lx. 1 2. Q,uoted by Beloff, ~tll' t.(l948) , lx. Also quoted by A. de 
Lapredelle in his introduction to E. de Vattel, Le Droit 
des Gens en Principes de l a Loi Naturelle. 
). See above, 47. 
4. Hobbes, LEV, 147. All references to the Leviathan are 
to Burtt, EPBM. 
5. Hobbes, LEV, 163. 
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than Hobbes in his belief in a law of nature. Locke was in-
fluential on the political thought in America during the time 
immediately preceding the American Revolution. 1 Some of 
Locke's writing is closely similar to that contained in the 
Declaration of Independence, and in The Federalist. 
The state , of Nature has a law of Nature to 
govern it, which obliges everyone, and rea-
son, which is that law, - teaches all mankind 
who will but consult it, that, being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another.in h~s life, health, liberty, or 
po ssess1ons. 
As a corollary to this adherence to belief in a law 
of nature there follow "all the rights and privileges of t he 
law of Nature, n3 the chief ones of which are the rights to 
preserve one's property and to punish offenders of one's 
property.4 Being originally free and equa1 5 in a state of 
nature, the rights of preservation can best be served through 
entering in to a social compact. 6 Locke recognized a retUI:' n 
of a government to a people as necessary when either a time 
limit was placed on its existence, or "when by the mi scar-
r:ia ges of those in authority it is forfeited. "7 
The preceding seems to be the general background of 
the views on natural law and natural rights as held by the 
writers of The Federalist. There is some evidence8 that the 
1. See Maciver, Art.(l938), 51~61. 
2. Locke, ECCG; ch~ ii, -sec. 6. 
3~ Locke; ECCG; ch~ vii, , sec. 87. 
4~ Locke~ ECCG; ch~ viii; sec~ 94; 87. 
5. Locke; ECCG; ch~ viii, s~c. 95. 
6~ Looke; ECCG; ch~ ix, · sec. ·123. · 
7. Looke, ECCG, ch. xix, sec. 243. 
8. See above, 45-47; 51. 
131 
writers on natural law mentioned above were read. There is 
no clear basis for assuming that they went beyond these men 
for their views on natural law. 
To the charges that the Philadelphia Convention had 
gone beyond its powers, Madison replied: 
If they had exceeded their powers, they were 
not only warranted, but required as the con-
fidential servants of their country, by the 
circumstances in which they were placed, to 
exercise the liberty which they assumed; and 
that finally, if they had violated both 
their powers and their obligations, in pro-
posing a constitution, this ought neverthe-
less to be embraced, if it be calculated to 
accomplish the vieys and happiness of the 
people of A.Irerica. 
Madison, in order to establish a firmer justifi-
cation for the right to make a complete revision, amount-
ing to a new constitution of the existing Articles of Con-
federation, quotes from the Declaration of Independence in 
the following context. 
In all great changes of established govern-
ments, forms ought to give way to substance ••• 
A rigid adherence in such cases to the form-
er, would render nominal and nugatory the 
transcendent and precious right of the peo-
ple to 'abolish or alter their goverllm9nts 
ZSic7 as to them shall seem most ll~ely to 
effect tbeir safety and happiness. 
The writers of The Federalist "after an unequivocal 
experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal gov-
ernment" appealed to a law of nature to justify a change 
from a constitution that was binding but inadequate. This 
1. FED(40), 259. 
2. FED(40), 257. 
132 
was a dangerous -precedent .but, no doubt, a necessary one. 
What they actually contended for was the right to revolu-
tion. But in building a new structure of government they 
built so well that the amending process has oo far proven 
adequate to accommodate necessary or desirable alterations. 
B. National Humiliation. Hamilton remarked in Es-
say Number 15 that the last stage of national humiliation 
had been reached. All things which could wound the pride of 
a nation he claimed Americans had experienced.1 Engagements 
made in good faith were broken as though they had never been 
made. Debts to foreigners as well as to citizens of the 
United States which were contracted during a time of critical 
peril remained with no satisfactory arrangements for their 
dis charge. 
Have we valuable territories and important 
posts in the possession of a foreign power 
which by express stipulations, ought long 
since to have been surrendered? These are 
still retained, to the prejudice of our in-
terests, not less than our rights. Are we 
in a condition to resent or to repel ag-
gression? We have n~ither troops, nor trees- . 
ury, nor government. 
Hamilton further contended that the citizens of the United 
States were "entitled by natWI."e" to navigation on the Missis-
sippi but were denied this right because they were unable 
to claim it. Public credit, commerce, even respectability 
had declined beyond embarrassment. "The imbecility or our 
government even forbids" anyone "to treat with us. n3 
1. FED(l5), 87. 2. FED(l5), 87. 3. FED(l5), 88. 
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Madison lamented the fact that under the existing 
form of government the nation could not defend itself mil-
itarily.1 It might well be contended that this is not a 
fact which should induce a person to desire a change in a 
form of government. War is an evil and is never a solution 
to national or international problems. The writers of~ 
Federalist assumed, however, that the best way to peace, to 
foreign recognition, and respectability among the nations of 
the warld is physical might. The system of raising annies 
and budgets by quotas and . requisitions was a complete fail-
ure. The national government did not demand the respect of 
its own citizens as the state governments acted in a role 
superior to the national government. Repeated more in The 
Federalist than any other opinion is the view that the state 
governments must not be superior to the national government; 
that no federal government can long exist where individual 
corporate states stand between the federal goverl1Irent and the 
individual citizens. 2 
One of the major reasons for the national humiliation 
which existed was the necessity for the concurrence of thir-
teen sovereign wills for important legislation to be passed. 
Each state was what amounted to an independent government. 
Madison's studies in the history of federal government had 
convinced him that every instance of a group of sovereign 
1. FED(41), 263-267. 
2. FED(l5), 89. See also: (23), 143; (16), 95; (18), 107; 
(23)' 155; (17), 101; (15), 91-92; (16), 97-98. 
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states making up a confederacy where they gave up little to 
the national government, and the national government did not 
reach the pe0ple directly in legislation, had failed.1 The 
necessity for the concurrence of thirteen sovereign wills to 
get tax legislation passed made it just about impossible for 
the national government to raise money. The national govern-
ment was bound by the Articles of Confederation to deal with 
the states in their corporate capacities. It has never been 
easy . to get thirteen out of thirteen to agree to be taxed. 
Hamilton held: 
To depend upon a government that must itself 
depend upon thir teen other governments for 
the means of fulfilling its contracts, when 
once its situation is clearly understood, 
would require a degree of credulity not of-
ten to be met with in the pecuniary trans-
actions of mankind, and little reconcilable 
with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarioe.2 
C. The National Government under the Arti ole s of Con-
federation Could neither Operate Legally nor with a Sanction 
to its Laws. Madison in Essay Number 38 enumerated some of 
the things which Congress had to do which were illegal. He 
approved of their efforts but regretted that Congr~ss had to 
funo tion illegally.3 
They LQongres~ have proceeded to form new 
States, to erect temporary governments, to 
appoint officers for them, and to prescribe 
the oondi tions on which such States shall 
be admitted into tbe Confederacy. All this 
has been done; and done without the least 
color of constitutional authority. Yet no 
1. FED(37), 226. 
3. FED(38), 240-242. 
2. FED(30), 187. See also (17), 
105; (42), 270; (20)' 122. 
blame haf be.en whispered; no alarm has been 
sounded. 
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What Madison feared in this connection was the danger in-
volved in the existence of a government which did not have 
power commensurate with its objects. 
Even after laws had been passed, the national govern-
ment had no authority to enforce them under the provisions of 
the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton called attention to 
this fact in Essay Number 21. 
The United States, as now composed, have no 
powers to exact obedience, or punish dis-
obedience to their resolutions, either by 
pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or di-
vestiture of privileges, or by any other 
constitutional mode. There is no e:xpress 
delegation of authority to them to use force 
against delinquent m:::Jmbers; and if such a 
right should be ascribed to the federal 
head~ as resulting from the nature of the 
social compact between the States, it must 
be by inference and construction, in the 
face of that part of the second article, by 
which it is declared, 'that each State shall 
retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, 
not expressly delegated2to the United States in Congress assembled.' 
Madison used "The United Netherlands" in Essay Ntim.ber 20 as 
an example of how coequal and sovereign states always for m 
a weak confederacy. He quotes Grotius to the effect that 
"Nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of 
Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their 
constitution. n 3 He quotes Temple to give examples of ir-
1. FED(38), 241. 
2. FED{21), 125. See also (38), 242; (40), 257; (44), 293; 
(41)' 262; (42)' 271; {25)' 158. 
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responsibility. Great as it seemed on parchment, says Madi-
son, tbe confederacy of "The . United Netherlands" contained 
"imbecility in the goverrunent; discord among tre provinces; 
foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in 
p3ace, and peculiar calamities from war."1 
The national government was weak under the Articles of 
Confederation. The word "weakness" sums up the characteris-
tics of it. The factors which have been enumerated as conduc-
ive to a change of government have been names for elements 
of weakness. Madison compares2 the Articles of Confederation, 
or the national government under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, with other confederacies and pictures their common 
weaknesses. The chief factor conducive to a change of gov-
ernment was weakness in the present structure. Of a weak 
constitution Madison said that it 
must necessarily terminate in dissolution for 
want of proper powers, or the usurpation of 
powers requisite for the public safety. 
Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will 
stop at the salutary point, or go forward to 
the dangerous extreme, must depend on the con-
tingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps 
oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, 
called for, on pressing exigencies, by a de-
fective constitution, than out of the full ex-
ercis~ of the l argest constitutional authori-
ties.) 
Another factor which added to the weakness of the na-
tional government under the Articles of Confederation was 
"the want o1· a judiciary power." Hamil ton referred to this 
1. FED(20), 121. 
3. FED(20), 122. 
2. See especially FED(l8, 19 and 
20), 106-124. 
137 
as a "cir cwns tance which crowns the defects." There were no 
courts to expound the true meaning of the laws. Treaties 
h ad no force at al l , since they wer e not "ascertained by ju-
dic i al determinations."1 Instead of encountering t he con-
fusion of a court of final jurisdiction in each state, Ham-
ilton recommended "one court paramount to the rest, possessing 
a general su~rintendence, and authcrized to settle and de-
clare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice."2 
The writers of The Federalist feared conditions which 
might lead to anarchy.3 They had seen enough of national em-
barrassment and failure; they understood the factors which 
were conducive to a change of government; and they were aware 
of the necessity of a systematic government. Jay expressed 
it this way: 
Although the absolute necessity of system, 
in the conduct of any business, is uni-
versally known and acknowledged, yet the 
high importance of it in national affairs 
has not yet become ~ufficiently impressed 
on the public mind • 
The question now is, why did the writers of The Federalist 
argue for union? To be sure, the proposed constitution could 
not be defended except on a basis of some philosophy of un-
ion. But they did not have to support it because of a.ny ex-
ternal compulsion. -
1. FED(22}, 138. 
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3. Why Union? 
A. Geography and the People. Jay in Essay Number 2 
praises Providence for having blessed the area which is the 
United States with a variety of streams, fertile lands and 
m vigable waters. He must have been talking about the pres-
ent area of the United States and not the area of the thir-
teen original states. His description seems to be of the 
present area of the country. Jay was equally impressed by 
the fact that Providence bad seen fit to place a people here 
who were united by ties of blood and religion, and interests, 
and background and language. He reasoned that a country con-
nected by fine geographical linkages such as waterways and 
good soils, and a people united by common ties should form 
an inseparable harmony. Such a union as this "should never 
·be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sov-
. t. "1 ere 1gn 1.e s • 
Common political backgrounds, similarities in relig-
ious views, family ties , common loyalties and language are 
some things which have at times held people in bonds of uni-
ty. And geography no doubt is sometimes a factor in keeping 
a people unified. But Jay's argument on this particular sub-
ject sounds more like a Chamber of Commerce speech than a 
careful piece of reasoning. He doesn't say what Providence 
had against the Indians. 
1 • FED ( 2 } , 9 • 
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This isn't a valid criticism of Jay, but at least it 
opens the way for som3 tb. ing to be said not previously men-
tioned. The Federalist was submitted originally as a piece 
of campaign literature and does contain some special plead-
ing. It was necessary that a popular and emotional appe a1 
be n::ade when possible. As well as excelling in the legal 
profession, in politics and political theory , the writers 
of The Federalist were also gifted pamphle te·ers. 
Madison in Essay Number 14 repeats the argument for 
sacred ties which bind individuals together in common pur-
suits.1 And Hamilton uses this argument in Essay Number 15.2 
B. Advice and Judgment of Experienced Men in the 
Philadelphia Convention should be Respected and Relied upon. 
Experienced men in this Convention proposed a constitution 
which will greatly facilitate union. The proposed consti-
tution, therefore, ought to be adopted.3 Jay pointed out 
that some of the members of the Philadelphia Convention were 
n:embers also of the Congress of 1774. They had had wide ex-
perience in the affairs of the national gover~nt and would 
recommem n:easures which were prudent and . wise. Jay made the 
contention that tbe proposed constitution should be adopted 
on the basis of the wisdom of its framers. 4 The final draft 
of the constitution as adopted by the Philadelphia Convention 
affirmed the belief that in a union of the states lay the best 
1 • FED ( 14} , 84 • 
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possible form of governn:ent. The people, then, ought also to 
adopt this belief. 
Such an argument as Jay here offers as a reason for 
union is good or bad irrespective of any syllogistic reason-
ing involved. A people could never wisely plot a course for 
a government through agreeing blindly to fallON a leader or 
group of leaders. With particular reference to the adoption 
of the new constitution it can be said that ;ray was right in 
urging tba. t the wisdom of the framers could be relied upon. 
He might have added, hcwever, with tongue in cheek, that the 
wisdom of some of the framers could be relied upon, and par-
ticularly that of Madison. Any argument dealing with a spe-
cific situation must be particularized to carry any authority 
of reason. It can never safely be universalized and stated 
that in all instances where men have experience they should 
be followed. Jay made this mistake in this argument for un-
ion, although in this particular instance he was right. In 
addition to this argument of Jay there is affirmation in The 
Federalist of a belief in the rational self-determination of 
men.l A republican form of government based on a represent-
ative principle is really postulated on the principle of ra-
tional self-determination. 
c. In Union L.ies Greatness. Jay called attention to 
the fact that the first Congress of the United States, as well 
as each succeeding Congress and the Philadelphia Convention, 
1. FED(70), 457. See also (77), 502. 
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1 
alone." He used his knowledge of the history of federal 
government to make the point that liberties had never been 
secure where union did not exist. He observed that the "vet-
eran legions" of ancient Rome were an overmatch for any op-
position, and she was rendered "the mistress of the world." 
But Madison was quick to add the following observation. 
Not the less true is it, that the liberties 
of Rome proved tbe final vic tim to her mili-
tary triumphs; and that the liberties of 
Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, 
with few exceptions, been the price of her 
military establishment-s. A standing force, 
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time 
that it may be a necessary, p.rovision. On 
the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. 
On an extensive scale its consequences may 
be fatal. On any scale it is an object of 
laudable circumspection and precaution. A 
wise -nation will combine all these consider-
ations; and, whilst it doe_s _not rashly pre-
clude itself from- any resource which may be-
come essential to its -safety, will exert all 
its prudence in diminishing both the neces-
sity and the danger of resorting to o~e which 
may be inauspicious to its liberties. 
This quotation is given at length because the argu-
ment is simply majestic. Madison here in a brief paragraph 
writes what could well form a volume. He uses his knowl-
edge of the history of governments to show what has been the 
fate of liberties when the military prevailed. He directs 
attention to the truth that this is a danger to be avoided. 
Madison is pointing directly at a situation facing his fellow 
countrymen-. There was a clamor among the opponents of the 
proposed constitution that the sovereignty of the states be 
1. FED(41), 263. 2. FED(41), 262-263. 
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perpetuated; that the national authority would extend to the 
states in their collective capacities; that it would not ex-
tend to the individual citizens; and that the union be no 
more than a confederacy of sovereign states which was the 
case under the Articles of Confederation. Madison, as well 
as anyone, was aware of this situation. In the above quoted 
paragraph Madison is making a h.int which be elucidates in 
the succeeding paragraphs which he writes. It is that, 
America united, with a handful of troops, or 
without a single soldier, exhibits a more for-
bidding posture to foreign ambition than Amer-
ica disunited, wifh a hundred thousand veterans 
ready for combat. 
Madison rightly explained2 that if the nation were di-
vided into a confederacy of separate sovereignties, and each 
state were allowed to provide its own military establishment 
as a substitute for a national military establishment, the 
end would be an archy and chaos. The independent sovereign-
ties would clash with each other, and, in spite of splendid 
natural PTOtections from foreign invasion, would duplicate 
the military history of Europe. 
The security of liberty depends upon union. That was 
Madison's concl.usion. "The moment of the dissolution" of the 
Union "vdll be the date of a new order of things ••• It will pre-
sent liberty everywhere crushed between .standing armies and 
perpetual taxes."3 
1. FED(41), 263. 
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Hamilton develops a similar argument in Essay Number 
11 in a discussion of commerce. He reasoned that if the un-
ion be adhered to, America would "become the arbiter of Eur-
ope in America, 11 and "be able to incline the balance of 
European competitions in this part of the world as our in-
terest maydictate."1 But if the union be not adhered to, 
A.m3rica will be the spectacle of competing parts serving as 
checks on each other and frustrating every tempting advantage 
which ArrE ricans enjoy. .AnE rica would be a prey to imperial 
powers. She could not even be neutral, for "the rights of 
neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by 
an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, 
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral."2 
Madison and Hamilton were calling attention to im-
mediate possible dangers. They were writing with the current 
situation in mind. It is not a fair adverse criticism to 
say that they should ba ve extended the idea that "Union is 
essential to the security of liberty" to include the arts and 
sciences. When anarchy and discord reign, learning suffers. 
Madison and Hamilton must have had many civil liberties in 
mind. Hamilton speaks of the security of our "oG>mmon liberty" 
in Essay Number 28. 3 
E. Union as Security against Hostilities from Abroad. 
It was necessary for the writers of The Federalist to overlap 
their arguments in treating the scope of union. They under-
1. FED(ll), 65. 2. FED{ll), 65. 3. FED {28), 174. 
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took to explain how almost every area of national life would 
be affected by union as against disunion. It was not possi-
ble for them to discuss union as es-sential to the security 
of liberty without having sore thing to say, among other top-
ics, about union as security a gainst hostilities from abroad. 
But in each discussion there was something specific to em-
phasize. If nothing more, their repeated reiteration of the 
idea of union as it affected the different areas of the lives 
of the people helped to emphasize the significance of union 
as it was understood by them and to reveal their ideas con-
cerning union. 
Jay spoke in Essay Number 3 of the importance of ob-
serving "the laws of nations. n1 The number of wars which 
will be fought he held to be proportionate to the causes 
which will incite them. He then raised the question as to 
whether a united .Anerica would incite fewer wars than a dis-
united Aroorica. 
If it should turn out that United .Anerica 
will probably give the fewest, then it will 
follow that in this respect the Union tends 
most to preserve the peop~e in a state of 
peace with other nations. 
The just causes of war Jay then enumerated to be direct vio-
lence or the violation of treaties. "America has already 
formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and 
all of them, except Prussia, are Maritime. n3 It would be a 
serious misfortune to have these treaties broken and incur 
1 • FED ( 3 ) , 14 • 2. FED ( 3) , 14. 3 • FED ( 3 ) , 14 • 
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the destruction of war or the expense of unneighborliness. 
Great importance is to be placed on assuming the obligation 
to observe treaties. "The laws of nations," Jay contended, 
would be much better observed by one national government 
than by thirteen separate state governments, or several con-
federacies of states.1 This idea recurs again and again 
throughout The Federalist. The opponents of the proposed 
constitution interireted union to mean a confederation of 
sovereign and independent states, whereas the writers of The 
Federalist thought this to be no union with merit but, in-
stead, a step toward disunion and anarchy. So Jay was cer-
tainly right in maintaining that one national government 
would better observe treaty obligations than several separate 
confederacies or thirteen independent states. 
Where a union exists with one national government as 
the agent to interpret treat ie s and e xe cute them there is 
less likelihood of violations or infractions. Unquestionab-
ly this is conducive to peace. Hamilton in Essay Number 79 
stated: 
If there are such things as political axioms, 
the propriety of the judicial power of a gov-
ernment being coextensive with its legislat-
ive, may be ranked among the number. The mere 
necessity of uniformity in the interpretation 
of the national laws, decides the question. 
Thirteen independent courts of final juris-
diction over the same causes, arising upon the 
sam9 laws, is a hydra in g overnment from which 
nothing ~ut contradiction and confusion can 
proceed. 
1. FED(3), 14. See (23), 142. 2. FED(79), 516. See(3), 15. 
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F. Union as Security against Dissensions within the 
States. Hamilton in Essay Number 28 pictured a possible 
situation of a popular uprising in a state when the state 
is an independent sovereign and there is no national govern-
ment to whic h appeal can be made. If the persons entrusted 
with po."!er in a single state "become usurpers, 11 the different 
divisions and districts find themselves unable to defend 
themselves. They have "no regular .measures for defense." 
They are relpless victims so far as armed might is concerned. 
"The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without con-
cert, without system, without resource; except in their cour-
a ge and despair."1 The usurpers can crush any opposition 
before a great amount of strength is accumulated. This is 
easier to accomplish where territories are small than in 
large areas. Hamil ton was thinking here of a pur ely mili-
tary situation where both sides would, if possible, resort 
to armed might. He gave no consideration to the view that 
arroo d force may not be as good a weapon as ideas, or an in-
domitable faith in truths wh ich are superior to military 
force . 
The point which Hamilton wanted to make was that in 
union the people would be "the rna sters of their own fate." 
The danger of usurpation by rulers of individual states 
would be removed. Power would be "most always the rival of 
power." The general government would always check "the usur-
1. FED(28), 173. 
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pat ions of the state governments, and these will have the 
same disposition towards the general government." The peo-
ple would always be able to make either side preponderant 
by throwing their weight in the scale. 
If their rights are invaded by either, they 
can make use of the otffir as the instrument 
of redress. How wise will it be in them by 
cherishing the union to preserve to them-
selves an adva~tage which can never be too 
highly prized. 
Here a part of the system of checks and balances is seen in 
operation. It is likely that Montesquieu influenced2 the 
writers of The Federalist in their views on a system of checks 
and balances in government. Both Madison and Hamilton quote3 
Montesquieu in The Federalist. 
The above argument that rulers in state governments 
might usurp pouer were there no national government to inter-
vene appears far-fetched to us who live under the constitu-
tion which the ratifying convention of 1788 made the supreme ' 
law of the land. Under a system of government ,. such as Hamil-
ton described as amounting to a confederation of independ-
en t sovereign states, how ever , the danger of usurps. ti on could 
well be a real danger. 
Another danger which Hamilton maintained would be very 
real if the "States should be either wholly disunited or only 
united in partial confederacies"4 was the danger of "violent 
1. FED(28), 173-174. 
2. See above, 58. 
3. FED(9}, 50-53. I!'ED(47), 313-316. 
4. FED(6), 27. 
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contests" the independent states might have with each other. 
To presume a want of motives for such con-
tests as an argument against their existence, 
would be to for get that men are ambitious, 
vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a 
continuation of harmony between a number of 
independent, unconnected sovereignties in 
the same neighborhood would be to disregard 
the uniform course of human events, and to 
set at defi~ce the accumulated experience 
of the ages. 
There are innumerable causes of hostility among nations, and 
Hamilton felt that some of them would operate upon the states 
if they were separated into distinct sovereignties. Among 
tbe causes of hostility Hamilton mentioned are "the love of 
power," "the desire of preeminence and dominion," "the jeal-
ousy of power," and "competitions of commerce. n 2 Hamilton 
was sure that a great amount of discord which would result 
among states as independent, collective sovereignties would 
be avoided in a union of the same. 
What immediately comes to mind is whether this argu-
IJBnt is sound in the present context. If, for example, a 
number of small independent, disunited states invite dis-
sension and hostilities, is not the same true of a number of 
small states united in a larger whole? Are the causes of 
factions, and dissensions, and hostilities removed by uniting 
parts into a larger whole? One argument, at least, which 
Hamilton would submit in reply is that states or nations are 
usually enemies if they exist side by side. 
1. FED{6), 27. 
2. FED(6), 27-28. 
So far is the general sense of mankind from 
corresponding with the tenets of those who 
endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of 
discord and hostility between the States, in 
the event of disunion, that it has from long 
observation of the progress of society be-
come a sort of axiom in politics, that vi-
cinity, or nearness of situation, consti-
tutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent 
writer expresses himself on this subject to 
this effect: 'NEIGHBORING NATIONS are nat-
urally enemies of each other, unless their 
common weakness forces them to league in a 
CONFEDERATIVE REPUBLIC, and their constitu-
tion prevents the differences that neighbor-
hood occasions, extinguishing that secret 
jealousy which disposes all states to ag-
grandize themselves at the expense of their 
neighbors.' This passage, at the same tii'l13 , 1 points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY. 
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This quotation by Hamilton is from Mably's Principes des Ne-
. t. 2 gocJ.a J.ons. Madison quotes Milot in Essay Number 18 to the 
same effect.3 The writers of The Federalist made constant 
appeal to the history of federal government to add weight to 
tffi ir points of view. It was, as well as being an appeal to 
history, an appeal to human nature and experience. 
This is one argument the writers of The Federalist 
would give to the quest ion of whether the evils which befall 
small, independent sovereignties do not befall larger confed-
eracies as well. Other arguments which the writers of The 
Federalist would give would flow from the first one and be an 
extension of it. It is simply a matter of historical fact 
that small independent states existing side by side with other 
1. FED(6), 33. 
2. Hamilton gives this information in a footnote to FED(6), 
33. ). FED(l8), 108. 
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small states do find it harder to get along with each other 
than when united into a federal system. And when small 
states exist side by side with much larger states, it has 
usually been the case that they often have been overrun. 
This is avoided to a large extent when there exists a union 
of states. A difficulty the writers of The Federalist had 
in usin g their knowledge of the history of federal govern-
ment was in finding good models to refer to. They could not 
find any but which sooner or later fell to pieces because of 
some obvious error or mistake. What the writers of The Fed-
eralist do is call attention to the error. More than from 
any theory of society the writers of The Federalist drew 
from their knowledge of the federal republics of the past 
and profited by their acquaintance with the mistakes of those 
republics. 
What lft.rould be the consequences of dissension between 
the states in the case of disunion, or several different com-
binations of the states? Hamilton held that the first re-
1 
sult would be a "desultory and predatory" war. Hamilton 
here a gain tells a story of the history of similar examples. 
The initial stage, according to Hamilton, which the states 
would undergo would be an instance of large states tramping 
upon smaller ones. Sufficient time would not have elapsed 
for military fortifications to be built. In Europe time has 
allowed military blockades to be established, and conflict 
1. FED(B), 42. 
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there takes on a different picture than it would in the case 
of the American states. 1 In America: 
The want of for tific at ions, leaving the fron-
tiers of one State open to another, would 
facilitate inroads. The populous States 
would, with little difficulty, overrun their 
less populous neighbors. - Conquests would be 
as easy to be Ilii de as difficult to be re-
tained. War, therefore, would be desultory 
and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever 
march in the train of irregulars. The calam-
ities of individuals would make the princi-
pal figure in the events whic~ would charac-
terize our military exploits. 
Madison in a reference to this same situation stated 
in Essay Number 41: 
This picture of the consequences of disunion 
cannot be too highly colored, or too often 
exhibited. Every man who -loves peace, every 
man who loves -his country, every- man who 
loves liberty, ought to have it ever before 
his eyes, that he may cherish in his he art 
a due attachment to the Union of America, and 
be able. to ~~t3a due value on the means of presernng 1. t. 
Hamilton, with moving eloquence, reasoned a bit fur-
ther on the consequences of disunion and saw the danger of 
dissensions among the states to civil liberties. He observ-
ed that safety from danger is one of the most powerful di-
rectors of human conduct and national life. Men who most 
love liberty, in a continued state of danger with violent 
destruction of life and property a frequent experience, are 
at times compelled to resort for security to those "insti tu-
tions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political 
1. :FED(B) 42. 
3. FED(41~, 264. 2. FED(8), 42. See also (41), 264. 
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rights."1 Hamilton then writes a sent~nce which could well 
be written on the hearts of all who live in this power-
stricken and muscle-bUlging world of ours: "To be more 
safe, they at length beco:rm willing to run the risk of being 
less free." 
The writers of The Federalist were firmly against any 
situation which would permit the ascendancy of the military 
over the civilian. America disunited would, in their opin-
ion, clear the way for this unhappy event. When the military 
prevails over the civilian, liberties become the prey to 
means of defense. The paramount danger is that a sense of 
human rights will be weakened among those who live under the 
military. Hamilton saw this danger as a real one when the 
military state becomes elevated above the civil. 
The inhabitants of territories, often the 
theatre of war, are unavoidably sUbjected · 
to frequent infringements on their rights, 
which serve to weaken their sense of those 
rights; and by degrees the people are 
brought to consider the soldiery not ~nly 
as protectors but as their superiors. 
G. Importance of Union to Commerce. America disu-
nited would be, in the opinion of the writers of The Feder-
alist, a bappy hunting ground for all nations interested in 
commercial advantages at the expense of the rest of mankind.3 
It would be to the great advantage of countries hw1gry for 
commercial advantage to see the individual states of America 
1. FED( 8) ; 42 ~ 
2~ FED(8), 45. 
3. FED(ll), 63. (23), 142. 
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completely disunited or united into separate confederacies. 
These countries could then play these states against each 
other and exploit them at will. The states united could 
"counterac.t a policy so unfriendly" to their "prosperity in 
a varie ty of ways • ul 
By prohibitory regulations, extending, at 
the same time, throughout the States, we 
may oblige foreign countries to bid against 
each other, for the privileges of our mar-
kets. This assertion will not ~pear chi-
merical to those who are able to ~preciate 
the importance of t~e markets of three 
millions of people. 
The states united could prevent other nations from monopoliz-
ing the profits of their trade. Disunited the states would 
be especial prey to nations at war and eager for additional 
. resources for waging war. 
Hamilton understood a close relationship to exist be-
tween a prosperous commerce and a navy. The states united, 
be argued, would be able to establish a federal navy which 
would be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of 
either of two contending parties.3 A union of the states un-
der the plan proposed by the Philadelphia Convention would 
permit them for the first time to become the "arbiter of Eur-
ope in America." This would permit the states to incline 
tl:e balance of European competitors as their "interest may 
die tate. n4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
FED(ll), 
FED(ll), 
FED(ll), 
FED(llJ, 
63. 
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What would be the situation regarding internal commerce 
among the states in the event of either disunion or union? 
The reply the writers of The Federalist give is a ready one.l 
In the event of disunion the states would be interested in 
profiting at the expense of each other. Either the states 
individually or as several. distinc.t groups would interest 
themselves in commercial advantage to the injury of all of 
them. For in so doing they would create a discord and weak-
ness which would be lucrative bait for interested outsiders. 
But in the event of union, commercial intercourse between 
the states would be unrestrained and profitable. Commercial 
enterprise would have much greater scope due to the divers-
ity of productions in various states. States, like men, are 
capable of producing different things. Hamilton anticipated 
a free flow of commerce between the states united which would 
permit the citizens of individual states to concentrate on 
what they were best suited to produce. It would be unneces-
sary for them to try and undertake ruch measures as would en-
able them to live alone. In union trade would be advanced 
both for hoiOO and foreign markets. 
H. Importance of Union to a Sound Revenue. 2 The 
most productive sQuroe of national wealth, according to Ham-
ilton, is commerce.3 As we have just seen, the states disu-
1. FED(ll}, 68. 
2. FED(31), 190; (34), 204-207; (21), 130; (30), 182; (21), 
127-128; (30), 182. 
3. FED(l2), 70. 
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nited and fraught with dissensions and aggressive motives 
at the expense of each other, would place commerce in a 
state of peril. No strong commerce would be able to de-
velop in a situation where each state undertook to be the 
sole guardian of its trade. 
It is astonishing that so simple a truth 
should ever have had an adversary; and it 
is one, among a multitude of proofs, . how 
apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or 
of too great abstraction and refinement, 
is to lead men astray from the plainest 
truths of reason and conviction. 
The ability to pay taxes is dependent on the amount 
of money in circulation, and the amount of money in circula-
tion is dependent upon commerce... It is not possible to vis-
ualize material wealth without commerce. ·The two exist to-
gether. Unless there be money in circulation with which 
taxes can be paid, it is useless to levy taxes. 
The ability of a country to pay taxes must 
always be proportioned, in a great degree, 
to the quantity of money in circulation, and 
to the ce.lerity with which it circulates. 
Commerce, contributing to both these ob-
jects, must of necessity render the payment 
of taxes easier, and facili tat~ the requi-
site supplies to the treasury. 
Another significant point which Hamilton makes with 
regard to the "importance of Union to a sound revenue" is 
that "it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums 
by direct taxation. u3 No matter how many times tax laws are 
multiplied to ra i se money by direct taxation, they are never 
1 • FED ( 12 ) , 71 • 2. FED(l2), 71. 3. FED ( 12 } , 71. 
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adequate enough to raise a sufficient amount of money for 
the operation of a . government. Hamilton did not have in 
mind a federal income tax. The major part of tax money is 
raised by the method of indirect taxation. 
In so opule-nt a nation as that of Great 
Britain, where direct taxes from superior 
wealth must be much more tolerable, and, 
from the vigor of the government, ·much 
more practicable, than in America, far 
the greatest part of the national reve-
nue is derived from taxes of the indi-
rect kind, from imposts, and from excises. 
Duties on imported articles form a1large branch of this latter description. 
The states disunited or grouped together in separate confed-
eracies would practically eliminate the possibility of rais-
irtg any great amount of money by indirect taxation. 
trade. 
In union there is also a protection a gainst illicit 
The relative situation of these states; the 
number, of rivers with which they are inter-
sected, and of bays that wash their shores; 
the facility of communication in every di-
rection; the affinity of language and _man-
ners; the familiar habits of intercourse;--
all · these are circumstances that would con-
spire to r_ender an illicit trade between 
them a matter of little difficulty, and would 
insure frequent evasions of the commercial 
regulations of each other. 
As a means of avoiding the development of a situation such 
as this the states would be induced to lower their duties.3 
This, of course, would reduce income. 
What happens when revenues are too small to pay the 
1. FED(l2), 72. 2. FED(l2), 73. 3. FED(l2), 73. 
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expenses of government? Hamilton answered with the view 
that national existence is dependent upon an income adequate 
for the operation of government. "A nation cannot long ex-
ist without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, 
it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded 
condition of a province."1 The existence of a national gov-
ernment in America, he concluded, was dependent upon a union 
of the states after the plan adopted by the Philadelphia Con-
vention. A plan of union similar to the Articles of Confed-
eration which permitted the states to act in a sovereign and 
independent role was inadequate. If for no other reason than 
its failure to make possible the raising of revenue, a plan 
similar to the Articles of Confederation would lead to the 
dissolution of the union. "Union is important to a sound 
revenue." 
I. Advantage. of Union with Regard to Economy of Gov-
ernment. The writers of The Federalist rightly maintained 
that in the case of union there would be one national govern-
ment to support instead of a number of independent govern-
ments. They understood that revenue would be required to 
operate the individual states even were the plan of union 
adopted. But in the case of disunion each state would have 
to support a separate civil list, whereas in the event of un-
ion there would be only one civil list to support. 2 
1. FED(l2), 75. 
2. FED(l3), 76. 
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Also, fewer persons would be required to guard the 
inland communities against practices of illicit trade.1 
In the event of union illicit trade practices would be less 
common because of a free and unbridled exchange of trade 
among the states. And where illicit practices did occur the 
national government would handle the situation. It would be 
much less expensive to have the responsibility of guarding 
against illicit trade practices than for each state to sup-
part a separate means for doing this. In the event of union 
it would be unnecessary for each state to maintain extensive 
milH;ary establis:hrll9nt s. Union is conducive to economy in 
government. 
J. Advantages of Extent of Country Embraced by Union. 
Opponents of the proposed constitution contended during the 
period between its adoption by the Philadelphia Convention 
and its ratification by the states that the size of the ter-
ritory embracing the states made a republican administration 
impracticable. 2 The opponents of the proposed constitution 
had used passages from Montesquieu to substantiate their 
contention that the geographical size of America was too 
large for a republican form of government.3 Hamilton, in 
dealing .with tbe opponents of the proposed plan of govern-
ment on the question of the feasibility of a republican form 
of govern.n.ent for a large territory, wrote the folla~ling: 
1. FED(l3), 79. 
2. FED(l4), 80. 
3 • FED ( 9 ) , 4 9 • 
The opponents of the plan proposed have, with 
great assiduity, cited and circulated the ob-
servations of Montesquieu on the necessity of 
a contracted territory for a republican gov-
ernment. But they seem not to have been ap-
prised of the sentiments of that great man 
expressed in another part of his work, nor 
to have adverted to the consequences of the 
principle to which !hey subscribe with such 
ready acquiescence. 
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Hamilton, in rebuttal to the argument produced by the 
opponents of the proposed constitution tba t the size of the 
country was too large for a republican administration, used 
Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws. In so doing Hamilton 
was making use of the reasoning of the same person to up-
hold the proposed plan of government that its adversaries 
had used to argue against it. Hamilton concludes that 
So far are t he suggestions of Montesquieu from 
standing in opposition to a general Union of 
the States, that he explicitly treats of a 
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for ex-
tending the sphere of popular government, and 
reconciling the advanta~es of monarchy with 
those of republicanism. 
Hamilton was right in disagreeing that only a small geo-
graphical area could be administered satisfactorily by a 
republican form of government. His quotations from Montes-
quieu3 on this subject, however, never seem to be exactly 
to the point. The quotations he uses deal with the advan-
tages of a republican government in quelling factions and 
preventing tyranny but have nothing to do with whether a 
republican government can be adequately administered over 
1. FED( 9) , 49 • 2 • FED ( 9 ) , 50 • 3. FED(9), 50-51. 
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a large territory. 
Madison thought that one of the great assets of a re-
publican form of government lay in the fact that it could be 
administered over a large territory. In Madison's opinion, 
the fact that a greater number of citizens and "extent of 
terri tory" could be brought within the comp:t ss of republican 
than of democratic government was the principal circumstance 
which rendered "factious combinations less to be dreaded in 
tre former than in the latter. n1 
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests; you make it 
less probable that a majority of the whole 
will have a common motive to invade the rights 
of other citizens; or if such a COIIliD.On motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength, and 
to act in unison with each other. Besides oth-
er impediments, it may be remarked that, where 
there is a consciousness of unjust or dishon-
orable purposes, communication is always check-
ed by distrust in proportion to2 the number 
whose concurrence is necessary. 
The great extent of the country was, in the opinion 
of the writers of The Federalist, a utility and a security.3 
Against the attacks of a foreign power it is a utility. And 
it has "precisely the same effect against the enterprises of 
ambitious rulers in the national councils. u4 
Madison further remarked, 5 contrary to the ideas held 
by some of the opponents to the plan of union adopted by the 
Philadelphia Convention, that if the plan of union were 
1. FED(lO), 60. 
2. FED(lO), 61. 
3· FED{28), 174. 
4• FED{28), 174; {51), 340; 
( 23) ' 146; ( 43) ' 282. 
5 • FED { 14) , 83 • 
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adopted, improved roads and means of communication would be 
one of the benefits. Travel and commerce between the states 
would be facilitated. 
K. Union Will Give Government Power to Execute Neces-
sary Measures. One of the severe experiences under the .Ar-
ticles of Confederation was the experience of a government 
which was impotent. The impotence of the national government 
under the Articles of Confederation was the chief defect 
from which others issued. The writers of The Federalist, 
with a thorough understanding of the Articles of Confedera-
1 tion, warned repeatedly that if the plan of union adopted 
by the Philadelphia Convention were not ratified, the condi-
tions experienced under the Articles of Confederation would 
not only be continued bu.t worsened. 
It is true, as has been before observed, that 
facts, too stubborn to be resisted, ,have pro-
duced a species of general assent to the ab-
stract proposition that there exist material 
defects in our national system; but the use-
fulness of the concession, on the part of the 
old adversaries of federal measures, is de-
stroyed by a strenuous opposition to a rem-
edy, upon th~ · only principles that can give 
it a chance of success. While they admit that 
the government · of the United States is desti-
tute of energy, they contend against confer-
ring upon it those poWers which are requisite 
to supply that energy. They seem still to aim 
at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an 
augmentation of federal authority, without a 
diminution of State authority; at sovereignty 
in the Union, and complete independence in the 
members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish 
with blind devotion the political monster of 
1. FED(l5), 89; (20), 122; (41), 263; (25), 154-158; 
(20), 124; (JO), 184. 
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an imperium in imperio. 1 
Union under the plan of government proposed will establish 
an insul ar situation with regard to the defects of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. The supreme law of the land will be 
enforced. 2 A reversion to any plan of government which is so 
weak as to allow the states to act as independent sovereigns 
will terminate in dissolution.3 
L . Union Will Afford a More Efficient Administration. 
The writers of The Federalis.t adopted the point of view that 
a single government based on the proposed plan of union 
would be administered by abler men than the states disunited. 
In Essay Number 4 Jay clearly expressed this opinion. Jay 
was interested in the treaty-making powers of government and 
indicated this fact in the following quotation. 
One government can collect and avail itself 
of the talents and experiences of the ablest 
men, in whatever part of the Union they may 
be found. It can move on uniform principles 
of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, · 
and protect the several parts and members, 
and extend the benefit of its foresight and 
precautions to each. I n the formation of 
treaties, it will regard the interest of the 
whole, and the particular interests of the 
parts as connected with that of the whole. 
It can apply the resources and power of the 
whole to the defence of any particular part, 
and that more easily and expeditiously than 
State governments or separate confederacies 
can possibly do, 4for want of concert and unity of system. 
1~ FED(l5); 89. 
2. FED(l5); 91-92; (27), 169. · 
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Madison explained in Essay Number 58 how the legis-
lative branch of the proposed plan of union would be consti-
tuted by the ablest men. Theoretically Madison was right, 
but as a matter of actual experience the House of Represent-
atives has not always been constituted by the ablest men. 
Yet Madison still might be right in the possible reply that 
any other plan than the one proposed would open the way for 
a greater number of incompetent representatives to gain of-
fice. It was Madison's view that under tbe proposed plan of 
union there would not be an excessively large number of 
elective offices and the people would be able to choose from 
a few good leaders. 1 Incompetent men would not be able to 
win popular approval with a comparatively law number of elec-
tive offices available. Madison drew upon his knowledge of 
the history of federal government to say: 
In the ancient republics, where the whole 
body of the people assembled in person, a 
single orator, or an artful statesman, was 
generally seen to rule with as complete a 
sway as if a sceptre bad been placed in · 
his single hand. On the same principle, 
the more multitudinous a ·repre_sentative 
assembly may be rendered, the more it will 
partake of the infirmities incident to 
collective meetings of the people• Igno-
rance will be the dupe of cunning, and 
passion2the slave of sophistry and decla-mation. 
Madison thought, then, that a rational mean should be adher-
ed to in the creation of public offices. ~e goal was to 
permit the different interests of society to be represented, 
1. FED(58), 377-383. 2. FED(58}, 382. 
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and nothing could be gained in establishing elective offices 
beyond that point. 
Experience will forever admonish them that ••• 
after securing a sufficient number for the 
purposes of safety, of local information and 
of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, 
they will counteract their own views by 
every addition to their representatives.1 
The writers of The Federalist were explaining the value of 
union as a for.m of national government. They repeatedly 
made reference to how local conditions would be affected 
were the proposed plan of union adopted; but they were too 
intent on the plan of union to discuss such a thing as the 
New England Town Meeting as a way of handling local affairs. 
Certainly they would never have agreed upon this as a means 
of handling national affairs. This idea was repugnant to 
them as a national procedure. 
M. Union Affords a Uniform Policy. This topic is a 
general su:m.DE.ry of the answer to the question, "Why union?" 
In the event of the adoption of the proposed plan of union, 
the writers of The Federalist rightly maintained that one 
system of courts2 would be better than a number of courts. 
If the states as independent sovereigns or grouped in sev-
eral confederacies maintained separate courts, there would 
be no uniform interpretation of national laws dealing with 
internal affa:ir s. Neither would there be a uniform interpre-
tation of laws dealing with treaties. A pluralism in the 
1. ~~D(58), 382. 
2. FED(83), 548; (22), 138; (27), 169; (3), 15. 
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courts such as this would lead to frustration and chaos. 
The military under the proposed plan of union will 
not be dan@Brous to the liberties of the people. If the 
military be 
placed under the direction of the Union, 
there will be no danger of a supine and list-
less inattention to the dangers of a neigh-
bor, till its near approach had superadded 
the incitements of self-preservation to t£e 
too feeble impulses .o.f duty and sympathy. 
Standing armies maintained by separate confederacies or in-
dependent sovereign states would be dangerous to liberties 
as well as incompetent and excessively expensive. Madison 
advised that all prudence should be exerted in "diminishing 
both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one [8. mil-
itary establishment? which may be inauspicious to its liber-
ties."2 
Independent states or states joined in separate confed-
eracies with only a DEaningless attachment to a national gov-
ernment would create conditions approaching anarchy with re-
gard to intercourse between the states, foreign trade, taxa-
tion, and all other affairs of government. A uniform policy 
is possible only in union. And as Hamilton stated in Essay 
Number 84, union is the ba.sis of the political happiness of 
the "citizens of America. n3 
4. Interpretation and Cr i sis 
The problem of states' rights and the power of the 
1. FED(29), 182. 2. FED(41), 263. 3. FED(84), 564. 
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National government has always been an ilnpor tant question 
to American political thinkers. It was uppermost in the 
minds of American legislators before the Philadelphia Con-
vention at which the Constitution was framed; it was a ques-
tion of paramount importance during this Convention; and it 
has been a central question since the adoption of the Con-
stitution. 
In the opinion of Madison the Constitution was not an 
organism which had been brought about by the unfolding of 
some destiny. It was not older than the Philadelphia Con-
vention. It was a compact. But it was not merely a com-
pact. It was also a law. 1 In order to give tbe Constitution 
a character of law, Madison 
insisted that it should be ratified by con-
ventions elected by the people, and not by 
the state legislatures. If it were rati-
fied by their own governments, the States 
would come to look upon it as ·a mere trea-
ty; and a brewh of it by any one of them 
would be held to absolve the others from 
their whole obligation. As a result the 
nation would be no whit better off2than un-der the Articles of Confederation. 
Wbat has been called a "distinctively American idea" 
came out of the Philadelphia Convention.3 It was the "con-
caption of a constitution as a law unalterable and unassail-
able by a maj"ori ty of the legislature, and enforceable by 
the courts."4 The question before us now is, does a party 
1. Farrand, RFC, I, 122-123; II, 92-93. 
2. Burns, · ~~, 93. 
3. Warren, CCSC, 12-16. 
4. Burns, JMP, 93. 
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to this compact have a right to break it? Does a State have 
a right to secede? 
It is necessary to bear in mind that the framers of 
the Constitution did not look upon it as being strictly na-
tional. It was partly national and partly federal. It was 
national in that the government operated directly upon indi-
viduals. It was federal in that it operated upon the several 
political units composing the Union. For a government to be 
completely national its authority would have to be indefinite 
over individuals and States. The United States government 
has a distinctly federal character in that the States have 
powers as political units. Conflicts between these two ju-
risdictions of power seem to be perpetual. 
The political issues which most agitated the public 
mind during the first sixty years of the life of the Consti-
tution were nullification and secession. Madison 
regarded tbe Union as a union of States 
forn:e d by the people in the States as sov-
ereign political communities not by the 
State governments. The Constitution was 
to him a compact among the States in the 
sense of political societies, and it was 
the instrument by which the people, · that 
is a majority of them in each State, sur-
rendered a portion of their sovereignty 
to the government of the Union. · The only 
parties to the compact~ however, were the 
States as political societies, not the 
people as indiyiduals nor the gpvernments 
of the States. 
Madison held that the Constitution as a compact was 
1. Burns, JMP, 117. 
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binding on all the States. A State had no more right than 
an individual to violate solemn engagem.ents. 1 Each party to 
a compact has a right to decide whether the agreement has 
been broken. If a party to a compact insists that it has 
been violated the other parties have a right to contend that 
the compact is still valid and to demand its execution.2 It 
would appear from this reasoning that Madison held the Union 
to be indissoluble. Unfortunately, Madison became identi-
fied, though the identification was too rigid, with the 
States' rights movement. 
Madison is commonly credited with having advocated 
nullification and secession in the Virginia Resolutions of 
1798. But as Commager points out: 
These resolutions, it must be remembered, 
were not primarily concerned with -present-
ing a philosophy of States Rights, or a 
compact theory of governrnen t, but rather 
with restating the fundamental principles 
of the Revolutionary struggle---the prin-
ciple that government is limited, that 
there are certain things no government 
can do, and that among these is depriving 
men of liberty. It was liberty that 
Jefferson and Madison were concern~d with 
here, not constitutional doctrine. 
In 1799 Madison drafted a long "Report on the Virginia 
Resolutions"4 in which he said nothing of' armed resistance 
against the federal government. There is nothing in any of' 
the letters which Madison wrote against the South Carolina 
1. Hunt (ed~); WJM; IX; 513~ 
2. Hunt (ed~), WJM, IX, 483. 
3. Commager, .LIA, 273. 
4. Burns, JMP, 120. 
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nullificationists in 1832 to indicate that he advocated dis-
ruption of the Union. 1 
Madison, in his "Notes on Nullification"2 repudiated 
the doctrine that any State can declare a law of Congress 
unconstitutional, "arrest the operation of that law within 
its own territory, and at the same time maintain its adherence 
to the Constitution."3 If an individual State had no con-
stitutional right to declare an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional, neither did it have any constitutional right to se-
cede from the Union. 4 
It should be noted that Madison made one important 
exception to his denial of the right of a State to withdraw 
from the Union. This right, he maintained, was a natural 
right, not a constitutional one.5 After suffering intolera-
ble oppression at the hands of the federal government a 
State would be permitted to exercise this natural right just 
as an individual might gp intO exile if oppressed beyond en-
durance by a State. 
This problem of nullification and secession, as has 
been stated, was an important one until after the Civil War. 
Daniel Webster was the most ardent spokesman for the view 
that the Union is indissoluble. 6 But it took the crisis of 
the Civil War to crystallize his arguments into solid fact. 
1. Burns; JMP; 120. 2. Hunt (ed.), IX, 598. 
3. Burns, JMP; 121. 4. Hunt (ed.), IX, 356. 
5~ Hunt (ed.), IX, 353; 387. 
6. See Webster's "Second Reply to Hayne," Jan. 26, 1830, and 
his famous "Seventh of March Speech," 1850. Key extracts 
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5. Summary 
Opponents of the Constitution proposed by the Phila-
delphia Convention as well as those who favored it were 
agreed upon one thing, namely, that a change in the struc-
ture of government was necessary. Just what should be the 
extent of this change was debatable. Would it be necessary 
to alter the entire fabric of the existing government, or 
could the needed changes be made within the framework of the 
Articles of Confederation? A review of the evils which ex-
isted under the Articles of Confederation made it clear to a 
majority of the builders of the Constitution that a complete 
overhaul was essential. 
This chapter has dealt with the idea of union as basic 
in tbe minds of the Constitution's framers. It was clear to 
them that only Wlder a more perfect union than they had ex-
perienced could their survival as a nation be assured. 
Constitutional thought with regard to the indissolu-
bility of tbe Union was much divided until after the Civil 
War. 
If the concept of union was looked upon as fundamental 
to the life of the American republic the question which natu-
rally arises is, how should the idea of union work concretely? 
What kind of union did the builders of the Constitution think 
was best for the American States in 1787? It will be the pur-
from these speeches may conveniently be found in Commager, 
LIA, 276-279; 283-286. 
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pose in the succeeding chapter to consider this question as 
it was answered by the writers of The Federalist. 
17.3 
CHAPTER IV 
WHAT KIND OF UNION? 
Throughout this study the answer to the question of 
the nature of the union advocated by the writers of The Fed-
eralist has been implied. This has been necessarily true 
because it is not possible to discuss what they were against 
or the advantages of union as opposed to disunion without 
implying what kind of union they favored. In producing the 
arguments of the writers of The Federalist which were against 
the Articles of Confederation, and in producing their argu-
ments favoring a union of the states instead of a disunion 
of the same , it was discovered that they were opposed to any 
plan of government which permitted the states to exist as 
independent sovereigns or in groups of separate confederacies. 
Their studies in the history of federal government 
had convinced them of the error of legislating for states 
in their collective capacities. It was particularly true 
of Madison that he had excelled in the study of federal gov-
ernment. The error of legislating for states in their col-
lective capacities was a present experience while living 
under the Articles of Confederation. Specifically, then, 
what did the writers of The Federalist say should constitute 
tre nature of union? In their answer to this question is 
the genius of the ir work, and their con tri bu ti on to social 
philosophy. 
1. A Union Which Is Compatible with 
the Genius of the American People 
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Madison may ba. ve been guilty of special pleading in 
this particular instance of explaining not only the pro-
posed plan of union, but what he held to be the best possi-
ble kind of union. It was, nevertheless, good technique, 
for in promoting a cause it is essential that the emotions 
of men be kept not too far in the background. Yet Madison 
was right in his assumption that union would be compatible 
with the genius of the American people. And he was right 
again in proclaiming that such a form of union as the one 
proposed would be in keeping with "the fundamental princi-
1 ple s of the Revolution." Madison was again right when he 
maintained that the people of America were capable of self-
government and that union ought to be constructed on that 
premise. 
It is evident that no other form would be 
reconcilable with the genius of the people 
of .An:e rica ; with the fundamental principle s 
of the Revolution; or with that honorable 
determination which animates every votary 
of freedom, to rest all our political ex-
periments on the capacity of mankind for 
self-government. If the plan of the con-
vention, therefore, be found to depart from 
the republican character, its advocates 2 must abandon it as no longer defensible. 
2. Characteristics of the Republican Form of Government 
A. No Adequate Precedents. The writers of The Fed-
1. FED(39), 243· 2. FED(39), 243. 
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eralist were convinced of the fact that no adequate prece-
dents existed by which a republican for.m of government could 
be characterized. Hamilton's and Madison's knowledge of the 
his tory of federal government, as well as their knowledge of 
the theory of society, was indispensable to their clarifica-
tion of the nature of a truly republican form of government. 
No greater contribution to the concept of federal government 
based on republican principle has been made than that of 
Madison and Hamilton in their analysis of the nature of re-
publican government in The Federalist. Hamilton calls at-
tention to the fact, in Essay Number 9, that no adequate 
precedents exist. 
It is not to be denied that the portraits 
they LOpponents of the plan proposed? have 
sketched of repUblican government were too just copies of the originals from which 
· they were taken. If it had been found im-
practicable to have devised models of a 
more perfect structure, the enlightened 
friends to liberty would have been obliged 
to abandon the cause of thai species of 
government as indefensible. 
It was Madison, however, who was clearer and more 
specific in this matter of denying the existence of ade-
quate precedents. 
What, then, are the distinctive characters 
of the republican for.m? Were an answer to 
this question to be sought, not by recurring 
to principles, but in the application of the 
ter.m by political writers, to the constitu-
tions of different States, no satisfactory 
one would ever be found. Holland, in which 
no particle of the supre~ . authority is 
1. FED(9), 48. 
derived from the people, has passed almost 
universally under the denomination of a re-
public. The same title has been bestowed 
on Venice, where absolute power over the 
great body of the people · is exercised, in 
the most absolute manner, by a small body 
of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a 
mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in 
the :ir worst forms, has been dignified with 
the same appellation. The government of 
England, which has one republican branch 
only, combined with an hereditary aristoc-
racy and monarchy, has, with equal impro-
priety, been · trequently placed on the list 
of republics. The se examples, which are 
nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a 
genuine republic, sb.C1N the extreme inaccu-
racy with which the ter~has been used in 
political disquisitions. 
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B. A Government Which Receives Its Authority from 
the People. A government, first of all, should receive its 
authority from the people •2 It was maintained in The F~d­
eralist that the Articles of Confederation had never been 
ratified by the people.3 Evidently this was one reason the 
writers of The Federalist mentioned the view that a govern-
ment should receiv~ its authority from the people. Hamilton 
stated in Essay Number 22: 
It bas not a little contributed to the infirm-
ities of the existing federal system, that it 
never had a ratification by the people. Rest-
ing on no better foundation · than the consent 
of the several legislatures, it bas been ex-
posed to frequent and intricate questions con-
cerning the validity of its powers, and has, 
in some instances, given birth to the enormous 
doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. 
Owing its ratification to the law of a State, 
1~ FED(39), 243· 
3. FED(22), 140. 2. FED(31), 192-193; (28), 173; (49), 327-328; (41)' 265; (37)' 227; (46)' 
305; (40)' 257-258; (33) J 200; (40)' 
255; (39), 244-246. 
it has been contended that the same author-
ity might1repeal the law by which it was ratif led. 
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Another, and much more significant reason, for men-
tioning the view that a government should receive its au-
thority from the people was the_ firm conviction that "the 
fabric of ~ric an empire ought to rest on the solid basis 
of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE." 2 It is not possible to say 
to whom, if any particular person, the writers of The Fed-
eralist were indebted for this idea. They may have obtained 
it from Locke,3 or from no particular person. The important 
fact is that they held it. 
C. A Government Which Extends Its Authority to the 
People. The Articles of Confederation was prohibited from 
extending its authority to the people because it dealt with 
the states in their collective capacities. Here, again, the 
writers of The Federalist used their knowledge of the history 
of federal government4 to illustrate that in all instances of 
a national government having to deal with member states in 
their collective ca-pacities the national government has been 
impotent. Its only means of enforcing laws is military co-
ercion. And military coercion ultlinately leads to a military 
state and the loss of liberties. This eventually can be 
avoided when the national government can extend its authority 
1. FED(22); 140~141. 
2~ FED(22), 141. 
3~ Locke, ECCG, ch. ii, sec. 15. See above, 90-95. 
4• FED(l6}, 97. 
to the citizens and demand obedience of them. 
It seems to require no pains to prove that 
the States ought not to prefer a national 
Constitution which could only be kept in 
motion by the instrumentality of a large 
army continually on foot to execute the or-
dinary requisitions or decrees of the gov-
ernment. And yet this is the plain alterna-
tive involved by those who wish to deny it 
the power of extending its operations to 
individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable 
at all, would instantly degenerate into a 
military despotism; but it1will be found in every light impracticable. 
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The proposed plan of union would extend the supreme 
law of the land to the people. The individual citizens 
would be protected by the federal courts, and they would 
likewise be responsible to the federal courts. The federal 
courts would be practically meaningless to the individual 
citizens were they to extend only to the states and were the 
states to maintain separate courts to interpret national 
laws. The latter would be a step in the direction of con-
fusion, dissolution, and anarchy. 
D. Necessity of Resorting to Principles. Since, in 
the opinion of the writers of The Federalist, all historical 
examples of federal government gave witness to an inadequate 
relationship between the federal gov.ernment and the people, 
it became necessary to appeal to the principles of federal 
government in order to determine its true nature. How, then, 
may a truly republican form of government be defined? 
If we resort for a criterion to the different 
1. FED\16) , 97-98; ( 15) , 89; ( 23) , 141-142. 
principles on which different forms of gov-
ernment are established, we may define a 
republic to be, or at least may bestow that 
name on, a government which derives all its 
powers directly or indirectly from the 
great body of the people, and is administer-
ed by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for i limited period, or during 
good behavior. 
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To whom were the writers of The Federalist indebted 
for the principles to which they resorted? Had not Locke 
said, for example, that governments should rest on the con-
sent of the governed?2 Was not Montesquieu referred to in 
connection with the discussion of the separation of powers 
in government?3 Had not Harrington in The Commonwealth of 
Oceana also advocated the principle of the separation of 
powers in government? And had he not also set forth a theory 
of the economic basis of politics which foreshadowed Essay 
Number 10? Had Harrington not given an analysis to the cause 
and remedy of factions similar to that of Madison in Essay 
Number 10? All these statements are true, but the extent of 
their influence on the writers of The Federalist cannot be 
definitely determined. It is highly probable that Madison 
was thoroughly familiar with the works of all of the above 
men tioned4 and that Hamilton and Jay were familiar with them 
as well. What can be stated with definiteness is the fact 
that the writers of The Federalist made use of the thought 
1. FED(39), 243-244• 
2. Locke, ECCG, ch. viii, sec. 121. 
). FED(47), 313-317. 
4. See above, 44-61. 
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of no one without placing the stamp of their own originality 
upon it. Consider, for example, the functional division of 
powers in government. Maciver correctly pointed out that it 
"does not imply the constituent division of sovereignty it-
self. The latter had no real precedents."1 
As was previously quoted: 2 
The balanced state which Madison did so much 
to construct and Hamilton so much to defend 
had a character entirely different from that 
of the exemplars and models to which they 
pointed.j · 
And the use made by the writers of The Fe.deralist of the func-
tional division of powers 
flouted an agelong tradition. It owed noth-
ing to Locke or Harrington or even Montes-
quieu. Greatly influenced by European po-
litical philosophies as were the builders 
of the Republic, the fabric they construct-
ed was in essentials, almose without their 
knowing it, profoundly new. 
Maciver was right in using the phrase "almost without 
their knowing it," but the writers of The Federalist knew 
that they were advocating the use of the principles of fed-
eral government in a novel way. They also knew they had ad-
vanced improvements on historical federations. What they 
could not foresee was the verdict of history and experience. 
The efficacy of various principles is now 
well understood, which were either not known 
at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. 
The regular distribution of power into dis-
1. Maciver, Art.(l938), 60. 
2. See above, 120. 
3. Maciver; Art.(l938); 60~ 
4. Maciver, Art.(l938), 60. 
tinct departments; the introduction of leg-
islative balances and checks; the institu-
tion of courts composed of judges holding 
their offices during good behavior; the rep-
resentation of the people in the legislature 
by deputies of their own election: these 
are wholl new discoveries LUnderscorlng is 
min~ , or have made the~r principal progress 
towards perfection in modern times. They 
are means, and powerful means, by which the 
excellencies of republican government may be 
retained1and its imperfections lessened or avoided. 
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The analysis given of republican government by the 
writers of The Federalist constitutes a masterful effort at 
keeping a government within the confines of the control of 
the citizens. The working arrangement they gave to the sys-
tem of checks and balances had no exact precedent in either 
Montesquieu or Harrington. The writers of The Federalist 
made certain to so arrange the functional separation of pow-
ers that the danger of the emergence of any tyrannical usur-
pation of power would be forestalled. The republican prin-
ciple of government would be guaranteed to each state, 2 and 
there would be no titles of nobility. 
Could any further proof be required of the 
republican complexion of this system, the 
most decisive one might be found in its ab-
solute prohibition of titles of nobility, 
both under the federal and the State gov-
ernments; and in its express guaranty of 
the republican form to each of the latter.3 
E. Republican Government as a Remedy for Factions. 
Madison in Essay Number 10 gave an unexcelled account of re-
1. FED(9), 48. See also {10), 54, where Madison claims im-
provements on republics both ancient and modern and says 
that these improvements cannot be too much admired. 
2. FED(43), 283. J. FED(39), 245. 
publican government as a remedy for factions. 
Among the numerous advantages promised by 
a well-constructed Union, none deserves to 
be more accurately developed than its tend-
ency to break and control the violence of 
faction. The friend of popular governments 
never finds himself so much alarmed for 
their character and fate, as when he con-
templates their propensity to this dangerous 
vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set 
a due value on any plan which, without vio-
lating the principles to which he is attach-
ed, provides a proper cure for it. 
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Madison observed that complaints were heard from the 
"most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends 
of public and private faith, and of public and personal lib-
erty" that governments were unstable and inadequate. 2 The 
conflict of rival parties disregarded the public good. Meas-
ures were often decided by an overbearing majority instead 
of according to "the rules of justice and the rights of the 
minor party. n3 Alarm prevailed concerning the state of 
private rights and the "distrust of public engagements."4 
Madison observed further that these undesirable conditions 
were 
chiefly, if not wholly, the effects of the 
unsteadiness and injustice with which a fac-
tious sp~it has tainted our public adminis-
trations. 
What is a faction? Madison stated: 
By a faction, I understand a number of cit-
izens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by som3 common impulse of passion, 
1. FED(lO), 53. 
4• FED(lO), 54. 
2. FED(lO), 54. 
5. FED(lO), 54. 
). FED(lO), 54. 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent ~d 
aggregate interests of the community. 
18.3 
How can the "mischiefs of faction" be cured'? There 
are two ways of doing this. One is "by removing its causes; 
the other, by controlling its effects. "2 
How can the causes of faction be removed'? One way is 
to destroy "the liberty which is essential to its existence." 
Another way is to give "to every citizen the same opinions, 
the same passions, and the same interests.") Madison ob-
served that the first remedy would be worse than the disease. 
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, 
an aliment without which it instantly ex-
pires. But it could not be less folly to 
abolish liberty, which is essential to po-
litical life, because it nourishes faction, 
than it would be to wish the annihilation 
of air, which is essential to animal life, 
because4it imparts to fire its destructive agency. 
The second remedy for the removal of the causes of faction 
Madison found to be "as impracticable as the first would be 
unwise."5 Men have different faculties, interests, passions, 
and opinions. Man's reason is also fallible and as long as 
he is at liberty to exercise it, his reason and his self-love, 
passions and other interests will have a reciprocal influence 
on each other. Also, "the diversity in the faculties of men 
from which the rights of property originate, is not less an 
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. n6 It can 
1 • FED ( 10 ) , 54. 
4• ~~D(lO), 55. 
2. FED(lO), 54-55. 
5. FED(lO), 55. 
3. .l!"'ED(lO), 55. 
6. FED ( 10) , 55. 
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never be expected that men will have a uniformity of interests, 
passions, and opinions, and that their reason will lead them 
to identical points of view. 
Madison's inference, then, regarding the removal of 
the causes of faction was that "the causes of faction cannot 
be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means 
of controlling the effects. nl 
How can the "effects" of faction be controlled'? It 
can be done by one of two means only. 
Either the existence of the same passion or 
interest in a majority at the same time must 
be prevented, or the majority having such 
coexistent passion or interest, must be 
rendered, by their number and local situa-
tion, unable to concert and2carry into ef-fect schemes of oppression. 
Madison's discussion of the subject of controlling 
the "effects" of passion was a comparison and contrast be-
tween a pure democracy and a republican form of government. 
By a pure democracy Madison meant "a society consisting of 
a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
government in person."3 A pure democracy, he maintained, 
could never admit of a "cure for the mischiefs of faction."4 
.In a pure demooraoy no satisfactory relationship can ever ex-
ist between majorities and minorities, between men of dif-
ferent passions. Tbe "effects" of faction can be most sat-
isfactorily controlled under a republican form of government. 
1. FED(lO), 57. 
3. FED(lO}, 58. 
2 • FED ( 10 ) , 5 8 • 
4• FED(lO), 58. 
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"A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme 
of representation takes place, opens a different. prospect, 
and promises the cure for which we are seeking."l 
In what way are the "effects" of faction controlled 
in a republic? The public views will be enlarged and refined 
by passing them through a chosen body of citizens whose love 
of justice and patriotism will not permit them to sacrifice 
partial considerations to the national welfare. 2 Madison was 
aware of the possibility of "men of factious" tempers win-
ning elections and betraying the interests of the people. 
The question resulting is, whether small or 
extensive republics are more favorable to 
the election of proper guardians of the pub-
lic weal; and it is clearly decided in favor 
of the la tter.3 
The men who possess the "most attractive merit" will 
find it easier to win elections when it is necessary to win 
the approval of a large number of citizens. But even in a 
large republic there is a danger of factious-minded men gain-
ing office where elective offices are too greatly multiplied. 
Also, the extent of terri tory which can be brought within the 
compass of a republican form of government "renders factious 
combinations less to be dreaded"4 than in a democracy. 
Extend the sp:te re and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests; you make it 
less probable that a majority of the whole 
will have a common motive to invade the rights 
of other citizens; or if such a common motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
1 • FED ( 10 ) , 59. 
.3. FED(lO), 59. 
2. FED(lO), 59. 
4• FED(lO), 60 • 
feel it to discover their own strength, and 
to act in unison with each other. Besides · 
other irnpe diments, it may be remarked that, 
where there is a consciousness of unjust or 
dishonorable purposes, communication is al-
ways checked by distrust in proportion to 
the number whose concurrence is necessary.l 
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Madison therefore reached the following conclusion 
with regard to the subject of controlling the "effects" of 
faction. "The same advantage which a republic has over a 
democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoy-
ed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Un-
ion over the States composing it. tt 2 "A republican remedy," 
then was discovered "for the diseases most incident to re-
public an government. "3 
3. Proposed Plan of Union Conforms 
to Republic an Principles 
That the proposed plan of union conformed to repub-
lican principles is obvious from the fact that The Federalist 
was written to recommend the proposed plan of union to the 
people composing the ratifying conventions. Frequent ref-
erence has been made in this study to the circumstances of 
states existing as independent sovereigns or as separate 
groups of confederacies, while at the same time being parts 
of a national government. What will be the status of the 
states in the proposed plan of union? 
1. FED(lO); 61. 
2. FED(lO), 61. 
3 • FED ( 10 ) , 6 2 • 
An entire consolidation of the States into 
one complete national sovereignty would im-
ply an entire subordination of the parts; 
and whatever powers might remain in them, 
would be altogether dependent on the general 
will. But as the plan of the convention 
aims only at a partial union or consolid-
ation, the State governments would clearly 
retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before had, and which were not, by that 
act exclusively delegated to the United 
States. This exclusive delegation, or rath-
er this alienation, of State sovereignty, 
would only exist in three cases: where the 
Constitution in express terms granted an ex-
clusive authority to the Union; where it 
granted in one instance an authority to the 
Union, and in another prohibited the States 
from exercising the like authority; and 
where it granted an authority to the Union, 
to which a similar authority in the States 
would be absol~tely and totally contradictory 
and repugnant • 
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Madison drew a clear distinction between a single re-
publican government and a compound one. 2 The former is 
characterized by the fact that all the power surrendered by 
the people is administered by a single govern.Ir2nt. "Usur-
pations are guarded against by a division of the government 
into distinct and separate departments. "3 The situation is 
far different in a compound republic. And the proposed plan 
of union is designed for a compound republic. 
In the compound republic of America, the 
power surrendered by the people is first · 
divided between tw:::> distinct governments, 
and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people. The 
• 
1. FED(32); 194; (62), 451; (51), 339; (31), 197. 
2~ FED(51); 338~339. 
3 • FED ( 51 ) , 3 39 • 
different governments will control each 
other, at the same tipe that each will be 
controlled by itself. 
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The proposed plan of union was also compound with re-
gard to being either wholly national or wholly federal. It 
was neither. It was both. Madison summarizes succinctly 
the national and federal characteristics of the proposed plan 
of union in the following way. 
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, 
in ·strictness, neither a national nor a 
federal Constitution, but a composition 
of both. In its foundation it is feder-
al, not national; in the sources from 
which the ordinary powers of the govern-
ment are drawn, it is partly federal and 
partly national; in the operation of 
these powers, it is national, not feder-
al; in the extent of them, ·again, it is 
federal, not national; and, finally, in 
the authoritative mode of introducing 
amendments, it is ne~ther wholly federal 
nor wholly national. 
With this said the writers of The Federalist made no 
claim that they had said the last word with regard to how a 
republican form of government could be best constituted. To 
one who studies The Federalist now it is a cause of wonder 
that the writers of The Federalist could have so thoroughly 
analyzed the nature and structure of federal government. 
Precedents in the field of the theory of society or actual 
historical republics were not too helpful as guides. The 
Federalist is an original and creative analysis of the nature 
and structure of what a republican form of government ought 
1. FED(51); 339~ 
2. FED(39), 250. 
to be like. Madison said of the critics of the proposed 
plan of union: 
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, 
that those who raise so many obje_ctions 
against the new Constitution should never 
call to mind the defects of that which is 
to be exchanged for it. It is not ne ce s-
sary that the former should be perfect; 
it is sufficient that the latter is more 
imperfect. No man would refuse to give 
brass for silver or gold fecause the la t-
ter had some alloy in it. 
4· Did Hamilton and Madison Agree with The Federalist? 
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This question is not intended to raise the question 
of integrity. It must be remembered that The Federalist was 
written as a piece of campaign literature. The proposed 
plan of union was a result of compromise between its framers. 
The product of any deliberative assembly is a result of com-
promise. And this is good, ;for what is brought about as a 
result of compromise in a deliberative assembly is formed to 
accommodate many different interests. The question before 
us is, "Did Hamil ton and Madison agree with The Federalist?" 
In other words, did they accept the proposed plan because it 
was all they had to recommend as a replacement for the Arti-
cles of Confederation, or did they actually believe what they 
wrote in The Federalist? 
The proposed plan of union was in large measure a pro-
duct of Madison's mind. He had ~ided the debates in the 
1 • FED ( 1 ) , 6 • 
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Philadelphia Convention with his superior knowledge of the 
history of federal government and his knowledge of the theory 
of government. There is no reason to doubt that he believed 
at least most of what he had written in The Federalist. 
Hamilton wrote in Essay Number- 1: 
I own to you that, after having given it an 
attentive consideration, I am clearly of 
opinion it is your interest to adopt it. 
I am convinced that this is tre safest course 
for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness. - I affect not reserves which I do 
not feel •••• I frankly acknowledge to you my 
convictions •••• My motives must remain in the 
depositary of my own breast. My arguments 
will be open· to all, and may be judged of by 
all. They shall at least -be offered in a 
spirit1which will not disgrace the cause of truth. 
It seems clear that Hamilton meant every ward o.f the above 
confession. The proposed plan was, in his opinion, much su-
perior to the Articles of Confederation. It was his only 
alternative. And he was willing to support it with all his 
energy and vigor. It seems equally clear, however, that the 
plan of union was not what Hamilton wanted. 2 Adair reminds 
us that while Hamilton was preparing to write The Federalist, 
he LflamiltoB7 drew up a private memorandum 
in which he prophesied its failure uil.less 
additional power could be sque,zed out of 
its clauses by interpretation. 
Hamilton favored a strongly centralized government and never, 
outside The Federalist, argued for a republican form of gov-
1. FED{l), 6. 2 2. See above, 22-23; 71-72. ). Adair, .Art.{l944) , 257. This memorandum is printed in 
Lodge {ed.), WAH, I, 420-424 under the title, "Impressions 
as to the New Constitution." 
191 
ernment similar to the one discussed in it. 
Hamilton made a ~eech at the Philadelphia Convention 
June 18, 1787 which lasted five hours. His ~eech consti-
tuted a plea for the adoption of a plan of government model-
led after the British monarchy.1 Madison's notes of Hamil-
ton's speech contain the following statem9 nt: "In his private 
opinion he had no scruple in declaring ••• tbat the British 
Government was the best in the world: and that he doubted 
whether anything short of it would do in .America. n 2 
Hamilton in Essay Number 32 in support of the pro-
posed plan of union said: 
An entire consolidation of the States into 
one complete national sovereignty would im-
ply an entire subordination of the parts; 
and whatever powers might remain in them, 
would be altogether dependent on the gen-
eral will. But as the plan of government 
aims only at a partial union or consolid-
ation, the State governments would clearly 
retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before bad, and wh i ch were not, by 
that act, excl~sively delegated to the 
United States. 
But in the Philadelphia Convention Hamilton maintained that, 
"only by the establishment of a state which institutionalized 
in its very organs a 'will' independent of the people could 
the class struggle be allayed in the United States."4 Hamil-
ton's syllabus of his speech in the Convention contains this 
line: "The principle chiefly intended to be established is 
this---that there must be a permanent will."5 Hamilton's ca-
1. See Farrand, RFC, I, 288-308. 
3. FED(32}, 194· 
5. Farrand, RFC, I, 310. 
2. Farrand, RFC, I, ~88. 
4. Adair, Art.(l944} , 257. 
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reer both before and after The Federalist indicated that he 
did favor a government with a stronger will than he advocat-
ed in The Federalist. 
Madison's chief embarrassment over The Federalist was 
his broad construction statement that the end justifies the 
means. "No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in 
reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are 
authorized. 111 No · doubt Madison firmly believed this when he 
wrote Essay Number 44. He could not anticipate what use 
would be made of this idea, and when Hamilton used it to 
justify the creation of the national bank, Madison developed 
a "strict construction" tmory of the Constitution. The idea 
·or a broad construction interpretation of the Constitution 
was not Madison's idea alone. It was Hamilton's as well. 
In Essay Number 23 Hamilton gave a broad construction theory 
of the Constitution. This was one way he could salvage 
something from his own original plan presented to the Con-
van tion. It enabled him to place pONer in the government. 
This is one of those truths which, to a correct 
and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evi-
dence along with it; and may be obscured, but 
cannot be made plainer by argument or reason-
ing. It rests on axioms as simple as they are 
universal; the means ought to be proportioned 
to the end; the persons, from whose agency the 
attainment of any end is expected, ought to 
possess2 the means by which it is to be at-tained. 
Frequently in this study use has been made of the 
1. FED(44), 294. 
2. FED(23), 142. 
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phrases "the writers of The Federalist were of the opinion," 
or "the writers of The Federalist held" when referring to a 
particular idea. This usage has been fair in view of the 
fact that The Federalist as an analysis of republican gov-
ernment must be understood as it was written. Its merit as 
a study in republican government is discovered not in what 
Hamilton or Madison thought before or afterward, or even dur-
ing the writing of The Federalist, but, instead, in what is 
actually written. 
The conclusion in this regard, then, is that The Fed-
eralist contains a social philosophy which is better than its 
authors intended. It is possible now better to understand 
Maciver's statement: 
Therefore the political philosophy of the 
Constitution is a different thing from the 
political philosophies that moved its ere-
. ators. In this respect they builded better 
than they knew, indeed better than the 
world yet knows. 
5. Arguments Applicable to International Union 
One of the great problems confronting people every-
wb9re today is how to solve international discord. Is the 
republican principle as advocated by the writers of The Fed-
eralist applicable to international union? It may be ob-
served that the reasons offered for the rejection of the pro-
posed constitution are similar to those which can be offered 
1. Maciver, Art.(l938), 61. 
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against international union. It was maintained against the 
adoption of the proposed plan of union that the geographical 
size of the United States was too large; that individual 
state sovereignty would be diminished; and that a national 
sovereign would be established which v.ould be a step toward 
tyranny.1 
These arguments offered by the opponents of the pro-
posed plan of union were satisfactorily answered by the writ-
ers or The Federalist. It was maintained by the writers of 
The Federalist that a republican form of government would 
operate more efficiently in an extended sphere. 2 Why could 
not this principle be applied to international union?3 To 
the question of the diminution of state authority the writers 
of The Federalist maintained that legislating for states in 
their collective capacities was a cardinal error.4 The na-
tional gpvernment should receive its authority from the peo-
ple, and exten:l its authority to the people. Could this 
same republican idea be applied to international union? 
This is perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the 
adoption of a satisfactory plan of world union. In any plan 
where the member nations are dealt with in their collective 
capacities the same consequences will occur which have been 
the experience of federal governments, both ancient and mod-
ern. 
1. 
2. 
4· 
In my opinion the principles of republicanism advocated 
FED(l5), 88-89; (15), 92; (16), 99; (31), 192; (14), 79-85. 
FED(lO), 58-62. . 3. See Cousins 1 MMIO, 53. FED(23), 143; {16), 95; (18), 107; (23), 155; ll5}, 89; 
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by the writers of The Federalist are applicable to world un-
ion. The problem is to prepare the people of the world to 
want a world union based on the republican idea as contained 
in The Federalist. The League of Nations was similar to the 
Articles of Confederation in dealing with states in their 
collective capacities, and so is the United Nations Organi-
zation. 
Ranney makes the following observation: 
The American precedent is not a completely 
discouraging one ••• However, these positive 
forces are confronted by stronger obstacles 
than the colonists ever had to face, in the 
form of nationalism, cultural and political 
diversity, and economic interests which 
profit by disunion ••• There has been no tra-
dition of union like that of the colonies 
under the British empire, and there has 
been no. collective enterprise so intense in 
character as the fighting of the Revolution. 
Under the circumstances it would be naive to 
suppose that the world is ready for its Con-
stitution; but it is not so fantastic, per-
haps, to think that parts of it are getti~ 
ready for their Articles of Confederation. 
The writers of The Federalist maintained with regard 
to the question of the possible emergence of a national sov-
ereign that the system of checks and balances would prevent 
such an occurrence. 2 The fact that the people would always 
be in control of the government would prevent the emergence 
of a national sovereign.3 And the compound relationship be-
tween the states and the federal government would prevent it.4 
(17)' 101; (15)' 91-92. 
Rann&yt Art.(l946}, 34-35. 2. FED(47), 313-315. 
FED(lOJ, 61-62. 
FED(51), 339; {31), 197; (32), 194; (62), 451; (32), 194. 
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Would not these deterrents to the emergence of a sovereign 
be just as effective in the event of international union? 
If the "extended sphere" idea be correct, the arguments main-
tained by the writers of The Federalist would work better in 
a case of world union than in a limited sphere like the 
United States. 
6. Concept of Human Nature 
The task of analyzing man as a political being is as 
old as the science of politics. A study of man as a member 
of society necessarily involves a view of man's nature. It 
can be said of the writers of The Federalist that they did 
two things in developing a social philosophy. To begin with 
they made an observation of man's nature. Next they sought 
to build their views of republicanism on the basis of what 
they had observed. To construct a social philosophy in any 
other way would be to court irrelevancy. A consideration of 
the concept of human nature presented by the writers of The 
Federalist raises two questions. What was their concept? 
And, what bearing did it have on their political views? 
Two sides of human nature are emphasized. Madison re-
minds us of this in Essay Number 55. 
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind 
which requires a certain degree of circum-
spection and distrust, so there are other 
qualities in human nature which justify a 
certain portion of esteem and confidence. 
Republican government presupposes the ex-
istence of these qualities in a higher de-
- - -- - - -- --~-----
gree than any other form. Were the pic-
tures which have been drawn by the polit-
ical jealousy of some among us faithful 
·likenesses of the human -character, the 
inference would be, that there is not suf-
ficient virtue among men for s elf-govern-
Ill3n t; and that nothing less than the chains 
of despotism can restrain them fro~de­
stroying and devouring one another. 
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Hamilton in another instanc~ of emphasis upon man's depraved 
state describes him as "ambitious, vindictive, and rapa-
cious. n 2 A problem of the au thor s of The Federalist was to 
explain a means of controlling man's depravity. 
In a discussion of the division of powers in the pro-
posed government Madison wrote: 
It may be a reflection on human nature, 
that such devices should be necessary to 
control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself, but the great-
est of all reflections on human nature? 
If men were angels, no government would 
be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary. 
In form.ing a government; which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: You mus·t first 
enable the government to control the gov~ 
erned; and in t~e next place oblige it to 
control itself. 
Again, a recurring theme in The Federalist is that 
"the principal task of modern legisla tion"4 is the regula-
tion of various and interfering interests or factions. But 
"the latent causes of faction are ••• sown in the nature of 
man. n5 
1. FED(55}, 365. 
2. FED(6), · 27. 
3. FED(51), 337. 
4· FED(lO); 56. 
5 • FED ( 10) , 55 • 
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On the other hand the claim is made that man is cap-
able of self-government. These views are not inconsistent. 
It is evident that no other form would be 
reconcilable with the genius of the people 
of America; with the fundamental principles 
of the Revolution; or with that honorable 
determination which animates every votary 
of freedom, to rest all our political ex-
periments on the capacity of mankind for 
self-government. If the plan of the con-
vention, therefore, be found to depart from 
tbe republican character, its advocates 1 must abandon it as no longer defensible. 
As well as recognizing the irrational side of man's nature, 
the authors of The Federalist were aware of man's power for 
rational self-determination. 2 
There is a rational and an irrational side of human 
natU['e. How did this affect the political views of the writ-
ers of The Federalist? They concluded that a repUblican 
form of government provided the best control of the factious 
spirit in man. J It should be said that the idea of the to-
tal depravity of man's political nature is not proclaimed in 
The Federalist. Madison was aware of two conflicting views 
of human nature out of which political parties commonly de-
vel op. 
According to one view the masses of men are 
slavish, licentious, ignorant, greedy, and 
incapable of discerning their true interests, 
much less the interests of the whole people. 
This theory is the basis of the ·aristocrat-
i c , or anti-republican, parties. On the 
other hand, there is the theory of the dem-
1~ FED(39); 243. 
2. FED(70), 457. -see also (77), 502. 
J. FED(lO), 53-62. 
.. 
ocratic or republican element, according to 
which the generality of mankind have at 
least sufficient wisdom and patriotism to 
be reasonably capa ble of self-government. 
Through enlightenment and awakening of th.rir 
noble instincts they may be made more so. 
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Madison associated himself with the latter view. Yet; this 
was not to be identified with a belief in the inherent good-
ness of man. The purpose of government remained "the cor-
rection of the evil propensities of man's nature."2 And these 
"evil propensities" were best controlled in a republican form 
of government which extended its authority to the people. 
Madison in the discussion of factions in Essay Number 
10 maintained "that neither moral nor religious motives can 
be relied on as an adequate control. n3 True as his state-
ment may be, neither can a mere form of government be relied 
on as an adequate control; although, let it be admitted, a 
good form of government is of tremendous value in this regard. 
Madison coUld well have observed that man has redeemable 
qualities. The combination of Christian love and reason 
forms the human "compound" which will permit the true prin-
ciples of republicanism to be established, not on parchments 
alone, but in the minds and hearts of men. 
?. Summary 
The republican form of government advocated in The 
1. Burns, JMP, 31-32. This quotation is a good summary of 
a view given by Madison in an article in 1792. See Hunt 
(ed.); w~, VI, 115-118. 
2. Burns, JMP, 33. J. FED(lO), 58. 
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Federalist was based on the assumption that the American 
people were capable of self-government. It was to receive 
its authority from the people and extend its authority to 
the people. The authority invested in the general govern-
ment througn adoption of the Constitution was to be the su-
prene law of the land and interpreted as such by the courts. 
Through an arrangement of a division of powers be-
tween the branches of the government any usurpation of power 
by any one branch was forestalled. This arrangement of 
functions of the several branches of government was seen as 
the most suitable remedy for the evil of factions. 
The best form of republican government is one that is 
neither wholly national nor wholly federal. It is partly 
both. 
Hamilton and Madison defended the proposed plan of 
government adopted by the Philadelphia Convention. It was a 
better plan than either of them had recommended to the Con-
vention. It was not what they had asked for. It was all 
they could get. It seems that history has shown it to be a 
better plan than either of them knew, or desired. 
Nothing short of the principles of republicanism as 
proclaimed in The F-ederalist will ever serve as an adequate 
basis for a lasting international union. 
Human nature is divided into rational and irrational 
sides. The principal task of governnent is to guide the ra-
tional to control the irrational. A republican form of gov-
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ernment is best adapted to accomplishing this purpose. 
The next chapter will contain a summary of the fore-
going study with an account of the conclusions reached. It 
will conclude this examination of the social philosophy of 
The Federalist. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
1. Account of Authorship 
The essays which comprise The Federalist appeared 
originally as newspaper articles in New York's Independent 
Journ~l and The New York Packet. They began appearing seri-
ally in the Independent Journal on October 27, 1787. They 
made their first appearance in a collected edition in the 
spring of 1788. They were published by J. and A. M'Lean, 
who were the publishers of the Independent Journal. The 
first volume was published March 22, 1788, and Volume 2 was 
published May 28 of the same year. 
The essays as they appeared in the Independent Journal 
and The New York Packet were written under the anonymous name 
Publius. In the first collected edition of these essays the 
name Publius was again given as the author. It was not until 
some years later that the authors were known to have been 
Hamilton, Madison and Jay. These men had confided to some 
of their friends that they had participated in writing these 
essays. No public account of the particular part that each 
of the authors had played in writing the essays was given un-
til Hamilton left an account of the authorship in Judge Ben-
son's office a day or two before he met his tragic death. 
Not much attention was given to this account of the 
authorship until the publication of Delaplaine's Repository 
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of the Lives and Portraits of Distinguished American Charac-
ters in 1816. Prior to the publication of this book by Dela-
plaine, some of the friends of the authors had solicited 
their interest in making public an account of the part they 
had played in writing these essays. After the publication 
of Delaplaine's book, friends of Madison took issue with the 
claim that Hamilton had written most of the essays. Madison 
took no part in the controversy until after his tenure of 
office as President of the United States. 
It was in 1818. that Madison's account of the author-
ship of The Federalist was made public in the Gideon edition 
of The Federalist. Madison's account differed from the ac-
count given by Hamilton in the Benson list. In the Benson 
list Hamilton had credited Jay with writing Essays Numbers 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 54; Madison with Essays Numbers 10, 14, and 37 
to 48 inclusive; Hamilton and Madison jointly with 18, 19, 
and 20; and Hamilton with all the rest. Discovery of the 
manuscript of Essay Number 64 in Jay's own handwriting dis-
pelled any doubt that Jay wrote Essay Number 64 instead of 
Essay Number 54, as had been stated by Hamilton in the Benson 
list. 
Madison made the claim in his account of the author-
ship of The Federalist that he had written Essays Numbers 10, 
14, 18, 19, 20, 37 to 58 inclusive, 62 and 63; and that Ham-
ilton had written the remainder. Madison stated in a foot-
note to Essay Number 18 in the Gideon edition of The Feder-
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alist that he and Hamilton discovered that they were both 
engaged in writing Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20. It was 
further discovered that Hamil ton had :prepared only a small 
amount of material to write these essays, and that Madison 
had :prepared a much larger amount of material. Hamilton gave 
to Madison the notes he had :prepared to write these essays, 
and tbe essays went to press at the hand of Madison. There 
is no evidence to substantiate either the claim that Hamil-
ton participated in writing Essays Numbers 18, 19, and 20, 
or that much of the material, if any, which he gave to Madi-
son was used. 
The question which had to be answered was ·: this: Did 
Madison write Essays Numbers 49 to 58 inclusive and Essays 
Numbers 62 and 63, or did Hamilton write them? It was shown 
in this study that the available internal and external evi-
dence makes clear the conclusion that Madison wrote these 
disputed essays instead of Hamilton. 
Why the importance of reaching a conclusion with regard 
to the authorship of these disputed essays? Some have dis-
posed of this dispute by assigning joint authorship in cases 
or doubt, or by dismissing the question or authorship alto-
gether. It was held in this study, however, to be of great 
importance to establish, if possible, the authorship of each 
essay. In no other way, it was held, would it be :possible 
to give an account either of the thought contained in The Fed-
eralist or the sources of that thought. Of course, it would 
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be possible without a discuss ion of this dispute over au thor-
ship to present what is contained in The Federalist, but a 
correct account of the authorship of the individual essays 
was deemed essential to an understanding of what the indi-
vidual authors actually believed and what the background of 
their thought was. This was considered necessary in order 
thoroughly to understand the views of republicanism contain-
ed in The Federalist. 
On the basis of the data which was examined, the fol-
lowing conclusion seems to be well established: The correct 
account of the authorship of The Federalist is as follows: 
Essays Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 were written by Jay; Es-
says Numbers 10, 14, 18-20 inclusive, 37-58 inclusive, 62 
and 63 by Madison; and all the others by Hamilton. 
2. Creativity of Madison 
Madison made a detailed study of the history of fed-
eral government. No one in America or anywhere else in the 
world was credited with having selected as splendid a library 
as had Madison on the principles which were basic to the 
establishment of a federal government. Not only was be fa-
miliar with the history of governments which were held to 
have been either federal or republican in nature, he was also 
familiar with the history of political thought. 
It is not possible to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that Madison was deeply indebted to any political thinker who 
206 
preceded him, but it is reasonable to assume that Madison 
was thoroughly familiar with the thought of the most out-
standing ones. It is probable that he was fairly well ac-
quainted with the thought of Plato and Aristotle on the sub-
ject of politics, if not from primary sources, certainly 
from secondary accounts of the thought of these men. It is 
also highly probable that Madison was familiar with the po-
litical thought of Harrington, Hobbes, Locke, and beyond any 
doubt familiar with Montesquieu. It also seems clear that 
Madison was acquainted with Vattel, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, 
and Bynkershoek. 
But in none of the precedents which were the models 
of republican and federal governments of the past could Mad-
ison find anything suitable for the genius of the people of 
the American states. Assisted as he may have been by the 
thought of political philosophers who went before him, he 
could discover no blueprint for the form of republicanism 
which was advocated in The Federalist. There were aspects 
of the views on republicanism presented in The Federalist 
which were profoundly new. These new a$Pects centered in 
the views concerning the division of sovereignty. The re-
publicanism .of The Federalist not only received its authority 
from the people; it extended its authority to the people. 
It was partly federal and partly national. It was national 
in that certain powers . were given to the central government. 
It was federal in that certain defined powers were left to 
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the individual states. 
There was a separation of powers in the organ of the 
national government which forbade any one of the major di-
visions of the government to usurp power. The Constitution, 
through the power delegated to it by the people themselves, 
acting through their states as political societies, came to 
be understood as the supreme law of the land and was to be 
so interpreted by the courts of the land. 
There was no precedent for this arrangement of a cen-
tral government, either in political thought or in actual 
historical precedent. The following conclusion is therefore 
warranted: Although Madison possessed a thorough knowledge 
of the history of federal government and of the theory of 
society, he was creative in his construction of the principles 
of republican government and was not strictly obligated to 
any particular person's thought or any particular precedent 
of republican government. 
3. A Prize of Compromise 
Hamilton and Madison went to the Philadelphia Conven-
tion possessed of ideas with regard to what the new plan of 
government should be like which were different than the 
ideas contained in the plan which was finally adopted. Mad-
ison went to the Philadelphia Conve~tion with the Virginia 
plan in mind. Although this was different in some respects 
from the plan, which was finally adopted, it was much more 
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analogous to the plan which was adopted than the one which 
Hamilton took to the Convention. 
Madison preferred to weaken the authari ty of the State 
governments and establish great authority in the national 
government. He desired that the national government receive 
its authority from the people and extend its authority to 
the people. Much of this general idea was adopted by the 
Philadelphia Convention. 
Hamilton, on the other hand, was interested in estab-
lishing a strong national government at the expense of the 
State governm9nts by creating a national government which had 
the authority to extend a permanent will over the States as 
well as over the people. He was interested in establishing 
a strong-souled government with the President and members of 
the Senate to serve for the duration of their lives. Hamil-
ton distrusted the States and the people as agents of strong 
powers, but he returned to the Philadelphia Convent ion to 
accept what the framers of the new Constitution had produced. 
He believed it to be muoh better than the Articles of Confed-
eration, and he gave heart and soul to making it a reality. 
The years immediately follow-ing the adoption of the 
new Constitution made it olear that interpretations of the 
·new government were made on a strict construction basis or 
a broad construction basis, depending on the end whioh was 
to be achieved. It seems olear that the Constitution adopt-
ed at the Philadelphia Convention and the principles of re-
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publicanism enunciated in The Federalist are better than 
either Hamilton or Madison had presented to the Philadelphia 
Convention and, perhaps, better than they knew. 
4. Views of Democracy 
By democracy the authors of The Federalist meant a 
system in which the people gathered in person to perform the 
duties of government. There were no elected representatives 
or delegated authority; the people simply met and acted in 
concert. They were strictly opposed to this form of govern-
ment. They thought it would result in anarchy, and instead 
of being a remedy for the factious spirit in man, would only 
serve to extend and agitate the factious spirit. 
Yet, in spite of the authors' rejection of a pure de-
mocracy as a suitable form of government, it must be held 
that the principles of republicanism supported in The Feder-
alist have aided tbe growth of the most distinguished democ-
racy of his tory. 
5. Union is Preferable 
The survey of the history of republican and federal 
governments made by the writers of The Federalist enabled 
them to understand some of the reasons why the different in-
terests of men had been inadequately controlled. The forms 
of those governments were not sufficient means of controlling 
the conflicting interests of men. They either dealt with 
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states in their corporate capacities, or they did not re-
ceive their authority from the people, or they did not ex-
tend their authority to the people. They were ill adapted 
to meeting the needs of men in their social community. It 
therefore became the purpose of the writers of The Federalist 
to construct a form of republicanism which would be able to 
cope with the political needs of men. 
It was discovered that a union based on the republican 
principle which extended its authority to the people and could 
be interpreted as the supreme law of the land, while at the 
same time being charac t erized by a division of sovereignty, 
best served as a remedy to the evils incident to social com-
munity. 
6. Possibility of International Union 
No plan of international union which has been entered 
into by the major nations of the earth has had a sufficient 
likeness to the plan of national union adopted by the Phil-
adelphia Convention. All of them, and specific reference is 
made to the League of Nations and the United Nations organiz-
ation, have been in their natures more akin to the historic 
federations which the writers of The Federalist found to be 
unacceptable. 
The salient shortcoming has been that they have dealt 
with nations as corporate states. No plan of international 
union has received its authority from the peoples of the 
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world, nor has one of them ever extended its authority to 
the individual citizens of the different countries. Plans 
of international union have, therefore, been powerless to 
exercise sufficient and necessary power. The conclusion was 
reached that the principles of republicanism as revealed in 
The Federalist seem adequate as a basis for a satisfactory 
world union. 
?. Economic Basis of Politics 
The authors of The Federalist were cognizant of the: 
role played by economics in shaping man's political societies. 
Madison, in Essay Number 10, is credited by many as giving a 
classic discussion of the economic basis of social community. 
It is irrefutable that there exists an economic man. 
To deny this fact would be to take a flight into a world un-
known to man. As long as people live on the earth, there is 
no possibility of their escaping being affected by economics. 
Madison delineated man as a political animal, and it was 
necessary as a part of honest observation to see man as an 
economic being. 
Yet it would be inaccurate to conclude from this that 
Madison gave a classic interpretation of the economic deter-
mination of history. Beard, who first made popular the 
view that the American Constitution was an economic document, 
later repudiated all determinism in history. He did not 
repudiate the economic side of man, but he did see the force 
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of ideas and ideals as well as other forces at work. Like-
wise, it can be said of Madison that his ideas on republican-
ism and his belief in the capacity of man for self-government 
transcended any merely economic interpretation of history. 
B. View of Human Nature 
The writers of The Federalist interpreted man as hav-
ing a depraved nature. He was unreliable, selfish, greedy, 
"vindictive and rapacious." They also believed that man was 
capable of rational self-determination. As members of social 
communities the depraved nature of men needed to be checked. 
In their opinion it was the task of government to 
regulate itself in such a way that the conflicting interests 
of men would be controlled. They reached the conclusion that 
tbe factious spirit in human beings could be most ideally 
handled under the form. of republicanism as portrayed in ~ 
Federalist. They presented a dualistic conception of human 
nature. 
THESES 
1. The correct account of the authorship of The Fed-
eralist is as follows: Essays Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 
were written by Jay; Essays Numbers 10, 14, 18-20 inclusive, 
37-58 inclusive, 62 and 63 by Madison; all of the others by 
Hamilton. 
2. Although Madison possessed a thorough knowledge 
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of the history of federal government and of the theory of 
society, he was creative in his construction of the principles 
of republican government and was not strictly obligated to 
any particular person's thought, or any particular precedent 
of republican government. 
). Hamilton and Madison contended for a form of re-
publicanism in The Federalist that was better than they had 
recommended to the Philadelphia Convention, or perhaps, even 
.knew. 
4. The principles of republicanism supported in The 
Federalist, in ~ite of the authors' disavowal or a pure de-
mocracy, have aided the gravth of the most distinguished de-
mocracy of history. 
5. Union based on the republican principle is pref-
erable to any other form of government because it serves as 
a remedy to the evils incident to social community. 
6. The principles of republicanism as revealed in 
The Federalist seem adequate as a basis for a satisfactory 
world union. 
7. Although Madison was aware of the bearing of ec-
onomics on political life, The Federalist cannot be satis-
factorily understood on the basis of a purely economic in-
terpretation. 
8. A dualistic conception of human nature is present-
ed in The Federalist. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate 
the social philosophy of The Federalist. The research is 
made on the assumption that social philosophy deals with 
all aspects of social cormnunity, including that of politi-
cal philosophy. This study will be historical only in so 
far as it is necessary to furnish an accurate background of 
the principles of social community. 
The Federalist may be understood as (1) a study of 
the principles of true republicanism and the relevance of 
these principles to the American situation of 1788-1789; 
( 2) an expos it ion of the proposed plan of union adopted by 
the Philadelphia Convention which has served ever since as 
a con~entary on that plan. This investigation is concerned 
with The Federalist as a study in principles of republicanism. 
In order to determine the thought of the contributors 
to The Federalist it is first of all necessary to adopt a 
point of view with regard to the disputed au thor ship of some 
of the individual essays. An analysis of relevant material 
shows that the view held by E. G. Bourne and Douglass Adair-
is correct; namely, that Madison's list of authors as print-
ed in the Gideon edition of The Federalist is accurate. The 
correct account, then, of tbe authorship of The Federalist 
is as follows: Essays Number s 2, 3, 4, 5, and 64 were writ-
ten by Jay; Essays Numbers 10, 14, 18-20 inclusive, 37-58 in-
clusive, 62 and 63 by Madison; and all of the others by Hamilton. 
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An investigation of tbe som·ces of The Federalist is 
required to determine what influenced the formation of the 
ideas held by its writers with regard to tbe principles of 
republican government. Madison collected the most extensive 
library known on the history of federal government and on 
the principles of federal government. He was probably the 
most learned person of his day on the subject of federal 
government. Also Hamilton read extensively on many different 
subjects and he, too, was learned in the history of federal 
government. The thinking of these men on the subject of the 
principles of federal government cannot, however, be traced 
to particular sources. They did not depend exclusively on 
any one source. There were no adequate precedents in the his-
tory of federal government which could serve as a model for 
the American states. But the study Hamilton and Madison made 
in the his tory of federal government was profitable in that · 
they learned what constituted the mistakes of the federal re-
publics which had existed in the past. Neither were there 
any precedents in the theory of republicanism from which Ham-
il ton and Madison could model their thinking. This was 
especially true of Madison, since he was more interested in 
republicanism than Hamilton and more thoroughly acquainted 
with it. Hamil ton, though he supported the proposed plan of 
union, was interested in seeing a government established 
among the states similar to that of Great Britain. 
What reasons are given in support of the proposed plan 
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of union? The citizens of the United States had undergone 
an "unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the sub-
sisting federal government," namely, that based on the 
Articles of Confederation. The major grievance was the im-
potence of the federal government. It could not collect 
taxes. It could not fulfill obligations. It could not con-
trol the factious elements incident to any government. The 
writers of The Federalist maintained that a plan of union 
based on the republican principle would offer the most satis-
factory remedy to the imperfections of the existing govern-
ment. It would be able to e x tend its authority to the indi-
vidual citizens of the nation instead of having to deal with 
the states in their collective capacities. Madison's stuiy 
of the history of federal government had led him to the con-
clusion that it is a fatal mistake for a republican form of 
governrr.ent to be based on the idea that the authorit·y of the 
national governroont should be directed to the states in their 
collective capacities rather than to the individual citizens. 
In their emphasis on the republic an nature of the new plan of 
gover~nt it may be held that the writers of The Federalist 
stressed too much the defects of the existing form of govern-
ment • 
A plan of union, the writers of The Federalist main-
tained, based on the republican principle after the manner 
of the plan proposed by the Philadelphia Convention would be 
able to make secure the liberties of the people. The danger 
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of hostilities from abroad would be removed. The federal 
government would be able to cope with dissensions among the 
states. In the event of union most of such dissensions 
would vanish. Commerce would be strengthened by union. 
A sys tern of sound revenue could be established. The opera-
tion of government would be less expensive. Union affords 
a more efficient administration. It affords a uniform fed-
eral policy and a uniform interpretation of treaties and 
national laws. Union based on the republic an principle is 
preferable because it offers a remedy for the evils incident 
to social community. 
What kind of union was advocated by the writers of 
The Federalist? In the absence of adequate precedents they 
resorted to principles of republican government. These prin-
ciples were that the government should receive its authority 
from the people and extend its authority to the people • The 
government should be administered by people who hold their 
offices for a limited time or during good behavior. No titles 
of nobility are allowed. 
A republican form of government is guaranteed the state 
goverrlill:lnts. The power surrendered by the people is divided 
between two dis tine t governrne nt s, and then that which is allot-
ted to each is subdivided among distinct and separate depart-
n:e nt s. This affords a double security to the rights of the 
people. As Madison maintained, "The different governments 
will control each other, at the same time that each will be 
controlled by it self." The purpose of the application of the 
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principle of the separation of pONers is to render every de-
partment and division of government a check on the others. 
The application of thi s principle so as to affect "a con-
stituent division of sovereignty" was a new development in 
republ ic an government. 
The pl a n of republicanism adopted by the Philadelphia 
Convention and defended in The Federalist was different from 
any of the plans presented to the Convention. It was also 
better than either Harnil ton or Madison knew or wanted. Al-
t hough Hamilton argued for the plan, he did not trust repub-
licanism and wanted a government with a stronger will. Madi-
son regretted ever having maintained that where an end is de-
sired the means are justified. His defence of nthe necessary 
and proper clause" caused him much embarrassment. 
Although it has been accurately claimed that Madison 
gave clear expression to the economic basis of politics, it 
would be inaccurate to maintain that he believed in the eco-
nomic determination of history. 
The writers of The Federalist emphasized the partial 
depravity of man. They understood the causes of faction to 
arise from man's nature. But they also acknowledged the pos-
sibility of his rational self-determination. Although the 
causes of faction cannot be removed because they arise from 
man's nature, tm effects of faction can be controlled under 
a republican form of government which, by extending the sphere 
of its influence, can render the factious elements ineffec-
tual. Madison's republican faith was that the rational could 
overcome the irrational. 
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Are the principles of republicanism supported by the 
writers of The Federalist applicable to international union? 
It is held in this investigation that they are suitable, put 
it is unlikely that the people of the world are ready to 
live under an international republican form of government. 
THESES 
1. The correct account of the authorship of The Fed-
eralist i s as follows: Essays Numbers 2, J, 4, 5, and 64 
were written by Jay; Essays Nwnbers 10, 14, 18-20 inclusive, 
37-58 inclusive, 62 and 63 by Madison; all of the others by 
Hamilton. 
2. Madison not only possessed a thorough knowledge 
of the his tory of federal government and of the theory of 
society, but he was also creative in his construction of the 
principles of republic an government and was not s trio tly ob-
ligated to any particular person's thought, or any particular 
precedent of republican government. 
3. Hamilton and Madison defended a form of republican-
ism in The Federalist that was better tban they had recommend-
ed to the Philadelphia Convention, or, perhaps, even knew. 
4. In spite of the:ir disavowal of a pure democracy, 
the authors of The Federalist supported the principles of re-
publicanism . which have aided the growth of the most distin-
guished democracy of history. 
5. Union based on the republican principle is prefer-
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able to any other form of government because it serves as a 
remedy to the evils incident to social community. 
6. Although Madison was aware of the bearing of eco-
nomics on political life, The Federalist cannot be satis-
factorily understood on the basis of a purely economic in-
terpretation. 
7. While the writers of The Federalist recognized a 
depraved state in man, they also acknowledged the possibility 
of his rational self-determination. Man's rational affirma-
tion of himself can best be achieved under a republican form 
of government • 
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